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ABSTRACT 
Old fashioned, centralised and bureaucratic systems of natural resources management have 
been blamed for the failure to conserve forest resources. Such arrangements are alleged to 
result in top-down decision making processes, low levels of community participation, and 
lack of transparency. These criticisms have led to claims that the devolution of forest 
management to the community will improve resource management and more effectively 
deliver sustainable development.  The devolution from the state to local communities of 
natural resource management access rights has been an important policy tool for forest 
management over the last several decades.   
This research examines to what extent, and how, decentralized forest governance delivers 
enhanced economic, social and environmental benefits. More specifically this study develops 
and tests a framework to assess how devolved forest governance performs across the 
indicators of participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. 
A set of policy relevant and locally applicable governance indicators was developed through 
a participatory process that involved a large number of stakeholders including CFUG 
members and policy makers. To explore this topic, the study combines a single case study of 
devolved forest governance in Nepal with a medium-n research design of perceptions of 
community forestry operations  in nine community forest user groups from three districts 
representing three different Nepalese ecological zones. A purposive sampling method was 
used to select CFUGs with different characteristics and CFUG members' opinions were 
collected using both qualitative and quantitative approaches.  
The study reveals that the key elements and indicators of governance are dialectically 
interconnected. Governance performance on one element and associated indicators shapes the 
iv 
outcome of other elements and indicators. Community forests located in the Middle Hills and 
High Mountains regions of Nepal generally perform well across the various governance 
indicators used, while a lower level of performance was observed in Terai region. However 
the research finds that ecological zone is not a determining factor of good governance; 
instead, socio-economic factors are found to shape the success of community forestry 
governance and outcomes. In addition, the research reveals that external agencies actually 
enhance community forest governance and outcomes as a result of synergy, interaction and 
cross-fertilization of knowledge between community forestry participants, government 
officials and other stakeholders. It is also the case that the better a community forest is 
governed, the more it flourishes and the wealthier it becomes. However, the distribution of 
the wealth and capital generated by a community forest remains a concern as the benefits are 
not being shared with the wider community. 
The research highlights the need to build the capacity of community forest users and, 
especially, to empower poor and disadvantaged people to ensure they obtain access to and are 
able to utilise the available resources. By developing an innovative framework to assess 
governance at local level, this study not only informs us about decentralised community 
forestry in Nepal, but the framework can also be utilised to assess community-based natural 
resource management initiatives in other developing countries. 
 
Keywords: 
Decentralisation, good governance, community forestry, community forest user groups, 
participation, transparency, accountability, Nepal
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GLOSSARY OF NEPALI TERMS 
Ban Janch Adda  Forest Inspection Office Birta 
Birta  A grant of land to a noble as a reward for a service rendered to the state. 
This led to the emergence of Birta land tenure. It was usually both tax free 
and heritable, and had no set time limit. It was valid until it was recalled or 
confiscated 
Dalits Lower caste groups 
Guthi Endowment of land or other property for a religious or philanthropic 
purpose 
Jagir A grant of land to a government employee (civil or military) in lieu of 
salary.  
Kipat Ancient type of communal land tenure, applied to both cultivated and 
forested land. Under this system, a community had communal tenure. On 
kipat land, the community (community leader) used to give individuals the 
right to till certain areas and to collect forest products from other areas. 
Mukhiya Local leader 
Muluki Ain First legal code of Nepal promulgated in 1854 by order of the first Rana 
Prime Minister of Nepal 
Rana The hereditary dynasty of Rana Prime Ministers who ruled in Nepal from 
1846 to 1950 
Talukdar Talukdar was responsible to collect land tax for the state and also had the 
responsible for controlling access to the forests and for distributing forest 
products. This position was abolished after the end of the Rana regime in 
the 1950s 
Tamang Ethnic group 
Tole The smallest unit of settlement: a number of toles constitute a village 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The term ‘decentralization’ is central to community development and the transfer of power 
from central government to local people. Over the past few decades, decentralization of forest 
management has become a common policy in developing countries.  Decentralization and 
devolution policies in forestry sector are purportedly aimed at increasing community 
participation in planning and decision making about forest resources affecting local 
livelihoods (Larson and Soto, 2008; Ravikumar et al., 2013). Since the 1980s, there has been 
an increasing interest, worldwide, in the potential of local participation in forest management 
to contribute to efficient service provision, environmental stability, and poverty reduction 
(Pokharel and Tiwari, 2013). In order to improve equity and justice for community groups, 
international organisations, government authorities and civil society organization have now 
backed Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM). Many developing 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America now claim to be decentralising at least some 
components of their natural resource management approaches (Larson, 2005).  In many cases 
decentralization can improve financial and administrative efficiency, foster local-level 
democracy, and generate a more equitable distribution of benefits (the latter mainly promoted 
by international donors) (Conyers, 2003; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Resosudarmo, 2005). It can 
also promote the rights of local people (Larson et al., 2010), reduce costs and increase 
revenues (Colfer, 2005).  While the decentralization of power to manage forest resources 
around the world is moving ahead at a rapid pace, the implications for forests and forest 
dependent communities can be positive or negative depending on how the decentralisation is 
occurring in practice (Colfer et al., 2008).  In the Asia-Pacific region forestry decentralization 
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continues to be a work in progress and Nepal is a good example of forest decentralization 
through a series of Community Forestry (CF) policies and practices (Agrawal, 2010; 
Pokharel et al., 2012; Pokharel and Tiwari, 2013). 
 
1.2 COMMUNITY FORESTRY  
 
There is increasing recognition in developing countries that forest resources cannot be 
sustainably managed without the active involvement of local communities. In recent years, a 
growing movement has emerged that addresses concerns about forestry management via the 
active involvement of local communities and other stakeholders and which encourages the 
sharing of indigenous knowledge and the benefits of the forests (Thoms, 2008). Nurse and 
Malla (2006) claim that at least 22% of the total forest area is being managed legally under 
community management systems in developing countries and this figure has increased in 
recent years. Although the concept and practice of community forestry (CF) emerged mainly 
in developing countries, there has been some diffusion to industrialized nations (White and 
Martin 2002). CF is a primarily a forest-based activity where the local communities have the 
fundamental role in protecting and managing forest resources either directly or through 
management systems that are accountable to the community through representatives selected 
by them (Wicklund, 1993; Agrawal, 2010; Pokharel et al., 2012; Pokharel and Tiwari, 2013). 
Nepal is considered as a global leader in CF (World Bank, 2001; MFSC, 2013). In most 
cases, local community groups will only manage their forests well if it is in their economic 
and social interests to do so (Roberts and Gautam, 2003). This means that the policies that are 
developed and the practices that occur must be community-oriented, with the community in 
charge of decision making and in receipt of most of the benefits (Brown et al., 2002).  The 
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practice of CF, understood as the ‘devolution’ of power from forest agencies to the local 
community, 1 creates opportunities for poor and disadvantaged forest dwellers to participate in 
forest management. Properly managed, a forest commons can play a crucial role in delivering 
multiple benefits such as community cohesion, local livelihoods, carbon sequestration, and 
biodiversity conservation (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2008). CF essentially cuts across three 
layers of governance and operates at the (i) micro- (local, community) level; at the (ii) meso- 
(district or provincial) level; and at the (iii) macro- (national) level (Pokharel et al., 2002). 
Therefore, CF policy is a good example of decentralised forest governance. 
 
1.3 DECENTRALISATION AND FOREST GOVERNANCE 
 
Decentralization is often viewed as a potential means of promoting ‘good forest governance’ 
that is more participatory, adaptative, responsive, equitable and efficient to local needs, 
especially those of the poor and marginalised groups of society (Suryanta et al., 2003; Bene 
et al., 2009).  An effective democratic form of governance relies on ‘public participation’, 
‘accountability’, and ‘transparency’. Participation is the involvement of citizens and 
stakeholders in decision making, either directly or through legitimate intermediaries 
representing their interests. Responsibility, on the other hand, is the requirement that actors 
occupying positions of authority account for their actions and decisions. Finally, transparency 
refers to the clarity and free flow of information enabling all members to access, understand 
and monitor processes, institutions and information. However, some scholars argue that 
active involvement of local communities is not always a prerequisite for launching a 
decentralization program (see Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001 for example). However, local 
                                                                
1
The transfer of responsibility and authority over natural resources from the state to non-governmental bodies.  
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actors must be actively engaged once a program is launched. Suryanta et al. (2003) argue that 
rapid tropicaldeforestation and degradation in developing countries have compelled decision 
makers to adopt these policies, which are designed not only to protect the forest resource but 
also to support the livelihoods of local people. Decentralised and good forest governance are 
expected to make local communities and forest groups more independent and build their 
legitimacy – the latter considered a critical element to enhancing their governing capacity. 
However decentralisation does not always result in better outcomes and the policy is not free 
from criticism (Ravikumar et al., 2013). 
 
1.4 RESEARCH RATIONALE  
 
CF is now a widely researched and studied program including in Nepal and therefore a large 
literature is available dealing with various aspects of CF. Within this literature, the Nepalese 
model of CF is identified as one of the most successful government programs and Nepal is 
recognised as a global leader in community forestry (World Bank, 1999; Shreshtha, 2003).  
Despite many positive outcomes, however, CF in Nepal has faced increasing challenges, 
limitations and shortcomings, particularly in implementation and many of these issues are 
associated with governance (Bhatta and Gentle, 2004;  Dhital et al., 2004; Maharjan et al., 
2004;  Pokharel and Niraula,  2004; Sharma and Acharya, 2004; Giri, 2005; Ojha et al., 2009; 
Maraseni et al., 2014). While it is evident from this literature that local communities are 
participating actively in protecting and managing forest, concerns have been raised that 
effective participation in decision-making is often lacking because those in charge do not 
represent the diversity of people’s views or take them into account when making decisions 
(Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). These concerns generate several interesting questions. Are 
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communities empowered in CF? How are decisions actually made within CFs? Are 
participants treated equally? If not, what hinders participation?  And perhaps most 
importantly, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions under which CF provides 
benefits to all members of a community?  
Very few previous studies systematically document the diverse aspects of CF governance.  
Moreover, given the widespread occurrence of a number of challenges associated with CF 
governance, the literature contains many contradictions. These contradictory findings are 
summarised in Table 1-1, and indicate there is a clear need to examine in more detail how 
decentralised forest governance works on the ground. 
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Table 1-1. Potential positive and negative effects of CF 
Criteria Positive effects of CF on forest 
structure and the communities  
Negative effects of CF on forest 
structure and communities  
Participation CF promotes participation and equity 
in management and use of forest 
resources through formalised policies 
to empower ‘backward, poverty 
stricken, and women users’ 
Marginalised groups may not receive 
their legitimate share if CF is captured 
by local elites 
Capacity CFs demonstrate capacity to manage 
the forest, make decisions and obtain 
the benefits  
Devolution does not mean that CFs 
automatically have the capacity to 
manage forest and reap the benefits 
Benefits sharing Despite differences in power, 
position, gender and/or caste, all 
users are treated equally and benefits 
are equitably shared  
Rich, male CF members  gain 
comparatively more benefits from 
community forests than poor and female 
members 
Income 
generation 
Special programs support the 
livelihoods of poor and marginalized 
groups 
Forest dependent communities are 
marginalized and become even poorer 
Transparency Decisions to spend funds are made 
collectively and financial 
transactions are transparent  
Only members of an elite make 
decisions and financial transactions are 
not transparent and revenues are misused  
Forest 
management 
Forests are better protected and 
managed for a diversity of values  
Forests are converted to plantations to 
maximize market values resulting in a 
decline in biodiversity 
Support from 
Forestry 
Department  
staff 
Role of Forestry Department staff 
changes from policing to facilitating 
community forestry 
Forestry Department has insufficient 
resources and capacity to support 
community groups  
Empowerment 
and forest 
management 
Local communities are empowered 
leading to improved forest 
management 
Local communities are not empowered 
and there is no improvement in forest 
management 
Access to basic 
forest products 
Forest users obtain extensive and 
unimpeded access to basic forest 
products for their daily use 
Forest users, especially the poor and 
marginalized, obtain limited access to 
basic products  
Biodiversity  Community forests evidence 
improved overall forest condition 
including especially the maintenance 
of biodiversity 
Community forests evidence an interest 
in commercial timber species and non-
commercial vegetation is cleared which 
decreases structural diversity 
Institutional 
innovation 
Community forestry policy 
contributes to the creation of new, 
appropriate institutional structures at 
the local level that facilitates 
downward accountability   
Institutional innovation does not occur 
and improved welfare of poor and 
marginalized group is generally lacking 
due to an absence  of downward 
accountability 
 
Sources: Shrestha, 1996;  Baral, 1999; Paudel, 1999; Varughese, 1999; World Bank, 1999; Malla, 
2000; Agarwal 2001; Ojha and Bhattarai, 2001; Ojha et al, 2002; Yadav et al., 2003; Adhikari et al., 
2004; Pokharel and Nurse, 2004; Pokharel et al., 2005; Pandey, 2007; Khadka and Schmidt-Vogt, 
2008; Ojha et al., 2009; Shrestha et al., 2010, MFSC, 2013. 
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A full account of the issues listed in Table 1-1 is provided in Section 3.2. They establish the 
context for the current research, which undertakes a detailed case study of devolved forest 
governance via CF in Nepal by examining the experiences of nine Community Forest User 
Groups (CFUG). CFUGs are community forestry membership organisations that are 
composed primarily of natural resource users.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The central research question of this thesis is: does devolved forest governance via CF deliver 
an appropriate mix of economic, social and environmental benefits to local communities? To 
answer the question, a study is undertaken of devolved forest governance in Nepal, 
examining the state’s forest polices, forest management agreements, decision making 
processes, the position of local communities and institutional arrangements. The study 
focuses on the relationships, rights and responsibilities of key actors and their perceptions of 
whether decentralised management of forest resources brings decision making closer to local 
people. More specifically, the study investigates whether community forest management is 
perceived to enhance the participation and representation of ordinary people and contribute to 
better livelihood opportunities and poverty reduction. It examines if marginalised groups are 
perceived to participate in CF constitutional and operational plan preparation and whether 
their voice is heard by elite community members.  
Central research question 
To what extent, and how, does decentralized forest governance via CF deliver 
enhanced economic, social and environmental benefits to marginalized groups?  
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Supplementary research questions 
Q1: Does decentralised forest management via CF enhance community participation 
including the participation of women and other marginalised groups? If not what are 
the barriers and how can these be overcome? To what extent are ‘marginalised 
groups’ involved in CF planning and decision making processes? How do they 
participate in these processes? (Chapter 5) 
Q2: Are CFUG policies, procedures and activities transparent to all members? What 
can be done to enhance transparency in CFUGs? (Chapter 5) 
Q3: How accountable are the actors that play a key role in managing CFs? Are they 
accountable to the users? If not, why not? (Chapter 6) 
Q4: How effective is decentralised forest management in the form of community 
forestry in delivering economic benefits? What goods and services do people obtain 
from CF and, how do they make decisions to distribute these benefits? (Chapter 6) 
Q5: To what extent is decentralised forest governance via CF efficient? (Chapter 7)   
Q6: How fair or equitable are CF benefit sharing mechanisms? Do all members obtain 
benefits equitably? (Chapter 7)   
 
1.6 ARGUMENT 
 
Those favourably disposed to community forestry argue that a decentralised or devolved 
mode of governance that is closer to the local people and community groups contains a more 
effective set of checks and balances to limit the power of government officials and elites, 
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ultimately making them more responsive to local needs (Anderson et al., 2006; Colfer et al., 
2008). If true, decentralisation in turn would contribute to equity and social justice, 
strengthen local participation, enhance efficiency and effectiveness, and empower local 
people (Burns et al., 1994; Turner and Hulme, 1997; Bergh, 2004).  However, a review of the 
literature on the practice of decentralisation reveals varied outcomes as witnessed by an 
earlier wave of experiments with decentralisation in Africa and Asia in the 1950s and 1960s 
which is considered to have largely failed (Crook and Manor, 1998). Reports on the recent 
experience of other regions also detail mixed results. For example, as outlined in Table 1-1, 
the Nepalese case of so-called successful decentralised forest governance is reported to have 
delivered both positive results and key challenges (Pokharel et al., 2005; Pandey 2007; 
Khadka and Schmidt-Vogt, 2008; Ojha et al., 2009; Shrestha et al., 2010; Pokharel and 
Tiwari, 2013).   
Building on this literature, my central hypothesis is that the implementation of a policy of 
decentralization is never straightforward and that only rarely does it create the foundations 
necessary to achieve its purported efficiency and equity benefits. This is because, in many 
cases, decentralisation will fail to achieve the equal participation of local people, and poor 
and disadvantaged groups will be excluded from major decision making processes. In 
addition, my secondary hypothesis is that the various actors operating within state, market 
and civil society institutions (including NGOs and INGOs) that play a vital role in delivering 
CBF have divergent responsibilities to many different authorities and that this will lead to 
contradictory actions and results and ultimately to a reduction in the level of transparency and 
fairness. Overall, therefore, I hypothesise that while some aspects of decentralization may 
improve people’s welfare by delivering more effective public services and reinforcing a 
‘good governance’ approach to forest resource management, the net result of decentralization 
is, by reinforcing asymmetric local power relations, the achievement of the opposite outcome.  
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1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
This  study combines a single case study of devolved forest governance in Nepal with a 
medium-n research design of perceptions of community forestry operations  in nine 
community forest user groups from three districts representing three different Nepalese 
ecological zones. A purposive sampling method was used to select CFUGs with different 
characteristics and CFUG members' opinions were collected using both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Full specification of research framework and research method is 
described in Chapter 4.   
 
1.8 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE 
 
 
This first Chapter has provided the background for this research, including a statement of the 
research questions, arguments and methodology.   
In Chapter Two, I focus on the concept of governance, good forest governance, 
decentralisation and their application to the forest sector and the various mechanisms 
employed for governing forest resources globally. The chapter critically reviews the key 
literature on the concept of forest governance, analyses the elements of good forest 
governance proposed by various international organisations, and argues that the putative 
benefits of good forest governance may not be delivered in practice.  
In Chapter Three, I set out an overview of Nepal’s political history associated with forest 
policy and management systems. The chapter commences by outlining Nepal’s geography 
and its forest resources (size, type, location) and then provides a detailed account of the 
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evolution of forest policy in the country by describing key legislative milestones and 
regulations and their implications for the forestry sector. Building on this historical overview, 
the second part reviews historical and recent developments in decentralised forest governance 
in Nepal. 
In Chapter Four, I outline the research methodology used to examine decentralised 
community based forest management of Nepal. I first review some conceptual underpinnings 
of governance associated with natural resource management particularly those related to 
community forestry. Secondly, I review the various good forest governance frameworks 
suggested by different groups and organisations and then develop a research framework to 
analyse how CFUGs are governed in Nepal. This research framework focuses on six key 
dimensions of governance: participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, 
efficiency and fairness. Next, I detail the method used to select my case studies. Finally, I 
discuss the research protocol, ethical issues, data collection and analysis and provide an 
introductory background to the next three analytical chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  
In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I investigate the degree to which devolved, decentralised 
resource management in the form of community forest governance has democratised forest 
resource access by examining participation and transparency (Chapter 5), accountability and 
effectiveness (Chapter 6), and efficiency and fairness (Chapter 7).   
In Chapter Eight, I reflect on what has been learned about the status of community forest 
governance in Nepal and generalise the findings to community forestry elsewhere. 
Furthermore, I summarise the research questions, argument, and data, identify the broad 
opportunities and threats to the practice of community forestry, and point the way towards 
further research in this field.
12 | P a g e  
CHAPTER 2: DECENTRALISED FOREST GOVERNANCE  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Decentralised forest governance is considered  key to the successful management of forest 
resources in developing countries (Agrawal et al., 2008; Petheram et al., 2004). Decentralized 
forest governance via community forestry has rendered  policy makers, researchers and 
practitioners in the global South  optimistic in achieving the twin goals of ecological 
restoration and poverty reduction (Dressler et al., 2010). Nonetheless, decentralizing forestry 
governance has not been straight forward, and in many cases has encountered difficult 
challenges (Phelps et al., 2010; Ribot et al., 2006). As a result, a vast body of literature has 
developed in favour of, or against, decentralized forest governance across the world.  
This chapter reviews the concept of governance being used in the scholarly literature in 
general, and the ways it has been employed in community based forest governance in Nepal 
in particular. Firstly, the diverse definitions and concepts of governance are discussed and 
this is followed by an examination of the different governance classification systems 
proposed by various scholars and institutions. Secondly, the concepts of ‘good governance’ 
popularized by international donor organisations and financial institutions are reviewed to 
highlight the link between decentralization and good governance. Next, the chapter discusses 
decentralised environmental and forest governance before finally outlining the evolution of 
community based forest governance as a form of decentralized forest governance in both the 
South Asian and Nepalese contexts. 
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2.2 CONCEPT OF GOVERNANCE 
 
The term ‘governance’ is relatively new but its meaning can be traced back to ancient times 
as ‘societies have always required some form of collective steering and management’ (Peters, 
2002:1). Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) argue that the concept is as old as human civilization 
and trace its origin back to at least 400BC to an exposition on governance by Kautilya titled 
Arthashastra. Kautilya, who was believed to be the Chief Adviser to one of the kings of the 
Mauryan Empire (a region that that today covers much of modern India), recognizes the duty 
of the monarch as to protect the prosperity of the nation and its people (Kaufmann and Kraay, 
2008). According to Kaufmann and Kraay (2008: 3), Kautilya presents three ‘pillars’ of the 
‘art of the government’ emphasising ‘justice, ethics, and anti-autocratic tendencies’.  
In another early usage of the term, the mid-fourteenth century Italian student of politics 
Lorenzetti considered governance important for the welfare of a country’s citizens. He 
describes good governance as occurring where men are working, others are cultivating, 
women dancing and children playing, and where integrity reigns in the beautiful city. 
Conversely, he describes bad governance as occurring in deserted lands where people are not 
working, and where violence occurs and women are abused (Kjaer, 2004).   
In the early modern era, however, the concept of governance became fused with that of 
government with the latter emphasising formal political influence. The term ‘governance’ 
was not common during the post-World War II period (Kjaer, 2004). It is only in the past 
couple of decades that the term has been brought back in to refer to wide-ranging social 
systems of governing that include, but are not limited to, the narrower institution of 
government as the main decision-making political unit (Rogers and Hall, 2003).  
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The field of governance studies has become increasingly popular in recent years, and the 
growing amount of published literature published speaks to the growing interest in the subject 
(Klijn, 2008; Tollefson et al., 2012). The popularity of governance studies is not surprising as 
the conventional hierarchical models of government have been criticised of being heavily 
dependent on centralized ‘command and control’ regulation and limited role of local actors 
(Tollefson, 1998; Tollefson et al., 2012). Pierre and Peters note the key reason for the recent 
popularity of the concept of governances is ‘its capacity – unlikely that the narrow term of 
government – to cover the whole range of institutions and relations involved in the process of 
governing’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000:1). Proponents of alternative approaches to governance 
consider voluntary, community and market instruments such as certification and community-
based resource management as key to secure the goals of sustainable management of natural 
resources (Tollefson, 1998; Cashore et al., 2001). However, others note that some kind of 
steering from the state is required to achieve the collective goals for society (Peters, 2002). 
Peters claims: 
The concept of steering is central to this discussion of governance, with the basic idea 
being that there must be some mechanisms for making and implementing collective 
goals for society (Peters, 2002: 3) 
 
The concept of governance began to transform scholarly work in the areas of global 
associations, political science and public administration in the late 1980s (Gale, 2008; 
Tollefson et al., 2012). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Rhodes disputed  the conventional 
model of ‘top-down hierarchical state control’ form of governance and proposed a ‘model of 
public sector management’ that reflected the reality that governments were progressively 
governing through networks (Rhodes, 1997). Using the British case, Rhodes describes 
governance as ‘self-organizing, inter-organizational networks’ that were characterised by 
interdependence, exchange of resources, competition and, most importantly, independence 
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from the state (Rhodes, 1997). Furthermore, Rhodes claimed that governance refers to a ‘new 
process of governing’ (Rhodes, 1997: 15).  
Rhodes (2000) sets out seven definitions of governance: (i) corporate governance and (ii) 
good governance which emphasize formal processes of both private companies and 
governments for auditing, ensuring transparency, and information disclosure; (iii) new public 
management, which refers to improving efficiencies of government bureaucracies by 
introducing private sector management methods; (iv) new political economy, which 
emphasizes the changed relationship among the government, civil society and the market; (v) 
international interdependence, (vi) socio-cybernetic system , and (vii) network, which deny 
the existence of mono-centric power.  
 Since the early 1990s, the concept of governance gained importance as international 
institutions began to identify a ‘crisis of governance’ at the heart of the failure of 
international development to deliver economic growth. Most of literature on governance 
agrees that the distribution of authority across diverse authorities is not only more effective 
but also is also normatively better to centralised state control (Marks and Hooghe, 2000). 
Governance often relates to ‘the broad social systems of governing’ that comprises, but is not 
limited to, the narrower institution of government as the main executive political body 
(Rogers and Hall, 2003). In its broadest sense, governance has been defined to encompass the 
management of society and resources not by a single centralized authority but by the 
combination of agencies and institutions including state, civil society and private sector 
(Simonis, 2004).  
Governance is defined by Mayers et al. (2006) as synonymous with ‘government’, an 
approach that others view as a ‘conservative conventional approach’. In fact, ‘government’ is 
only one of the multiple actors involved in ‘governance’ and the others vary depending on the 
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level of ‘government’ being considered (Pokharel and Tiwari, 2013). Over the last decade or 
so, the concept of ‘governance’ has gained a wider currency in a range of contexts within 
societies and organizations and taken on a much broader meaning. In this context, the word 
‘governance’ is used to distinguish it from ‘government’ which is viewed as a form of 
hierarchical command (Gale, 2008). While there are many alternative conceptions to that put 
forward by Mayers and his colleagues, many scholars view governance as ‘the art of steering 
and coordinating the affairs of interdependent societies and organizations’(see also Bahr and 
Falkner, 2005; Gale, 2008; Tollefson et al., 2008). 
Kjær (2004) explains the shifting dynamics of governance as being related to the formulation 
and implementation of public policy. She claims that governance is about ‘the setting of 
rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules’ (Kjær, 2004). By adopting an 
institutional analysis approach, governance includes decentralization, privatization, and all 
the formal and informal modes of interactions and power relations between institutions and 
other actors (corresponding interplay), as well as between different levels of the same 
administration (determining interplay), and their respective roles in delivering effective and 
accountable collective choices.  
James Rosenau sees governance as ‘rule systems’ where there are ‘steering mechanisms 
through which authority is exercised in order to enable the governed to preserve their 
coherence and move toward desired goals’ (Rosenau, 2004). For Rosenau, what differentiate 
government from governance are systems of rule. In fact, the governance can thus take many 
forms as “rule systems acquire authority in a variety of ways” (Rosenau, 2007:72).
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 Rosenau considers ‘governance’ to be a much broader conception than ‘government’ and he 
identifies a wide variety of stakeholders involved in global governance (Rosenau, 2002:80). 
These include: 
(i) sub national and state governments founded on hierarchical structures officially 
adopted in constitutions, 
(ii) for-profit global corporations formally hierarchically structured by articles of 
integration, 
(iii) global governmental organizations based on formal treaties and charters,  
(iv) sub national and national not-for-profit NGOs sustained by either formal laws or 
informal undocumented arrangements,  
(v) international or transnational not-for-profit (international) NGOs either formally 
structured as organizations or informally linked together as associations or social 
movements, 
(vi) markets that have both formal and informal structures that steer horizontal 
exchanges between buyers and sellers, producers and consumers 
 
While all above approaches provide an important and interesting avenues of understanding 
governance from different perspectives, Peters’ approach—which links governance to 
government via public policy making – is used for the propose of this thesis. This is 
particularly important in community based forest governance where the local actors are 
managing their resources with support from government under certain policy and legislative 
framework.  
Peters and Pierre (2006) describe governance as policy-related work that is interrelated with 
the political system and its environment. Pierre and Peters (2000) proposed two different 
approaches to governance - ‘the old or state-centric governance’ and ‘new or society-centric 
governance’. The former refers to ‘a steering conception of governance approach’ which is 
concerned with identifying the ‘capacity of the centre of governance to exert control over the 
rest of the government and over the economy and society’ (Peter, 2000:38). The latter 
approach looks at how the social forces are structured to channel the input into political 
processes and in implementation. The latter approach also questions 'how the centre of 
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government interacts with society to reach mutually acceptable decisions, or whether society 
actually does more self-steering rather than depending upon guidance from government, 
especially central government’ (Peters, 2000: 36). This governance framework presents an 
important and interesting avenue for reframing the study of politics and policy-making. To 
this end, Peters’ approach to governance is more balanced as it links governance with 
government via public policy making. Peters claims: 
Adopting the governance approach simply provides some standard against which to 
examine behaviour in the public sector, and analyse what has happened. The same 
type of analysis may be undertaken from other perspectives...but thinking about 
governance and governing makes the question of what has happened to policy ideas 
and proposals all the more evident (Peters, 2000:38) 
 
Furthermore, Peters and Pierre claim that while for the majority of the past three centuries 
governance in the public realm has been associated with the state as a dominant pattern of 
hierarchical governing in which governments decide the laws and policies to be adopted, this 
traditional view of governance is being challenged by networks and other societal actors 
seeking greater autonomy (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209 -210).  
 
2.3 CLASSIFYING GOVERNANCE  
 
The diversity of definitions and concept outlined in Section 2.2 shows that, although there is 
some agreement among the scholars about its core referents, governance is a highly 
contextual concept that encompasses a variety of processes and practices that vary 
considerably given the situation in which they are applied (Mossberger, 2007). Typically, 
when used in reference to the public sector governance focuses on being ‘a mechanism for 
resolving public problems’. In contrast, when used in reference to the non-governmental 
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sector it focuses on ‘representing a variety of stakeholder interests’ (Lee, 2003).   Even within 
these two sectors, the variety of mechanisms, interests, forms, functions and approaches may 
vary greatly from one organization to the other. Therefore when understanding, defining, 
classifying and applying concepts of governance, one operates in an area where ‘one size 
does not fit all’. This section outlines various modes and classifications of governance 
applicable to the natural resources management sector. 
A complete and vital investigation of governance via public private participation (PPPs) is 
provided by Börzel and Risse (2005). According to them ‘PPPs are said to increase both the 
effectiveness (problem-solving capacity) and the legitimacy (democratic accountability) of 
international governance in terms of democratic participation and accountability’ (Börzel and 
Risse 2005: 195). Figure 2-1 provides a typology of possible combinations of governance 
arrangements with or without government. A balanced, public-private partnership is located 
at the centre while increasing private-sector autonomy is located to the left side of continuum 
(i.e., governance without government) and growing government autonomy to the right side of 
the continuum (i.e., governance by government)  ( Börzel and Risse, 2005;  Börzel, 2010). 
The continuum can also be read as a depiction of the transformation of the state driven by 
privatization, deregulation and delegation of governance functions (Börzel, 2010: 9).  
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Figure 2-1.Governance with (out) government: the non-hierarchical involvement of 
nongovernmental actors (figure inspired by Borzel, 2010; Börzel and Risse,  2005). 
 
According to Newman (2001), governance comprises various, multifaceted strands that 
involve concurrent upward and downward flows of power. He presents four different models 
of governance: hierarchical model, rational goal model, open system model and self 
governance model and these are briefly outlined below (Lee, 2003:6-7): 
 the hierarchical model  is characterized by centralization and stability, and 
emphasizes official power, regularity and responsibility; 
 the rational goal model emphasizes decision-making authority, maximization of 
productivity and economic objectives;  
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 the  open system’s model is characterized by networks, and emphasizes flexibility 
and adaptation; and 
  the self-governance model is characterized by devolution, and emphasizes citizen 
power, transference and participation. 
 
This classification system provides an important avenue to understand multiple and complex 
systems of power which can be useful to understand the exercise of citizen power, 
devolution, participation and accountability in common pool resources management. Various 
other nomenclatures associated with the literature on governance can also be found and are 
elaborated extensively elsewhere. Some of these classification systems are outlined as 
follows (Lee 2003:7): 
 advance form, participatory form, flexible form, and deregulation form (see Peters, 
1996);  
 administrative form, corporatist form, pro-growth form, and welfare form (Pierre, 
1999); 
 participatory governance models (Shannon, 2006; Fristch and Newig, 2009; Secco et 
al., 2011) 
 bureaucratic form, business form, promote form, and complex form (Considine and 
Lewis, 1999); 
 Privatization of services, contracting out, and necessary viable tendering (Andrew and 
Goldsmith, 1998).  
 
Karen Mossberger outlined various forms of governance at local, regional and state level 
serving variety of purposes (see Table 2-2). In her governance models, the participation of 
stakeholders outside government is common, but not always a feature of these collaborative 
arrangements (Mossberger, 2007). 
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Table 2-1.Various forms of governance 
Governance model Purpose Major participants 
Collective management  Management as networking, 
collaboration  
Inter-jurisdictional, cross-sectoral  
Civic capacity  Policy networks  Cross-sectoral 
Administrative, 
Conjunction  
Administrative role in joint service 
delivery, other cooperation  
Inter-jurisdictional, cross-sectoral  
Rural regimes Governing coalition, village wide 
agenda 
Cross-sectoral 
Hollow state Contracting service delivery Cross-sectoral (private non-profit) 
New regionalism  Voluntary cooperation, policy 
issues and service delivery 
Inter-jurisdictional, cross-sectoral  
Other partnerships May influence city agendas, 
development  
Mixed, intergovernmental 
influence may be stronger  
Note: This table is adapted from Mossberger, 2007 
Pierre and Peters (2005) present a relatively simple but commonly agreed upon classification 
of models of governance relevant for the purpose of this thesis. They identify five models of 
governance based on ‘how a governance system induces and responds to information from 
society and a systems capacity to respond efficiently to this information’ (Duit and Galaz, 
2008: 316-317). The five models are (i) Etatiste, (ii) Liberal-democratic, (iii) State-centric, 
(iv) Dutch governance school, and (v) Governance without government (see Table 2-1). The 
five models ‘constitute a continuum ranging from the most dominated by the state (i.e., 
Etatist) and those in which the state plays the least role and indeed one in which there is 
argued to be governance without government’ (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 11). The models are 
briefly summarised in Table 2-1 below:
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Table 2-2. State and societal dominated governance models proposed by Pierre and Peters 
(2005) 
State dominated models of governance  
Etatiste model  the main actor in governance is government which has the power 
to take unilateral action and also to decide whether other actors are 
allowed to exercise power 
 state mostly relies on a competent bureaucracy to formulate and 
implement policies 
Liberal-democratic  state plays a pre-eminent role and determines which of actors it 
wishes to grant governance authority to 
 governments frequently have to rely on weaker, less-permanent 
bureaucracies and prefer to utilise parliamentary institutions as a 
substitute 
State-centric  the state remains the most important governing actor, but also 
establishes institutionalised associations with different non-state 
actors such as trade unions 
 strong state government sustains power while the institutionally 
integrated actors often acquire considerable stable organisation 
Societal actors dominated models of governance  
Dutch governance school  the state relies extensively on non-state actors to rule 
 Many actors take part in governance arrangements and the state is 
not automatically the most influential 
 a strong permanent bureaucracy is missing and actors make 
consensus-based decisions 
Governance without 
government 
 non-state actors are most influential and provide more authority 
than the state itself 
 the state simply provides an arena where other actors move 
collectively to make a decision and implement policies 
 system of government tends to be weak and lacks systematic 
authoritative capabilities 
Table adapted from the text by Duit and Galaz (2008), Fazekas and Burns (2012: 25) 
 
Duit and Galaz (2008: 317) point out that ‘state-dominated models’ outlined in the upper 
rows in the Table 2-1 are likely to provide ‘relatively poor or potentially biased feedback due 
to distorted information flows from lower to higher levels’. In contrast, the ‘societal-
dominated models’ are likely to ‘suffer from information deficiency due to lack of incentives 
to provide information from societal interests’ (Duit and Galaz, 2008: 317). The adaptability 
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of the former models is considered to be low due to information deficiencies while the 
adaptability of the latter models is assumed to be high as a result of organisational flexibility 
(Duit and Galaz, 2008). Berger (2003) sees a noteworthy role for governance within the 
practice of diversification of the rural economy. Both are interrelated and strengthen each 
other, predominantly by fostering rural growth.  It has been argued that local communities 
know better than anyone else what their needs are and what has to be altered to secure their 
needs (Berger, 2003).  
   
2.4 GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
The term 'governance' has been employed in a neutral, positivistic sense to refer to an 
approach that recognizes the existence of both state and non-state actors in governing both 
people and resources. Used this way, the term has no normative content. To use the concept 
normatively, some agencies and scholars have elaborated a notion of 'good governance'. 
When preceded by the adjective ‘good’, the concept of ‘governance’ acquires an evaluative 
aspect, and the term is normally used by bilateral monetary institutions such as the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
decide which developing countries meet the requirements for debt relief and aid (Gale, 2008). 
Today, many scholars, policy and decision makers, aid donors as well as aid recipients are 
familiar with the ‘good governance’ concept which is now considered a key component of 
successful social and economic development (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008). The concept of 
‘good governance’ came to prominence in the field of international development in the late 
1980s, when a World Bank-sponsored comprehensive study identified weak governance in 
many sub-Saharan African states as a cause of development aid’s poor performance 
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The World Bank defines good governance as: 
The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the 
common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, 
monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its 
resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (World 
Bank, 2007). 
 
Despite being a recent term, ' good governance' has had a historical legacy particularly since 
the immediate aftermath of the World War II. The World Bank, formally known as 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), adopted the idea of ‘good 
governance’ in the sense of getting the government right. Following its success in funding 
Europe’s post-war reconstruction, the IBRD started focusing on the developing world 
especially after the commencement of decolonisation in  Africa and South Asia. With profits 
from loans at marked up rates, the IBRD usually financed large transportation projects with 
the aim of improving government, an aim that was similar to the contemporary sense of 'good 
governance'. 
In 1956, a finance corporation was established to provide finance to the private sector. In 
1960, the IBRD established the International Development Agency (IDA) to provide loans on 
favourable terms to developing countries. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) offers political and non monetary risk assurance to private sector operators. The 
emphasis on improving governments in the developing world via institutional support, 
people's empowerment and improvement of service provision gave rise to the concept of 
'good governance' in which  the World Bank group played the lead role  (Marcus, 2005; 
Wright and Stone, 2007).  
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This conception of ‘good governance’ has been criticised by many scholars, however, as ‘a 
Trojan horse for liberal democracy’ (Kirby, 2004, cited in Gale, 2008). Gale (2008) provides 
an example from Tasmania (Australia) of an environmental decision making process that fits 
the World Bank’s concept of ‘good governance’  but which was nonetheless deeply contested 
by civil society organisations for its lack of transparency, participation and inclusion of 
science among others in the decision-making processes. 
Most UN agencies use the concept of ‘good governance’ as synonymous with the concept of 
‘good government’. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 
1997), good governance ensures that political and socio-economic priorities are based on a 
broad societal consensus and the voices of the most marginal and most vulnerable groups are 
heard in decision making over the allocation of development resources. Employed this way, 
the concept includes a number of essential elements such as reliable and equitable legal 
frameworks, political accountability, effective and efficient public sector management, 
bureaucratic transparency, participatory development and the promotion and protection of 
human rights (UNDP, 1997).  
The UNDP’s definition of governance also identifies three critical domains inherent to good 
governance--state (government), private sector and society-- which interact to deliver 
effective outcomes. Governance guidelines used by the UNDP establish that the function of 
the modern state/government is to create a political and legal environment that is conducive 
to economic growth; a private sector that is responsible for creating employment and income; 
and a society that supports social, economic, and political interactions – including 
encouraging groups within the society to participate in this interaction. The UNDP (1997: 2) 
views governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to 
manage a country`s affairs at all levels and asserts that good governance has nine attributes: 
(i) participation, (ii) rule of law, (iii) transparency, (iv) responsiveness, (iv) consensus 
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orientation, (v) equity, (vii) effectiveness and efficiency, (viii) accountability, and (ix) 
strategic vision. 
Since the 1990s, the concept of 'good governance' has been put forward by  organizations 
such as UNDP,  World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a vehicle 
to enhance  the sustainability and effectiveness of aid in the developing world in an open, 
transparent, equitable and accountable way. To these organizations, the term represents 
responsible forms of government.  
The Word Bank and other donors use good governance as a major theme for poverty 
reduction. Kaufmann et al. (1999) have categorised the main dimensions of good governance 
as following:  
 the rule of law that includes protection of property rights; 
 voice and accountability includes civil liberties and political stability; 
 the lack of regulatory burden; 
 government effectiveness, which includes the quality of policy-making and public 
service delivery; 
 independence of the judiciary; and  
 control of corruption. 
 
The Asian Development Bank has identified that good governance comprises a number of 
elements such as, rule of law, public participation, accountability, transparency, effectiveness 
and efficiency, equity, professionalism and effective management service orientation, and 
monitoring of performance (ADB, 2004). Similarly, the African Development Bank (2010) 
clarifies its concept of good governance by identifying four key elements--accountability, 
transparency, participation, and predictability. The African Development Bank’s definition 
addresses issues of participation of project beneficiaries and the group affected by project 
activities, the importance of improving the interface between the public and private sector, 
and the inclusion of the views of NGOs as important actors in development. According to the 
28 | P a g e  
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the 
best test of good governance ‘is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of key human 
rights such as, political, civil, cultural, economic, and social rights’ (UNESCAP, 2006). 
In reflecting on these and other concepts of good governance, Simonis (2004) describes it as 
having at least three defining features: (a) it is normative, taking on the values postulated by 
the actors and agencies defining it; (b) it is based on mutually supportive and cooperative 
relationships between government, civil society and the private sector; and (c) it is defined by 
the possession of all, or some combination of participation, transparency of decision making, 
accountability, rule of law and predictability (Simonis, 2004). 
In summary, therefore, some necessary conditions identified for good governance are 
inclusiveness, accountability, participation, rule of law, transparency, predictability, 
responsiveness, consensus orientation and strategic vision. Fairness or equity is often also 
included in the list of defining characteristics of good governance.  Indeed, good governance 
is strongly associated with social justice and equity. It is often described as a mix of 
representative government and participative politics acting in the public interest. Governance 
is also considered ‘good’ when it allocates and manages resources efficiently, effectively and 
equitably (World Bank, 2009).
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2.5 DECENTRALISED GOVERNANCE 
 
For several decades, the idea of ‘decentralization’ of resource management has been a 
popular approach to increasing peoples’ participation in decision making and forest 
management in both developing and developed countries. More than 60 countries around the 
world claim to have decentralized at least some aspects of their natural resource management 
(Agrawal, 2001). According to Manor (1999), about 80 percent of developing countries are 
now engaged in some form of decentralization. A popular argument in the political and social 
science literature is that decentralization brings natural resource management closer to the 
people and makes it more responsive to community needs (Colfer et al., 2008). There has 
been growing recognition that most of the resource management problems are a consequence 
of institutional malfunction and poor governance, and that decentralized governance is a pre-
requisite for sustainable community development. Decentralization can be defined in various 
ways. Acccordign to Crook and Manor (1998), ‘ decentralization is usually referred to the 
transfer of powers from central government to local levels in a political, administrative and 
territorial hierarchy.’  
Rondinelli and Nellis (1986:5) define decentralization from an administrative viewpoint as: 
The transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and 
allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of 
government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous 
public authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or 
nongovernmental private or voluntary organizations.  
 
In fact, successful decentralization involves devolution of decision-making to the community 
and a reconcentration of operational power to local level (Rondinelli, 1987). In this 
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connection, Ostrom et al. (1993, page) note delegation as “transfers of authority to public 
corporations or special authorities outside the regular bureaucratic structure”. 
Most of the literature on governance agrees that the distribution of governance across various 
jurisdictions is not only efficient but also normatively superior compared to a central state 
monopoly (Marks and Hooghe, 2000). This is particularly important in the case of natural 
resource governance in developing countries as governance systems must operate at multiple 
scales in order to capture the huge variation in circumstances at the local level (Marks and 
Hooghe, 2003). On balance and within reason, the more decentralized the jurisdiction, the 
better is the capacity to reflect the heterogeneity of preferences that exist among the wide 
range of stakeholders. Majone (1998) claims that multiple jurisdictions better facilitate 
realistic policy commitments. Furthermore, multiple jurisdictions allow for jurisdictional 
competition (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999) which facilitates innovation and experimentation 
(Gray, 1973). This idea is further elaborated in Chapter 4 on the conceptual underpinnings of 
forest governance (Section 4-2). 
 
2.6 ENVIRONMENTAL AND FOREST GOVERNANCE 
 
The issues of environmental governance began to receive more attention after the Rio Earth 
Summit in 1992, when Agenda 21 and other international environmental conventions and 
agreements emphasized the need for community participation in resource management 
systems (Karanja, 1998; Harman, 2005). Environmental management, as Rhodes (1997) has 
observed in the context of other policy sectors, involves ‘a collection of inter-organisational 
networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer 
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or regulate (Rhodes, 1997: 21)’. A key challenge for government is therefore to enable these 
networks and seek out new forms of cooperation so as to achieve particular policy objectives. 
‘Environmental governance’ involves a more equitable distribution of power through 
institutional processes and structures for decision-making in natural resource management. It 
aims to empower stakeholders to ensure they have an appropriate level of rights in relation to 
the resources they are responsible for. The Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) has defined environmental governance as: 
Environmental governance encompasses the values, rules, institutions, and processes 
through which people and organizations attempt to work towards common objectives, 
make decisions, generate authority and legitimacy, and exercise power (CIDA, 2006). 
 
Although CIDA’s conception regarding ‘environmental governance’ is comprehensive, as yet 
there is no definitive conception of ‘environmental governance’ (Gale, 2008). Indeed, a core 
strand of ‘environmental governance’ literature, for example, has framed the key challenge in 
terms of the requirement to balance opposing social interests (Hempel, 1996). Building on 
wider literature on environmental governance Gale (2008) defines ‘good environmental 
governance’ as: 
A set of transparent, accountable, open, balanced, deliberative, efficient, science-
based and risk-based processes for steering and coordinating the affairs of 
interdependent social actors in the making of environmental decisions (Gale, 
2008:268). 
 
Gale’s conception about ‘environmental governance’ not only covers the key elements of 
‘good governance’ proposed by international financial institutions such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund but also adds importance of science and risk-analysis in 
environmental decision making.  
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 Over the last four decades forest governance has flourished; ironically however, during the 
same period the Asia-Pacific region has experienced some of the highest rates of 
deforestation and degradation in the world despite pressure from international conservation 
organizations (Dauvergne, 2001). Deforestation and forest degradation continue despite 
global agreements on forest protection. FAO (2001) states that during the 1990s, the world 
lost almost 10 million ha of net forest cover per year. FAO (2007) warns that the trend of 
deforestation is likely to exacerbate in the future with a higher rate of about 13 million 
hectares per year if business as usual continues. In developing and developed countries illegal 
logging affects the world’s tropical and temperate forests, because of the total failure of forest 
governance (Higman et al., 2005). In recent years, there is a strong debate regarding climate 
change and the role of forests in combating climate change. Deforestation and degradation 
contribute 18% of global greenhouse gas emissions; however reversing this trend seems to be 
difficult due to increasing population and associated demand for food, fuel and forest 
products in developing countries. 
Recent experiments associated with forest governance have resulted in a series of different 
but interrelated institutional forms. Those mainly applicable to modern forest policy are the 
following (Gluck et al., 2006): 
 national forest programmes, 
 international forest deliberations, 
 decentralization,  
 non-state market driven forest certification mechanisms, 
 delegation of public rights, and  
 self-organization. 
 
Forest governance, or 'good forest governance', needs to address the issues of how forests are 
managed and the management challenges of illegal logging, corruption and a short-term 
focus on profits and jobs. Forest governance also includes issues such as how governments 
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and stakeholders make management decisions and who makes policy and law. Higman et al. 
(2005) describe good forest governance as transparent, equal and accountable decision 
making processes rather than traditional political structures of government. They describe 
forest governance as arrangements to inform forest managers about the practices of 
sustainable forest management.  People’s participation, accountability, rule of law, 
transparency and pro-poor policy change are considered as critical dimensions of good forest 
governance (Dahal, 2003). In many parts of the world local communities have practiced often 
self-regulated and task-specific governance to cope with locally explicit problems associated 
with common-pool resource (Ostrom, 1990). 
A number of empirical studies demonstrate that the general principles for robust governance 
institutions for common-pool natural resources are well established (Diaz et al., 2003; 
Ostrom, 1990). Figure 2-2 outlines general principles for robust natural resources governance 
applicable to the forestry sector.  
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Figure 2-2. General principles for robust governance of forest resources in left and right 
columns and the governance requirements that they help address in centre column. Each 
principle is relevant for meeting several requirements and the arrows indicate some of the 
most likely connections (after Dietz et al., 2003).
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2.6.1 GOVERNANCE VERSUS MANAGEMENT 
 
The terms 'governance' and 'management' are often used interchangeably or sometimes 
misleadingly in forestry studies. Whether the concept of governance and management are 
completely different or complementary to each other is a contested issue. Some analysts 
argue that 'management' has to do with the resources and 'governance' has to do with the 
people or actors regulating the resources. However, this distinction is difficult to sustain as 
the terminologies like 'human resource management' and 'natural resource governance' are 
often encountered. Therefore, a black and white differentiation between the term 'governance' 
and 'management' is not possible. For example, while most of the literature on natural 
resources refers to 'natural resource management' or 'forest resource management', these 
terms imply the broader contexts, processes and outcomes about what happens in natural 
resources. The meaning of 'management' when used in this literature does not exclude the 
meanings associated with the concept of 'governance' as discussed above. 
In many studies, resource 'governance' is considered to be the broader framework, 
encompassing resource management as a part or component within it. Nonetheless, there are 
also some other analysts who disagree that the concept of governance has the broader 
meaning and argue that power, governance and equity are all positioned within the 
framework of natural resource management (Blomley et al., 2009). Therefore, reaching 
consensus on the relationship between governance and management appears theoretically 
problematic. Instead of arguing about which encompasses which, this chapter uses the term 
'governance' as a general term to refer to both people's management  and resource 
management. Following this conceptualization, the term community-based forest governance 
(CBFG) will be used also as a substitute for the related term 'community-based forest 
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management' (CBFM) including in the historical contexts before the term 'governance' was 
coined.  
 
2.6.2 FOREST GOVERNANCE AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
 
In the 1970s, many development organizations realised that their policies and practices were 
not reducing the number of the economically poor; instead, their number was rising. While 
poverty reduction remains an overarching goal of international organizations such as the 
World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and other similar organizations, how to achieve the goal 
remains contested. With regard to the poverty/natural resource management nexus, almost 1.6 
billion people depend on forest resources for at least part of their livelihood. The local 
population living in rainforests in Latin America is 60 million, while developing country’s 
population using trees on farms for food and cash is about 1.2 billion and 350 million people 
living on dense forest rely on them for life or income (World Bank, 2004). The World 
Bank/DFID (2006) estimates that one quarter of the world’s poor population directly or 
indirectly depends on forests for their livelihoods. Like other sectors, forestry is not a magic 
bullet for poverty eradication, but with good forest governance, forestry can help to reduce 
poverty (IIED, 2002). The World Bank (2006) recommends strengthening national forest 
governance to improve the economic prospects of millions of poor people. On the one hand 
there is the question of vulnerability of forests or wood lands upon which 800 million poor 
people heavily depend for survival; and on the other hand, the rate of deforestation of five 
percent a decade is increasingly depleting this resource base, as well as contributing almost 
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20 percent of annual global CO2 emissions and seriously jeopardizing biodiversity (World 
Bank, 2006). 
 
2.6.3 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND FOREST RESOURCES  
 
The future of the world’s poorest people and of the world’s forests are interrelated. UNDP’s 
main development goal is to improve lives through poverty alleviation. The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) established by the United Nations include the target to halve by 
the year 2015 the proportion of people who survive on less than $1 a day. While considerable 
improvements in human wellbeing have been achieved over the past two decades, there are 
still more than one billion poor people who lack essential services, making them vulnerable 
to a range of economic, environmental and social shocks (UNEP, 2007). A report by UNEP 
(2007) claims that many countries are unlikely to meet their 2015 MDG targets. According to 
the World Bank, more than 1.2 billion people, representing 28% of the global population live 
in extreme poverty and 90 percent of those living with severe scarcity rely on forests  for 
their livelihood—a situation that increases the pressure on the world’s forest resources. It is 
generally agreed that, to achieve sustainable development, governance arrangements must be 
integrated from the local to the regional and global levels, across a variety of sectors, and 
over a longer time frame for policy making (UNEP, 2007).  
During the period 1990-2002 the rate of extreme poverty of those living on less than $1 per 
day dropped more rapidly in much of Asia than in Latin America and the Caribbean, while 
poverty rates remained unchanged in Western Asia and Northern Africa (UNDP, 2006). 
Again, in 2008, the UNDP reported that every night 850 million people go to bed hungry, 
which is due not only of lack of money but also a lack of access to essential resources, 
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including forests. To increase local food and forest security, and protect forests from outside 
violation, local people need tenure rights (IIED, 2002). Access to forest resources provides a 
vital cushion for very poor people by absorbing rural risk and reducing defencelessness. The 
Millennium Declaration (2000) and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (2002) both 
confirm the significance of good governance arrangements at local, national and international 
levels for sustainable management of forest resources (Brown et al., 2002). 
 
2.7 PRINCIPLE INDICATORS OF GOOD COMMUNITY BASED 
FOREST GOVERNANCE 
 
Nowhere is good governance more applicable than to community forestry (CF). The Regional 
Community Forestry Training Centre (RECOFTC) has developed a list of seven key 
indicators of good forest governance (Table 2-1). Similarly, World Resources Institute (WRI) 
has identified five principles of good governance. Most of the RECOFTC and WRI principles 
are the same. In addition to these principles, the World Bank (WB) has added four elements: 
the quality of forest administration, the coherence of forest legislation, the stability of forest 
institutions, and the capability to manage conflict (Table 2-3).  
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Table 2-3. Main elements of good forest governance 
RECOFTC WRI World Bank 
rule of law transparency transparency 
transparency participation accountability 
accountability accountability public participation 
decentralization and devolution coordination  Stability of forest institutions 
and conflict management 
participatory decision making capacity quality of forest administration 
gender sensitivity, equity and 
balanced representation 
- coherence forest legislation and 
rule of law 
- - economic efficiency, equity and 
incentives 
 
Source: RECOFTC, 2001; WRI, 2009; WB, 2009 
 
Most of the principle elements of good forest governance listed in Table 2-1 are relevant to 
community-based forest management. This is further elaborated in Chapter 4 under 
methodological framework (Section 4.3.1). Some important elements of community based 
forest governance are briefly described below. The indicators used to assess these key 
elements are outlined and justified in Section 4-3. These elements and indicators are then 
used to assess the performance of the nine case study CFUGs representing three ecological 
zones in Nepal (Chapter, 5, 6, and 7).  
 
2.7.1 RULE OF LAW 
 
The rule of law refers to ‘a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced…’ (United Nations, 2004). Good forest governance involves 
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the establishment of impartial legal frameworks. It also requires the complete safeguard of 
human rights, particularly those of poor and marginalised communities. The unbiased 
enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible 
forestry administration.  
 
2.7. 2 TRANSPARENCY 
 
Transparency denotes the visibility of decision-making processes, the clarity with which the 
rationale behind the decisions are communicated, and the accessibility of relevant 
information (Lockwood et al., 2009). Transparency ensures that the actions of governments 
and bureaucrats can be scrutinised by outsiders. Enabling access to information is crucial in 
order to ensure citizens are informed and engaged. Key attributes of transparency comprise 
the comprehensiveness, timeliness, availability, and clarity of information and whether 
efforts are made to ensure it reaches affected and vulnerable groups as appropriate 
(Nakhooda et al., 2007).  
 
2.7.3 ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Accountability is simply defined as ‘the obligation to answer for a responsibility conferred’ 
(Barrados, 2003 cited in Gale, 2008). This traditional but relatively straightforward definition 
highlights the ‘vertical’ dimensions of accountability upwards and downwards based on 
principle of delegation of authority (Gale, 2008). Accountability also comprises the extent to 
which there is clarity about the role that different institutions play in decision-making; that 
there is systematic monitoring of sector operations and processes; that the basis for basic 
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decisions is clear or justified; and that legal systems adequately uphold the public interest 
(Nakhooda et al., 2007). 
 
2.7.4 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
Arnstein (1969) claims that public participation is a redistribution of power that enables 
marginalized citizens, who are currently excluded from social, political and economic 
processes, to be purposefully involved in future programs. Effective participation can be 
understood as a process of empowerment of marginalised and disadvantaged groups (Khan, 
2012). Free and fearless opportunity to participate in community forest planning and decision 
making processes is a key cornerstone of good forest governance. The form of participation 
can be either direct or through the involvement of genuine intermediary institutions or their 
representatives.  Representative democracy does not necessarily mean, however, that 
representatives will always take account of the concerns of the most vulnerable people in 
society in decision making The core characteristic of good forest governance is broad-based 
participation that is ensured through the adoption of specific mechanisms that enable the 
effective participation of the very poor and marginalized groups. The continued existence of 
decentralized control over resources requires that active participation of local actors be 
ensured (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). 
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2.7.5 INCLUSIVENESS 
 
Every community’s well being depends on whether its members feel that they are part of the 
mainstream community and have a stake in it. This requires that the groups, particularly the 
most marginalised and vulnerable, have prospects to improve or preserve their well being. 
Inclusive participation is especially important where there are historically persistent and 
culturally entrenched social and economic inequalities. Class, caste, ethnic group and 
patriarchy are some of the stratifications in society through which discrimination manifests 
itself in community. This understanding leads us to critically examine the structure and 
operation of the ‘local community’ to assess the nature of the participation that has become 
critical to forest governance programmes. The inclusion of the categories of gender and 
marginalised groups adds additional dimensions to those related to historical disadvantages.  
 
2.7.6 EFFICIENCY  
 
Efficiency in forest management is often referred to as the use of inputs such as time, money, 
labour, efforts, tools, technologies or infrastructures to achieve intended outcomes to the 
optimum level in a given context (Kao et al., 1993). It is a measurable or quantitative concept 
as opposed to 'effectiveness', which is a qualitative idea. Output to input ratio is the 
customary concept of measuring efficiency. However, 'efficiency' in line with the 'good forest 
governance' is more than simply the assessment of inputs and outputs in terms of money 
metrics. Particularly in CF, more intangible inputs, processes and benefits, such as 
community participation, decision making, cultural significance of forests and support to 
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livelihoods of forest dependent poor are also considered important in identifying 'efficiency' 
as one of the key aspects of good forest governance. 
 
Decision-making processes often takes time and, if all things are equal, the shorter the time 
the more efficient the decision-making process is (Gale, 2008). Nevertheless, numerous 
factors hinder decisions being taken quickly. According to Gale (2008) key factors that affect 
the efficiency of environmental decision-making are: (i) the number of parties involved in the 
process; (ii) the amount of information to be assessed; and (iii) the seriousness of the risk of 
getting it wrong. Hence, in this study the more qualitative dimensions of the 'efficiency' of 
forest governance are considered, particularly the context in which CF is being practiced.  
 
2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
In this chapter, the concept of 'governance' was reviewed in line with how different global 
organizations are utilizing the idea in managing public resources. Following a review of the 
historical evolution of the concept and practices of governance, consideration was given to 
the neutral term 'governance' and the concept of 'good governance', the latter referencing 
more desirable governing process of people and resources. Decentralized governance was 
seen as a form of good governance and it was related to decentralized forest governance in 
the form of 'community forestry' (CF). Various elements of good governance applicable to 
CF were synthesized by reviewing literature, which will be helpful in developing some key 
criteria for understanding CF governance in Nepal. Further discussion of these approaches, 
and the similarities and differences between them, is elaborated in the section on  
methodological framework (Section 4.3.1).  A wide range of indicators associated with these 
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elements are identified (Section 4.3.4) and these are employed to assess the governance 
performance of nine CFs located in Nepal’s three major ecological zones (Chapter 5, 6, 7).
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CHAPTER 3 COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN NEPAL: 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution of community forestry in Nepal has a long history and has been influenced by 
a wide range of socio-economic, political, environmental and cultural contexts.  This chapter 
reviews the Nepalese context within which the current CF policy and regimes are formulated. 
The interlinked socio-ecological-political system is analysed, and the strengths and 
limitations of Nepal’s national forest policies and implementation guidelines, which influence 
forest governance, are identified and discussed.  
The chapter starts with a brief description of Nepal’s geography and key physiographic 
regions and then describes the state’s demographic structure and societal characteristics (i.e., 
gender, ethnicity, caste system, poverty, land tenure and associated indicators). Next, it 
outlines Nepal’s key forest types, and this is followed by a history of forest management and 
policy changes. Following this history, the key rationale behind community participation in 
forestry and various institutional arrangements and their roles in community forestry is 
outlined. In the next section, various modalities of community forestry are summarised and 
the political economy of the Nepalese forestry sector is discussed. Finally, the chapter ends 
with an examination of the social, economic and environmental benefits associated to 
community forestry and some challenges associated with CF are outlined. 
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3.2 GEOGRAPHY OF NEPAL  
 
Nepal is a small, landlocked country located between China and India. The country is located 
between 26º 22' and 30º 27' North latitude and 80º 04' and 88º 12' East longitude (LRMP, 
1986). Total land mass is about 14.7 million hectares (mha) and it is rectangular in shape 
extending from east to west (CBS, 2004). It is a diverse country stretching from the 
Himalayas in the north to the hot Gangetic Plains along its southern border. Rugged terrain 
(mountains and high hills) makes up 83% of the total land area. Altitudes in Nepal range 
from 66 metres above sea level (masl) in the South Eastern Terai to the 8,848 masl high peak 
of Mount Everest which is the highest peak in the World.  
The country has five main physiographical zones which are almost parallel to each other, 
running from west to east (Figure 3-1). These are (i) High Himalayan (altitude above 4500 m 
asl), (ii) High Mountains (altitude ranging from 3,000 m - 4,500 masl), (iii) Mid Hills 
(altitude ranging from 1000 m to 3000 masl), Siwaliks (altitude ranging from 500 to 1000 
masl) and Terai (below 300 masl) (MOAC, 2004; Malla, 2001). The major characteristics of 
each region, including area and percentage, are summarised in Table 3-1. 
47 | P a g e  
  
Table 3-1. Major characteristics including area and percentage of the physiographic regions 
of Nepal  
 
Features High 
Himalaya 
High-Mountain Mid Hills Siwaliks (Churia) Terai 
Elevation Above 
4000 m  
From 2200-
4000 m. High 
relief 3000 m 
from valley 
floor to ridges. 
From 800-2400 m. 
Relief 1500 m with 
isolated peaks to 
2700 m 
From 200-1500 m From 66-300 
m 
Climate Alpine to 
arctic 
(Snow 6-12 
months) 
Warm to cool 
temperate, 
alpine 
Sub- tropical, warm 
temperate, cool 
temperate on high 
ridges 
Sub-tropical (but 
warm temperate in 
higher hill spurs) 
Tropical / 
Sub-tropical 
Rainfall 
intensity 
Low Low Medium High High 
Geology Gneiss, 
schist, 
limestone 
and Tethys 
sediments 
Gneiss, quartzite 
and mica schists 
Phyllite, quartzite 
limestone and islands 
of granites 
Tertiary sandstone, 
siltstone, shale and 
conglomerates 
Quaternary 
alluvium 
Vegetation 
types 
Open 
meadows 
and tundra 
vegetation 
Fir, pine, birch 
and 
rhododendron 
forests 
Pine forests, mixed 
hardwood and oak 
forests 
Sal forests, mixed 
hard woods and 
pine forests 
Sal forests; 
mixed 
hardwoods 
People/ 
Ethnic 
groups 
Temporary 
herders 
Sherpa and 
Bhotiya 
Khas Chetri, 
Tibetan related 
groups - 
Thakali, 
Bhotiya, Sherpa, 
Tamangs, Ghale 
Gurung, Magar, 
Tamang, Newar, 
Brahmin, Chetri, 
Damai, Sarki, Sunar, 
Kumal, Rais, Limbu. 
Tharus (dun valley) 
presently all hill 
tribes displaced/ 
immigrated from 
middle mountains 
Tharus, 
Brahmins, 
Chetris, 
Source: Table adapted from the FAO, 2008 
 
The five physiographic regions can be reclassified into three basically different ecological 
zones. These are Terai (which includes Siwaliks), Mid Hills, and High Mountains (which 
includes High Himalaya) (See Figure 3-1). About one-third of Nepal's total area is forested, 
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21% is covered by cultivated land, and seven percent is non-cultivated land. Similarly, about 
23% of the total area is covered by shrubs, grasses and pastures (DFRS, 2001). By ecological 
zone, Mid-Hills has most of the forests (about 26%), followed by Terai (8 %) and High 
Mountains (1%) (DFRS, 1999).   
  
Figure 3-1. Map of Nepal showing location between in India and China and the three major 
ecological zones (Figure source: Chhetri et al., 2012, Applied Geography) 
 
3.3 DEMOGRAPHY 
 
The population of Nepal is 26.5 million, with an average family size of 4.9 and an average 
population density of 180 per square kilometre (CBS, 2012). The male and female population 
is 12.8 million (48.5%) and 13.6 million (51.5%), respectively. The population growth rate is 
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1.35 % per annum (CBS, 2012), which means it is projected to rise to 45 million by 2050 
with continued pressure on natural and built resources.  
Nepal’s population structure is unusual, as approximately 40% of the population is below 15 
years of age and seven percent of the population is above 60 years of age (CBS, 2002, 2004). 
Also, the population distribution in the three different ecological zones is very unequal. The 
High Mountain region contains approximately 7% of the population, although it occupies 
about 35% of the country’s land; in contrast approximately 43% of the population lives in the 
Mid-Hills region covering approximately 42% of the total land area. The Terai region, which 
occupies approximately 23% of the total land, supports the remaining 50% of the population. 
According to the 2011 census, 83 % of the population live in rural areas (CBS, 2012). 
The Terai emerged as an agricultural and industrial centre only after the eradication of 
malaria in the 1960s and its development is challenging the traditional economic and cultural 
centres located in the Mid-Hills region. There has been a large influx of people migrating 
from the Mid-Hills to the Terai region over the past 50 years. However, more than 40% of 
Nepal’s population still lives in the Mid-Hill region. Both land productivity and access to 
markets are limited in the Mid-Hills due to its rugged topography where subsistence farming 
is the main economic activity. Consequently, the majority of the people depend on the 
forests, using its produce for fuel for heating and cooking, and for agricultural inputs such as 
fodder and leaf-litter for animal bedding and composting (CBS, 2012). 
 
3.4 STRUCTURE OF NEPALESE SOCIETY  
 
Nepalese society is heterogeneous with a complex mixture of various ethnic groups overlain 
by deep disparities in socio-economic and political opportunities. The country’s social 
50 | P a g e  
structure and stratification is based on the hierarchical arrangement of various social classes, 
caste systems and strata (Abercrombie et al., 2000). The caste-based social structures and 
cultural practices contradict the newly emerging democratic and egalitarian norms and values 
adopted by the state, but these structures are deeply rooted in the past over at least three 
millenia (Gurung, 2005). The prevalence of castes, untouchability, the unequal status of 
women, and the gap between rich and poor have retarded the country’s development and 
further entrenched economic disparity (Pradhan and Shrestha, 2005).  
Based on the power relations in terms of access to different assets and services, the citizens 
can broadly be divided into two groups: marginalized and elites. Unlike the conventional 
Marxist division between the rich and the poor based on who controls the means of 
production, the inequality in Nepalese society is more complex in terms of caste, gender, 
ethnicity, class and region.  
The marginalized groups, which are also described in various terms such as 'oppressed', 
'disadvantaged' or 'exploited' groups have been constitutionally and legally recognized to be 
specially treated for their equitable upliftment and entrenchment into the mainstream. These 
groups are 'women', 'indigenous ethnic groups', 'Dalits', 'Madhesis', religious minorities  and 
all those who live in the remote area in the north-west part of the country (GON, 2007).  
Women in general, regardless of their family backgrounds, are marginalized or disadvantaged 
due to their far less opportunities in education, paid employment, right to property, political 
leadership and social status in comparison with their male counterparts.  Women make up 
nearly 51 per cent of the total population, but only eight per cent of them have land holding 
entitlements due to a patriarchal tradition in which land and other properties are formally 
owned by the male members of the family (Gurung, 2009). Their representation in the civil 
and other government employment is below 10 per cent, while the percentage of women in 
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the Legislative Parliament is below 20 per cent despite the official commitment of the state 
that at least 33 per cent of these institutions would accommodate women.  Thus the women 
are one of the disadvantaged or marginalized groups in Nepal. 
Indigenous ethnic group is another community, which is considered marginalized in the 
country. There are two broader ethnic groups in the country, namely Indo-Aryan language 
speaking Caucasoid group and Tibeto-Burman language speaking Mongoloid communities. 
The latter are called the 'indigenous' groups or communities, since they settled in the country 
much earlier than the former. These indigenous groups altogether make up nearly 35 per cent 
of the total population, but they are disadvantaged in terms of economic capabilities, political 
power, level of education and access to various resources and  services due to the dominance 
of so called high caste groups, such as Brahmin and Kshetriya, who have held  the major high 
ranking positions in bureaucracy, judiciary, military, police and political leadership (Gurung, 
2009; ILO, 2005). Gurung (2009) contends that various development programs, such as land 
reform and protected area systems have further marginalized the indigenous communities by 
depriving them off their access to land and other natural resources. Although the individuals 
of these indigenous group are scattered across the country, there are some pocket areas where 
certain indigenous groups are in the majority. For example, the Sherpas are mostly found in 
the high mountains, whereas the Gurungs mostly live in the western Mid-Hills. There are 62 
indigenous communities identified in Nepal and they are considered marginalized or 
disadvantaged people (World Bank and DFID, 2006). 
Dalits make up another marginalized group. The term Dalit literally means 'oppressed', 
'suppressed' or 'downtrodden' group, which can operationally be defined as an 'untouchable' 
caste (ILO, 2005). They are referred to as 'untouchable' in a sense that the so called high caste 
people do not eat the food or drink the liquid touched by the individuals belonging to this 
group. Dalits have suffered from this 'untouchability' tradition for generations since it is 'one 
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of the fundamental discriminatory practices committed against the Dalit people' resulting in 
their low social status and traditional occupations often detested by so called upper caste 
people (ILO, 2005:7). The Dalit group compose nearly 13 per cent of Nepal's population 
(NNDSWO, 2014). They are divided into Hill Dalits, who are originally from the mountain 
and the Terai Dalits, who are from the plain region of the country. They are basically artisan 
people by occupations. The major Dalit groups include darji (tailers), kami (blacksmiths), 
sarki/chamar (cobblers) and gaine (singers).  
The Madhesi population, who originally come from the southern plain region. is also 
considered marginalized in Nepal. These are people have a language and culture similar to 
the people in adjacent territory in northern India. They are, at times, called 'Indian-migrants' 
and treated as 'non-Nepali', although they have Nepalese citizenship (Dahal, 1983; Nayak, 
2011). Their presence in the civil service is very minimal in comparison with the people from 
the mountain since the state favoured the latter for education, political empowerment and 
military service over time. The overall education status of the Madhesi people is far below 
the average, whereas their economic status in general is poorer than the average status of the 
mountain people (Gurung, 2009).  
The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007 and other laws have adopted a 'positive 
discrimination' policies for the upliftment of these marginalized populations. Reservations 
have been provided for these groups in order to increase their representations in bureaucracy, 
military services, police force and the parliament.  
While discussing 'marginalized', it is relevant to talk about 'elites' as well. The terms, 
'marginalized' and 'elites' are relative in the given time and contexts. In Nepalese contexts, 
economically wealthy, well educated, upper caste and males are considered 'elites', as 
opposed to those who are economically poor, uneducated, indigenous people, Dalits, 
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Madhesis and women, who are normally considered 'marginalized'. The 'elites' and 
'marginalized' populations have exploitative relationships with the cultural power balance 
strongly in favour of the former despite the recent constitutional and legal reforms for the 
inclusion of the latter in economic, social and political processes (Gurung, 2009). 
Since at least 1814, Nepalese society has been based on hierarchical legal structures that 
exclude the ‘lower’ castes, women, ethnic communities, and non-Nepali speaking 
communities from state administration and land ownership (Bistha, 1991; Pradhan and 
Shrestha, 2005). These structures include Hindu religious law and, increasingly, customary 
law. As a result several ethnic groups have been subject to significant discrimination by the 
elites and so-called high caste groups (Pradhan and Shrestha, 2005). In fact, societal 
domination by small groups of people is a common phenomenon in many social systems, 
which is known as ‘elite orientated social stratification’ (Bottomore, 1964; Coleman, 2001).  
While a recent declaration of the recalled Parliament in May 2006 and the Interim 
Constitution of Nepal clearly state that ‘no person shall, on the basis of caste, be 
discriminated against as untouchable’ (UNDP, 2008), in fact ‘untouchability’ and 
‘discrimination’ are still alive in practice which effects the participation of dalits in 
community forestry.  
 
3.5 FOREST TYPES OF NEPAL 
 
In Nepal, forestry is a predominant land use with 4.27 million hectares of the total land area 
(29%) covered by forests and an additional 1.6 million hectares area (10.6%) covered by 
shrub land (DFRS/FRISP, 1999). The distribution of natural vegetation is greatly influenced 
by climate, and the effects of altitude, temperature, rainfall and aspect are significant. The 
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large variation in altitude, temperature, rainfall and geology enriches Nepal with a high level 
of biodiversity that includes 75 vegetation types and 35 forest types (FAO, 1999b). As a 
result of these factors, the country is divided into broadly parallel zones that range through 
different types of vegetation to permanent snow on the one hand and that vary in ecological 
diversity from tropical forests to alpine tundra on the other.  
Jackson (1994) classified Nepal’s vegetation into six different types based on climate and 
altitude. Similarly, Dobremez et al. (1972) classified Nepal into four domains and 11 sub-
levels, which provide six vegetation categories based on altitudinal classification (bio-
climatic zones), which identifies 118 distinct ecosystems in Nepal. Furthermore, Stainton 
(1972) classified Nepal’s forests into 35 different vegetation types and ten major forest types. 
Based on his previous vegetation classification framework, Jackson (1994) set out what is 
now a widely accepted account of Nepal’s forest types and this is presented in Table 3-2
55 | P a g e  
Table 3-2. Major Forests Types of Nepal 
Major Forest types Elevation Detail forest types 
Tropical forests below 1000 m 
1. Shorea robusta Forest 
2. Acacia catechu-Dalbergia sissoo Forest 
3. Other riverain Forest 
4. Grassland and Terminalia-anogeissus Deciduous Hill Forest 
Sub-tropical forests 1000 - 2000 m 
5. Pinus roxburghii Forest 
6. Schima-castanopsis Forest 
7. Alnus nepalensis Forest 
8. Riverain forest with Toona and Albizia species 
Temperate forests 2000 - 3100 m Lower temperate 2000 - 2700 m  
9. Quercus leucotricophora and Quercus lanata Forest (Oak) 
10. Quercus floribunda Forest 
11. Quercus lamellosa Forest 
12. Lower temperate mixed broad leaved forest with abundant 
lauraceae 
13. Pinus wallichiiana Forest (Lower type) 
Upper temperate 2700 - 3100 m 
14. Quercus semecarpifolia forests 
15. Upper temperate mixed broadleaved Forest 
16. Rhododendron Forest 
17. Upper temperate coniferous Forest 
Sub-alpine forests 3000 - 4200 m 
18. Abies spectabilis Forest 
19. Betula utilis Forest 
20. Rhododendron Forest 
21. Juniperus indica steppe 
22. Caragana steppe 
Alpine forests up to 4500 m 
23. Alpine forests 
Source: (Table summarised from the text by Jackson, 1994: 119 - 124) 
Forests have tremendous economic and social importance in Nepal.  Besides their ecological 
benefits, forests are the main source of livelihoods for rural poor people. More than 90% of 
the people use wood fuel as a source of energy for everyday cooking and heating. More than 
80% of Nepalese depend on agriculture for their livelihood, which is interconnected to forest 
resources and livestock through fodder, leaf litter, soil retention and organic matter. The 
Nepalese agriculture sector contributes nearly 34% to the country’s gross domestic product, 
with forests’ direct share estimated at about 15% (IIDS 2014). In addition to forests’ 
contribution to the economy through agriculture, its importance in ecotourism, forest-based 
enterprises, watershed conservation, green economy and climate change mitigation is also 
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significant. Socially, the forestry sector has contributed to creating inclusive institutions 
through various community-based forestry organizations. The inclusion of socially and 
economically marginalized communities as well as women in forestry groups has played an 
important role in enhancing the capacity of these social groups to challenge the social and 
gender discrimination they experience (LFP, 2004; NSCFP; 2007). 
 
 
3.6 HISTORY OF FOREST MANAGEMENT AND POLICY IN NEPAL 
 
Nepal’s forest management system has evolved over some centuries and reflects policies that 
favour the ruling elite (Gilmour, 1988; Guthman, 1997). These policies included land grants 
favouring elite members of the society such as, high caste, educated, wealthy peoples. They 
continue to influence land tenure arrangements and associated socioeconomic characteristics. 
More specifically, Nepal’s forest policy and management approaches have changed 
considerably since the beginning of twentieth century (Gautam et al., 2004). Over the past 
hundred years various forest policies were formulated and legislative provisions were made 
to resolve the perceived problems associated to forest management (Gautam et al., 2004). 
Based on the history of forest management in Nepal, Hobley (1996) identified three major 
phases of policy change. These were (i) era of privatisation (before 1957), (ii) era of 
nationalisation (1957 – 1978), and (iii) era of populism - decentralization and community 
involvement (1978 – now). The evolution of Nepali forest policy and its impact on forest 
management are summarised in Table 3-3.
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Table 3-3.  Historical Change of Forest Policy and their Effect in Forest Management 
Year Policy/Event Significance /impact on forest management 
Prior to 
1950 
i. distribution of national forest 
to Rana family members as 
Birta; i. forest land use change from forest to agricultural land use 
   
 
ii. planned logging and Terai 
forest clearance along the Indian 
border for the intention of 
settlement, and  ii. revenue generation to the state 
   
  iii (a) protection of forest land 
 
iii. traditional  management 
system (group efforts) Talukdar 
practice in the hills 
iii. (b)  fulfillment of basic forest products such as fuelwood, 
fodder and household 
  construction  
   
 
1957 
Private Forest Nationalization 
Act haphazard cutting of forests 
  conversion of private forest into farmland in the Terai 
  plains 
 
1961 Forest Act  classification of forest into various categories 
  Forestry officials empowered 
 
1967 Forest Conservation Act legal powers to forestry officials 
 
 (special Forest Management 
act) Law enforcement power reinforced 
 
1976 National Forestry Plan  acknowledgment of people’s participation in forest management  
   
  concept of village Panchayat Forest 
1977 Amendment of Forest Act 1961 Provision of Panchayat Forest and Panchayat 
  Protected Forest 
 
 
1978 
Panchayat Forest (PF) and 
Panchayat Protected transfer of national forest to village Panchayat 
 Forest (PPF) Regulation  
  
formal acknowledgment of rights of local people for forest 
management 
   
1982 Decentralization Act  authority to district and village Panchayats 
  promotion of users’ committee concept 
 
1987 
Revision of PF and PPF 
Regulation 1978  earnings from Panchayat Forest and Panchayat 
  Protected Forest channeled back to the concerned 
  Panchayats 
 
 
1989 
Master Plan for the Forestry 
Sector (MPFS) •iInitiation of a program approach in the forestry 
  sector 
  • provision of users’ committees for forest 
  management 
  • detailed planning and vision developed for each 
 
 
 
  
aspects of forestry development 
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Year Policy/Event Significance /impact on forest management 
  
 
 
1993 Forest Act   • level of quasi-judicial power of forestry officials reduced. 
   
  • CFUGs empowered for management of forest resources. 
  • act oriented towards people-centered management 
1995 Forest Regulations Legalization of the procedure of CF 
  • procedure of CF outlined 
  • forestry staff’s task changed from custodial to facilitator  
1999 Revision of Forest Act, 1993  • power mechanism for breach of operational 
  plans by FUG members developed 
  
• provision for spending the FUG fund in a variety of 
development activities 
   
2000 
i. Revision of CF Directives, 
1994 i. prerequisite for obligatory inclusion of growing 
  stock of CF and annual allowable cut in 
  operational plans 
 ii. Revision of MPFS, 1988 ii. joint management of state forests on 
  the basis of the landscape planning approach 
 
iii. Government decision on new 
concept of iii. a) managing of degraded and open forest areas 
 
forest management in Terai, 
Inner-Terai in the Terai and Inner-Terai regions 
 and Siwalik regions iii. b) conservation of Siwalik forests 
2002 Leasehold Forestry Policy  condition of basis for the transfer of national forests 
  to the private sector in the form of leasehold forests 
2004 
Herbs and Non-Timber Forest 
Products Development Policy 
emphasis on commercial production of non-timber forest 
products including medicinal and aromatic plants from forests 
including community-managed forests for biodiversity 
conservation, local livelihoods and forestry sector contribution 
to national economy 
2008 Initiation of carbon forestry 
Submission of Nepal's Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) for  
REDD+ funding to Forest Carbon Partnership facilities of the 
World Bank  
  Nepal selected for REDD+  in 2010  
  
preparation of various studies and baseline scenarios to be 
completed by 2014 
  
various piloting projects initiated in community forestry clusters 
to develop distribution mechanisms of REDD+ money to local 
people engaged in forest management 
  
different governance indicators at local level being tested for 
fair and equitable distribution of REDD+ money 
2012 President Siwalik Conservation all the Siwalik range (outer Himalayan range) declared a 
'protection zone' under 'President Siwalik Conservation 
Programme'. Community forests located on the Siwalik hill 
required to amend their operational plans to ensure the 
conservation guidelines outlined in this programme are met.  
2014 Chure and Siwalik Conservation 
area 
Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation recently declared 
Siwalik area from east to west and formed a special committee 
for further planning and management.  
 
Source: Summarized from the text (Kanel, 2007; MFSC, 2013; Pokharel et al., 2008; Ojha et 
al., 2009). For Nepali terms see Glosssary of Nepali terms in p. xxii
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3.6.1 ERA OF FOREST PRIVATISATION (BEFORE 1951) 
 
The era of forest privatisation is generally considered the period of pre-Rana and Rana 
regime in Nepal. Prior to the 1769, Nepal was divided into many small kingdoms and 
different forest management systems were adopted in different kingdoms. There was a little 
concern about forests because of small population and abundant resources. Most of the 
forests were state-owned but people were allowed to collect forest products under certain 
rules and regulations (Tiwari, 1990). For example, Kipat system was one of the ancient and 
traditional land holding systems that existed in Eastern Nepal. Under the Kipat system the 
forest resources were managed collectively within a community and the members of other 
communities via payment of fees or other commodities to the owners of the forest (Arnold 
and Campbell, 1986; Tiwari, 1990). 
After the unification of Nepal in 1769, various form of forest management systems were 
practiced by the Nepalese feudal rulers i.e., Shah and Rana dynasty. Some noticeable systems 
of forest management were Talukdari, Birta, and Jagir (see also Table 3-3). The feudal rulers 
encouraged people to convert hill forests into agricultural land use to increase revenue 
through land taxes which was known as Talukdari system. Talukdars (village headmen 
selected by the Ranas) had the responsibility to control the resources and collect the revenue.  
From the late of 1920s, and with the help of skilled British foresters, the cultivated area was 
extended by clearing some forests and extracting wood in other forests to sell abroad to India 
to collect revenue for the Terai region (Joshi, 1993). In addition, large areas of forests were 
given to members of the Rana family as birtas, and to influential and powerful officials as 
jagir.  Incomes from the forests under these tenures flowed to the owners of such lands rather 
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than the state.  It was estimated that by 1950 approximately one third of total forest area was 
under birta tenure, which was owned by the Rana family (Joshi, 1993).  
 
3.6.2 ERA OF FOREST NATIONALISATION (1951 – 1976) 
 
The era of forest nationalization occurred between 1951 and 1976, which was also a period of 
political turmoil in the country. The government nationalised all private forests in 1957 
through the Private Forest Nationalisation Act (PFNA) with aim of protecting them from 
indiscriminate use by a few elites (Talbott and Khadka, 1994). The main aims of 
privatisations were, (i) to avoid the destruction of forests, and (ii) to ensure sufficient 
protection, maintenance, and use of privately owned forests. Many analysts argue that the 
PFNA generated controversy and debate that further fuelled deforestation and ruined the 
indigenous forest management systems (e.g., Hobley, 1985; Messerschmidt, 1993). However, 
others argue that nationalization was essential to ensure that Rana rulers did not continue to 
exploit the Terai forests for their own purposes (e.g., Joshi, 1993). The positive result was to 
establish a separate ministry, the Ministry of Forestry, in 1959 and to expand the 
government’s forestry capacity. However, the government was not able to limit the 
deforestation that was occurring due to lack of manpower and access to remote villages. 
According to Joshi (1993), the government lacked capacity to take over the management 
responsibilities vested in it by the PFNA. 
Comprehensive forestry legislation in the form of the Forest Act 1961 (hereafter the Act) was 
promulgated in 1961 and many changes were enforced after democratic government gave 
way to authoritarian rule in 1960. The Act strengthened the Department of Forests’ capacity 
to control deforestation by clearly dividing forests into diverse categories, defining the duties 
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and power of the forest department, clarifying forest offences, and arranging penalties. In 
addition, the Forest Protection (Special Provision) Act (FPA), formulated in 1967 to support 
the 1961 Forest Act, provided for stronger penalties for destructive acts or the removal of 
forest products from state forests. These two acts, however, ultimately proved unsuccessful in 
protecting the forest as a result of poor enforcement (Gautam et al., 2004). The major 
drawbacks of the two acts were that they only focused on the sale of forest products, on 
prohibition and punishment, and on organizational changes, rather than on giving priority to 
sustainable forest management and the needs of the people. Many plans were prepared at the 
district level but were never implemented (Joshi, 1993). 
At the same time, the eradication of malaria in the Terai created serious pressure on the 
region’s forests as a result of natural migration on the one hand and the government’s 
resettlement programs on the other. In spite of government policies to control forest 
infringement and prevent deforestation for other non-forestry uses, the clearing of forests for 
resettlement programs continued. By implementing the policy in this way, many regional 
migrants were encouraged to engage in illegal incursions in the hope of getting land that was 
cleared and cultivated registered as personal property (Wallace, 1981). 
 
3.6.3 ERA OF DECENTRALIZATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
(1976 ONWARD)  
 
The devolution and decentralization of Nepal’s forestry sector started when the country 
launched its first National Forestry Plan (NFP) in 1976. The Plan introduced the community 
participation approach in forest management (Gautam et al., 2004) and was considered a 
stepping stone to decentralized forest governance in Nepal. This paradigm shift in Nepalese 
forestry was due to the influence of the discourse of participatory development on the one 
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hand and international concern over the theory of ‘Himalayan desertification’ on the other 
(Ojha et al., 2008). The government identified the need for public participation as a solution 
and recognized that local communities were legitimate actors in forest management after 
longstanding failures to combat deforestation and to restore denuded hills (Gilmour and 
Fisher, 1991). The following turning points in forest polices are recognized as major 
milestones in decentralised forest governance in Nepal in this period. 
 
3.6.3.1 STAGE OF LEARNING AND POLICY CREATION (1976 TO 1988) 
 
The 1976 NFP recognized the role of local peoples and specifically emphasized their 
involvement in forest management for the first time, a recognition that resulted from the 
Ninth Forestry Conference of 1974 (Pokharel, 1997).The Forest Act 1961 was amended in 
1977 and made provisions for both Panchayat Forest (PF) and the Panchayat Protected Forest 
(PPF), both new categories of forests to be managed by local communities, religious 
institutions and individual peoples. Forest Regulations for PFs and PPFs were enacted that 
formally allowed village panchayats to manage barren or degraded lands for forest production 
in 1978. These amendments to the Forest Act and Regulations signaled a major shift in 
Nepal’s forest policy and a milestone in forest management with the government realizing 
that forests could not be managed without the cooperation of local people (Shrestha, 1996). 
Resource development through reforestation and afforestation projects was the focus of the 
government and donor agencies during this early stage of participatory policy creation. 
Therefore, the involvement of community in forest management was limited to the planting 
and protection of forests to meet the government’s project objectives (Collett et al., 1996). 
However, despite good will, the partnership between government and village panchayats was 
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not especially effective during this period for a variety of reasons (Pokharel, 1997). 
Subsequently, therefore, a Master Plan for the Forestry Sector was initiated, which paved the 
way for the country’s current strong national policy of community forestry. 
 
3.6.3.2 STAGE OF CONDUCIVE LEGISLATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (1989 
– 2000) 
 
The enactment of the Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS) and decentralized forestry 
legislation (Forest Act, 1993 and Forest Regulations, 1995) are major events of this period for 
paradigm shift in forestry sectors of Nepal.  
The MPFS was approved by the government in 1989 for a 25-year period. It established 
private and community forestry as one of the six most important forestry programs in the 
state and made provision to shift forest access and managing rights to local communities. The 
Master Plan provided the framework for developing policies for managing the country’s 
forest sector, with the aim to mobilize, conserve and manage forest resources in a sustainable 
way and thereby maintain a balance in the demand for and supply of forest products, create 
income and employment opportunities within the sector for poor and marginalized 
households, promote people’s participation, enhance productivity, and develop appropriate 
land-use plans (MPFS, 1988). The Plan recommended the establishment of Community 
Forestry Users Groups (CFUGs) as a suitable local institution for management of local 
forests and the development of an operational forest management plan by communities as a 
precondition to handing over forests. The MPFS also proposed handing over all available hill 
forests to local communities based on their willingness and capability to manage them 
(Bartlett, 1992; Gautam et al., 2004). 
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Based on the provisions of the MFSC 1989 and Decentralization Act 1982, the promulgation 
of Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulation 1995 was a breakthrough for community forestry 
in Nepal. These two pieces of legislation provided a legal basis for the implementation of 
community forestry by establishing CFUGs as legal entities and classifying government 
forests into five sub-categories. These were: leasehold forest, government-managed forest, 
community forest, religious forest, and protected forest. The new laws established a CFUG as 
a self-governing, autonomous body with the rights to manage and use the forest according to 
an approved management plan. An amendment to the Act in 1999 made it compulsory for a 
CFUG to invest at least 25% of its income in forest management. The CF program proved 
very popular and one positive effect was its significant expansion in terms of both spatial 
coverage and number of forests handed over to local communities. Most of these community 
forests were in the Mid Hills region. Past studies, however, reveal that there is a great deal of 
unevenness in the success of community based forest management programs across the 
country. For example, the community forestry program has been far less successful in the 
Terai in comparison with the Mid Hills (JTRCF, 2001). Furthermore, despite making 
progressive provisions toward decentralization and good forest governance,  several gaps and 
inconsistencies in the Forest Act of 1993 have been identified, such as: forest user groups are 
given only usufruct rights; and forest ownership is retained by the state (Dahal and 
Chapagain, 2008; MFSC, 2013). 
 
3.6.3.3 STAGE OF EMERGING NEW ISSUES (FROM 2000 TO PRESENT) 
 
The revised forestry policy of 2000 coupled with the emergence of strong civil society and 
various development issues in forestry sector, such as forest-based poverty reduction, climate 
65 | P a g e  
change, multi-stakeholder concept and good forest governance were noticeable as landmarks 
in the forestry sector after 2000. However, retrogressive activities were started in 
decentralized forest governance at central level in order to recentralize the devolved authority 
from the local communities (Dahal and Chapagain, 2008). 
The Forest Sector Policy 2000 saw the government return to the conservation agenda of the 
past and insert obligatory provisions for CFUGs to pay 40 per cent of their earnings from 
timber sales to the state (Kanel, 2006). The policy also curbed the right of local communities 
with regard to CF management. The government imposed other restrictions on CFUGs. For 
example, it barred forest products from removal, even for subsistence requirements, unless a 
forest inventory to assess annual growth had been made and the CFOP revised. A separate 
policy also emerged in 2000 for the Terai, Inner-Terai, and Churia forests, which restricted 
CF in low lands. This policy stated that adjoining large blocks of forests were to be managed 
as state forest under a joint management agreement while unproductive lands, shrublands and 
inaccessible forests were to be managed as community forests (HMGN, 2000). The new 
policy created a rift between government and civil society, with the latter arguing strongly 
against the policy. They argued that the new policy discouraged CFUGs in their attempts to 
protect the country’s forests and demanded that the government pull back. Many scholars 
also have criticized the new policy (Mahapatra, 2001; Malla, 2001). 
The emerging conflict was compounded due to shifting attitudes to community forestry in the 
forest bureaucracy. Notably, there was a strong resistance to handing CFs in the Terai back. 
The Federation of Community Forestry Users Nepal (FECOFUN) constantly opposed the 
government’s plans and demonstrated with a big rally in favor of community forestry. During 
this period donor agencies and their project officials focused on issues of discrimination 
against marginalized communities and lobbied for the equitable and fair representations of 
these communities in community forestry user groups (MFSC, 2013).
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3.6.3.4 SUMMARY ISSUES AND OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN 
VARIOUS TIME PERIOD 
 
Another way of explaining and evaluating the history of community forestry in Nepal is to 
divide it into the following five phases based on the issues confronted: experimental, first 
generation, second generation, third generation and fourth generation. Table 3-4 summarises 
the phases, issues and outcomes and clearly demonstrates the gradual change in key issues 
associated to community forestry in Nepal. In early 1980 the focus was on trialing various 
mechanisms of community participation in forest protection whereas more recently the focus 
is on global warming, climate change adaptation mechanisms and payment of ecosystem 
services. 
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Table 3-4. History and evolution of community forestry in Nepal  
 
Phase Key Issues  Major Outcomes 
Pilot/experimen
tal phase 1980s 
Trials across different projects 
of user group forestry, including 
work on participatory group 
formation methods, major  focus 
on issues of  inclusion of women 
and marginalised groups such as 
women poor 
very influential period that led to major changes 
in policy and legislation.  
The focused time and attention spent on group 
formation processes, issues of inclusion and 
equity were not easily replicable to scale 
First generation 
issues 1990s 
Group formation, organisational 
change in forest department, 
management systems, 
productivity of forests and 
relationship to farming system 
Large number of user groups formed in short 
period of time, less attention to issues of 
participation and equity within groups.  
A strong focus on learning and exchange 
between groups and attention to forest 
management and silvicultural issues 
Second 
generation 
issues Late 
1990s to 2000+ 
Equity vs equality on benefit 
sharing, good governance, 
conflict management and social 
justice 
Major  investment by donor supported forestry 
projects in coaching in good governance, 
additional programmes to support the 
livelihoods of poor people, and a refocusing of 
community forest funds and activities to the 
extreme poor and poor 
Third 
generation 
issues 2000+ 
(during the 
period of 
conflict) 
Internal power dynamics, 
enterprise development, social 
exclusion dominant issue 
Conflict period highlighted the increasing 
problems of elite control  and social exclusion, 
leading to major attempts to rebalance power 
within user groups.  
Continued support to income generation and  
livelihood activities, reduced role of forest 
department staff and increased role of NGOs as 
service providers 
Fourth 
generation 
issues 2006+ 
Forest users as citizens, extreme 
poverty, rebalancing of sector 
actors, and the impacts of 
climate change and need for 
climate change adaptation and 
forests as sources for payment 
for ecosystem  services 
Development of a new national forest 
programme based on multi-stakeholder 
approaches at all levels. 
Recognition of the limitations of forests to 
directly reduce poverty, particularly for the 
extreme poor, a shift away from sole focus on 
community forestry to a range of management 
regimes that deliver multiple benefits to local 
people;  
Recognition of the potential of community 
forestry as an adaptation mechanism for climate 
change 
Source: MFSC, 2013: 88. 
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3.7 RATIONALE BEHIND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
FORESTRY 
 
In recent years, community management of forest resources has emerged as the main policy 
agenda in various developing countries (Adhikari et al., 2004; Agrawal, 2001; Heltberg, 
2002). There are three main advantages for adopting community management in place of 
state management; (1) lower implementation and monitoring costs, (2) higher incentive for 
local people to get involved in management activities, and (3) adequate information related to 
natural resource management (Adhikari, 2005).  Presently, approximately 17,500 recognised 
user groups legally manage over 1.7 million hectares or some 30 % of the total forested land 
in Nepal (DoF, 2014). A fundamental assumption of community involvement in forest 
management is that the particular forest communities cooperate to manage and use forest 
resources in a more sustainable way compared to centrally governed bureaucratic 
management. The rationale for community participation in forest management is multiple 
(see Table 3-5). 
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Table 3-5. The rationale behind community participation in forest management 
Proximity local communities are the immediate custodian in closest touch 
with the forest and dependent on it in a variety of ways 
Impact livelihoods of local communities are directly affected by the condition 
of the forest and the goods and services it provides 
Management 
Capacity 
community role and capacity to manage forest is well documented in 
the social science literature 
Cost effectiveness limited capacity and resources available to the government mainly in 
developing countries  
Adaptation flexible and adaptive management cannot be delivered by a central 
authority and requires local participation 
Equity  equity and social justice in the distribution of forest benefits are 
important and local community involvement increases the resource 
flow to rural area 
Livelihoods 
consideration 
local communities often interested in non timber forest products (e.g.,  
foods and medicine) as a safety net 
Biodiversity and 
other services 
multiple groups with different interests within a community help to 
manage the forest which may enhance biodiversity and other 
environmental services 
Development 
philosophy 
international communities and donor organisations often give high 
priority to participatory management of natural resources 
Governance decentralised forest management practices may improve performance 
across a range of governance indicators such as transparency, 
accountability, rule of law, etc. 
Source: Adapted from Brown (1999).   
 
3.8 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT CF IN NEPAL  
 
The national, regional, district and range-post levels of Department of Forests and community 
forest user groups are the primary actors in the implementation of community forestry in 
Nepal. Many bilateral and multilateral donors and international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) play important roles in providing financial and technical support to 
implement CF programmes. Similarly, a number of non state actors such as civil society 
organisations and private firms also play important roles in CF programme delivery. The 
linkage among key actors in CF programme is portrayed in Figure 3-2 and the detailed 
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structure of government agencies and FECOFUN that work with community forest users at 
the grass root level shown in Figure 3-3.   
 
 
Figure 3-2. Key actors in the operation of community forestry, Nepal (Adapted from 
Khadka, 2009) 
Notes: The solid two-directional arrow indicates the direct role that organisations play in 
policy setting and/or implementation; the solid one-directional arrow indicates the direct role 
organisations play in the operation of CF policy; and the dotted two-directional arrows 
indicate the operational relationships between organisations such as service providers and/or 
users. For acronyms see List of Acronyms p. xx. 
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Figure 3-3. Organisational structure of Nepalese Ministry of Forestry and Soil Conservation 
Federation of Community Forestry User Groups of Nepal (Figure drawn after Dahal and 
Chapagain, 2008). For acronyms see List of Acronyms p. xx. 
 
3.9 EVOLUTION OF OTHER COMMUNITY-BASED FORESTRY 
MODALITIES NEPAL 
 
The practices embedded in community forestry in Nepal have also been modified, scaled up 
and deployed in various other resource management programmes in the country. Some 
important programmes that employ elements of the community-based forestry regime are (i) 
leasehold forestry, (ii) collaborative forest management, (iii) community-based watershed 
management, (iv) integrated conservation and development, and (v) protected area buffer 
zone forestry (Ojha et al., 2008). The evolution of CF policy and the expansion of community 
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forestry institutions over the past three decades stem from Nepal’s unique socio-cultural, 
political, economic and ecological contexts. The large number of environmental, socio-
political and economic considerations that have played an important role in community 
forestry in Nepal are summarised in Table 3-6.
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Table 3-6. Summary of key conditions and factors for the success  of CF in Nepal (Table 
mainly adapted from the text by Ojha et al 2009:10-11)  
 
Condition, factors and policy context References 
heavy pressure exerted on the forest due to growing human and livestock 
populations (Mahat, 1987) 
presence of established, intense social networks and traditional modes of 
collective action around local forest management in Nepal 
(Fisher, 1989; Chhetri and Pandey, 
1992) 
media coverage of the crisis of Himalayan environmental degradation and 
subsequent international conservation assistance (Gutman, 1991) 
presence of existing forest-based livelihood systems in the Middle Hills  and 
incentives for local people to contribute in forest protection and management for a 
range of forest products  (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991) 
incapacity of the Forest Department to protect and manage forests effectively, due 
to lack of manpower, resource and access  
(Gilmour and Fisher, 1991; 
Subedi, 2006); 
effect of the Forest Act 1993, particularly in the Middle Hills region, which has 
encouraged local people to exercise maximum control over forest resources (Kanel,1993; Hobley, 1996) 
‘community forestry is the outcome of past experiences related to political 
turmoil, population growth, regulatory enforcement and excessive dependence of 
people on forest resources and a paradigmatic shift in development thinking’ 
(Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001 cited 
on Ojha et al 2009) 
emergence of a democratic political system in 1990 and subsequent expansion of 
civil society spaces (Ojha, 2006) 
‘breakdown of traditional power relationships through political movements and 
emergence of “subaltern” groups taking leadership power at the CFUG level’ 
(Bhattarai, 2007 cited on Ojha et 
al., 2009) 
continued tradition of piloting new approaches and reflection among CF program 
stakeholders, including regular nationwide workshops every five years since the 
1980s (Ojha and Timsina, 2008) 
potential of 'household approach' to poverty reduction through direct engagement 
of poor households in income generation from community forests without 
debilitating 'common property' tenure 
(Dhungana, et al., 2008; NSCFP, 
2007) 
difficulty to exploit  hills and mountain  forests due to lack of access; (Ojha et al., 2009) 
improved information via research and scholarly interest in community forestry (Ojha et al., 2009) 
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3.9.1 LEAHOLD FORESTRY 
 
The original concept behind leasehold forestry was the leasing out of part of a degraded state 
forest to individuals, cooperatives or firms for commercial production of forest goods and 
services (MPFS 1988).  The concept of leasehold forestry for rural poverty reduction was 
introduced in the Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulations 1995. According to this policy 
degraded areas of forestland have been allowed to be leased to poor communities for a period 
of 40 years, with exclusive rights to use the land for agro-forestry and various income 
generation activities (MoFSC, 2002). The programme is jointly implemented by district 
forest offices (identification of forest and potential users), district livestock offices (support 
livestock activities) and the Agricultural Development Bank (provide micro-credits).  
In most cases, leasehold forestry helps to enhance natural regeneration and biodiversity, 
increase access to forage resources, and enable leasehold members to earn cash and 
experience an overall improvement in their livelihood situation (Ohler, 2003). It is perceived 
as an effective mechanism to alleviate poverty, especially because it is targeted to the poorest 
section of the community unlike broader CF programs. There is an ongoing debate about 
whether this program should be jointly implemented along with community forestry.  
 
3.9.2 COLLABORATIVE FOREST MANAGEMENT 
 
According to Collaborative Management Working Group (2003) the Collaborative Forest 
Management (CFM) approach promotes “sustainable forest management in collaboration 
with the local people for multiple benefits by maintaining ecological balance, generating 
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economic returns and improving livelihoods from the forests”. CFM is a concept introduced 
in 2000 by the revised forestry sector policy, which was partly based on the Forest Act, 1993. 
Under the policy, the MoFSC has the authority to develop management plans for 
government-managed forests (Rai, 2007). 
This program differs from the more widely known community forestry program and is being 
mainly implemented in Terai forests where heterogeneous communities, large forest blocks 
and readily accessible markets have hindered the successful implementation of community 
forestry. The CFM program is being implemented jointly with local communities, and local 
and central governments. However, the CFM approach is still at the pilot stage and, along 
with its framework policy, is under intense debate and strong controversy (Rana et al., 2009), 
and is often opposed by CF activists.   
 
3.9.3 COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 
 
Following the release of the Eighth Development Plan (1992-97), the Department of Soil 
Conservation and Watershed Management (DSCWM) started a participatory approach to 
watershed management in collaboration with local NGOs and community-based 
organizations (Pandit et al., 2007). This was partly a result of the new political direction of 
the country towards more participatory and democratic approach to resource management 
and partly due to the growing awareness of rural people of integrated resource management at 
the local level. The success of community forestry in institutionalizing community-based 
organizations also played a substantial role in replicating a group approach to watershed 
conservation and a move away from traditional bureaucratic approaches dominated by 
technicians. While the engineering infrastructure development remained the same in 
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watersheds, the decision making process of where, when and how this infrastructure was set 
up was devolved to local community groups. Also the technology was modified to make it 
easier for community groups to utilize their knowledge and skills while at the same time the 
approach’s watershed management activities were linked to other local resources such as 
forests, agriculture and livestock development.  
Later on, DSCWM started working with community-forestry user groups instead of forming 
new soil conservation groups wherever they were available. In some cases, additional 
conservation groups have been formed to focus more on watershed management in areas 
where community groups were not formed before but where urgent watershed intervention 
was required. DSCWM is working in more than 60 districts in collaboration with NGOs, 
community forestry groups and other locally formed groups.  
The community approach has contributed to watershed management by making it more 
transparent, community adapted, less expensive, culturally acceptable and robust than 
traditional techno-bureaucratic approaches.  
 
3.9.4 INTEGRATED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Nepal started establishing protected areas after 1973. Approximately 23% of the total land 
area of the country now falls within the protected area system. Initially, national parks, 
wildlife reserves and hunting reserves were established within several ecological zones with a 
largely 'command and control' approach to biodiversity, landscape and ecosystem 
conservation. While this system was very effective in conserving biodiversity, it had some 
unintended outcomes including the generation of conflict between the local people and park 
authorities over the use of natural resources (Brown, 1998). However, a more people-centric 
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approach to protected areas was initiated after 1990 with the introduction of 'conservation 
areas', which was a form of protected area that adopted a 'community-based conservation' 
approach (Bajracharya et al., 2007).  The 'conservation area' designation enabled the 
government to achieve similar conservation goals as other protected area designations but 
with the involvement of local community groups in planning, implementing and monitoring 
conservation activities while at the same time enhancing the contribution to local livelihoods 
and social development (Bajracharya et al., 2007). The first ever 'conservation area' was 
declared in the Annapurna area, a world-famous trekking circuit for tourists. Three more 
conservation areas were later set up along the Himalayas, namely Manaslu, Gaurishankar and 
Kanchanjungha ranges. In each conservation area, an overarching council is formed from 
local people, while at the same time, a number of local level 'conservation groups' are 
instituted to carry out environmental conservation and local development activities. It is 
argued that the community-approach to conservation is less expensive, more efficiently 
governed, more supportive of community development, more tourist-friendly and more 
equitable in resource sharing than traditional 'fortress' conservation (Bajracharya et al., 2007).  
 
3.9.5 PROTECTED AREA BUFFER ZONE FORESTRY 
 
As argued earlier, conflict between local people and park authorities was rampant in Nepal 
until the 1990s as elsewhere in the world (Brown, 1998). In order to mitigate these conflicts, 
Nepal adopted a combination of approaches to reconcile conservation objectives with 
community needs. Besides setting up conservation areas managed by local conservation 
councils and groups, some innovative efforts were undertaken in already established national 
parks and wildlife reserves that were strictly managed by park authorities.  A substantial 
portion of forests and other land use cover around national parks and wildlife reserves was set 
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aside as 'buffer zones' to be managed and sustainably used by local people in collaboration 
with park authorities. As with other community forests, the forests in the buffer-zones were 
handed over to local community groups as 'buffer zone community forests'. However, some 
unique features were associated with these groups including a greater focus on biodiversity 
conservation and wildlife protection and mechanisms to negotiate compensation with park 
authorities in the event that wildlife harmed humans or property. This approach has been 
praised for meeting multiple objectives: for achieving biodiversity conservation, eco-tourism 
enhancement, community development and amicable relationships between park authorities 
and local people (Paudel et al., 2007).     
 
3.10 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEPALESE FORESTRY SECTOR  
 
Nepal is characterised as a mountainous country with a subsistence-oriented agricultural 
economy (FRD, 2005). It has a heterogeneous society in terms of caste, ethnicity, class, and 
gender (Blaikie et al., 2005). Of the economically active population, 90% are employed in the 
agricultural sector (CBS, 2005); 30% of the population are poor and face food security 
problems (Luintel and Bhattarai, 2006).  
The Terai region and valleys in the Middle Hills have highly fertile land and are the regions 
where most economic activity is located.  A large proportion of Nepal’s population (~ 87%) 
is rurally based and dependent on agriculture for income and employment which is largely 
supported by forestry in some way. Therefore, the performance of the forestry sector has a 
direct impact on agriculture and the economy.  
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Nepal has the unique experience in the Indian sub-continent of having escaped colonial rule, 
which engulfed the neighbouring countries until about the middle of the twentieth century 
(Pandey, 1989). Despite its never-colonized status over its history, some Western scholars 
have characterised Nepal as a 'semi-colony' of British India and argued that Nepal suffered as 
a result.  ‘Because for a semi-colonial state this... involved many of the disadvantages of 
colonialism … with none of the advantages’ (Blaikie et al., 1979:30 cited in Pokharel and 
Tumbahamphe, 1995).  
Those authors further make the case that Nepal is an unliberated semi-colony now partially 
incorporated within the larger political economy of India. This issue is often raised by left 
wing political parties in Nepal who argue that India is engaged in economic exploitation via 
control of natural resources (e.g., water resources). However, Nepal’s modern political 
economy cannot be seen as being controlled by an external power. Yet, foreign aid and 
development intervention has had a considerable impact in restructuring the country’s 
political economy especially with respect to natural resource management (Pokharel and 
Tumbahamphe, 1995). Various donor-supported forestry projects have had this effect by 
strengthening the ability of individuals, groups and local institutions to challenge the 
authorities. These projects played  a vital role in empowering voices of the marginalized 
communities against inequality and in altering power relations in terms of class, caste, gender 
and access to resources and in the distribution mechanisms used (Pokharel and 
Tumbahamphe, 1995; NSCFP, 2011).  
Several bilateral forestry projects have been influential in shaping the processes and 
outcomes of community-based forest management in Nepal. Although the majority of these 
projects focused on reversing ecological degradation in the Middle Hills following so called 
'Himalayan Crisis' or the controversial 'Theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation'; 
(Guthman, 1997, Eckholm, 1976, Eves and Messerly, 1989, Gilmour and Fisher, 1991), they 
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adopted different working modalities at various times generating a variety of outcomes in 
forest governance, resource conservation and contribution of forests to local livelihoods. 
These variations happened not only between different projects but also within the same 
projects during different project phases. For example, the bilateral forestry project funded by 
the Australian Government (Nepal-Australia Forestry Project which was later renamed the 
'Nepal Australia Community Resource and Livelihood Programme’) assisted in plantation 
activities and capacity building of forestry officials at the departmental level in 1960s.  In the 
mid-1970s, the focus shifted to working with two hill districts in collaboration with district 
level government offices (Griffin, 1988). Later on, after the mid-1980s, there was an 
emphasis on building community forestry groups at the village or hamlet level, an approach 
that became a model across the country for community-based forest management (Gilmour 
and Fisher, 1991).  
Other projects funded by Switzerland, UK and USA followed suit in forming and 
institutionalizing community forestry user groups but they adopted different project and user 
group governance modalities. In this connection, the Nepal Swiss Community Forestry 
Project, funded by the Swiss Government, worked in four mountain districts (Dolakha and 
Ramechap in the first phase, with the addition of Okhaldhunga in the second phase and 
Khotang in the third phase) and put the major emphasis on forest-based enterprise 
development and decentralized governance in addition to ecological restoration (NSCFP, 
2007). The Nepal-UK Community Forestry Project (NUKCFP) later renamed the 'Livelihood 
and Forestry Programme’, covered 14 Middle Hill Districts and four Terai Districts and 
emphasized income generation for poor households, networking between different 
community forestry user groups, and the connection of forestry to agriculture (LFP, 2004). 
The United States also offered substantial support to forestry programmes but did not 
establish separate forestry projects in Nepal like the UK, Australia and Switzerland. The 
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major US forestry funding was used by Nepalese chapters of INGOs such as Cooperation for 
Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) and Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). The 
Nepalese government also adapted to transformations in the forestry sector via change in 
policy after the restoration of democracy in 1990. 
In summary, the practices of community-based forest management have evolved over time as 
a result of constant interaction between Nepalese farmers, foresters and expatriate forestry 
advisors and the changing policies of the government. The combined efforts of donor-funded 
projects, government agencies and non-government organizations have encouraged local 
communities, administrations and civil society to actively take part in planning and decision 
making processes via the establishment of CFUGs as new, innovative and evolving 
institutions. As a result of these interactions, CF has become the major government policy 
towards natural resources management, and continues to transform the forestry sector 
political economy towards more productive, sustainable and equitable outcomes. Although 
quantifying the contribution of foreign aid and development interventions is difficult, it is 
evident that CF, as one of the major recipients of foreign aid, has played a crucial role in 
changing Nepal’s forestry and wider political economy (NSCFP, 2007).    
 
3.11 SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF CF  
 
CF is thought to bring many social, economic, environmental and cultural benefits to local 
forest user groups including indigenous forest-dependent communities (Kanel, 2005). The 
introduction of CF in Nepal represents an attempt to decentralise control over forest 
management through the direct involvement of local people in decision making and benefit 
sharing. In addition, some studies indicate there are also improvements in the overall 
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condition of the forests due to the people’s sense of resource ownership (Kanel and 
Varughese, 2000). CF has also provided wider benefits, such as carbon sequestration and 
climate regulation to regional or global communities, who are not directly involved in the 
protection and management of resources. Moreover, economic improvement such as a greater 
degree of forest job security, reduced unemployment, a revitalised local economy and 
recreational attractions are additional benefits identified by adopting CF. These benefits have 
been documented in case studies undertaken by different organizations and researchers. Also, 
while there must be some 'costs' associated to these benefits, a detailed benefit-cost analysis 
is beyond the scope of this study. Building on the work of Hill (1999), it is assumed in this 
study that 'community forestry' is economically and socially  more beneficial than 'business 
as usual' approaches such as leaving forest resources under ineffective state ownership where 
it becomes a de facto open access resource  leading to its destruction in the long run. 
Dhungana (2006) concurs with this view that community forestry is economically more 
desirable than government-managed forestry but observes that this is true under certain 
institutional, ecological and social conditions. Thus, while there is general agreement on the 
benefits of community forestry, it is also recognised that these benefits depend on a range of 
conditions. The next section outlines some of the key benefits the literature identifies as being 
realised from the practice of community forestry in Nepal. A core aim of this research is to 
critically analyse what extent these benefits are realized in practice in Nepal’s community 
forestry programmes. 
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3.11.1 CF EMPOWERS LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
 
From the beginning community forestry has sought to improve local participation and 
equitable benefit distributions through formalised policies to empower ’backward, poverty 
stricken, and women users’ (HMG/N, 1998; Pokharel and Niraula, 2004). In order to 
empower the CFUGs to manage community forests on an equitable and sustainable basis, the 
government introduced the Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulations (1995). An empowered 
organization is one that enhances relationships, identifies issues, and mobilises around those 
issues. Community organizations are believed to be empowered through the CF policy by 
involving people in decision-making and planning, thereby defining the issues of importance 
to them. 
As a result, community forestry has contributed to more equitable benefit sharing; enhanced 
transparency, participation, and accountability; and improved pro-poor resource management 
practices (Luintel et al., 2006; Shrestha et al., 2009). 
 
3.11.2 CF PROVIDES BASIC FOREST GOODS TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES  
 
The basic goods and services derived from forests are significantly important for people 
living in rural areas because their livelihoods often depends on access to, and control over, 
resources. The main thrust of Nepal’s forest policy is aimed at providing basic needs (e.g., 
fuel wood, poles, timber, leaf, litter, and fodder, grasses, bedding materials) to the rural 
population (Maharjan, 1998). CF management and associated operational plans establish 
rights for local communities to a sustainable supply/harvest of forest product for domestic use 
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such fuel-wood, fodder, timber and other products. Community forests can be a major 
contributor to improved rural livelihood by providing income, construction materials, energy 
and animal feed (Gilmour et al., 2004).  
 
3.11.3 CF PROVIDE ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS TO LOCAL, REGIONAL 
AND GLOBAL COMMUNITIES  
 
Multiple purpose management of forests by communities is likely to lead to better 
conservation of biodiversity outcomes than forest managed by the government or industry 
(Brown, 1999). Evidence from Nepalese CFs indicates that forest coverage has increased in 
Middle Hills resulting in increases in biodiversity and associated social benefits. Aesthetic 
value is also a hidden benefit of CF, which occurs as a result of more appropriate and 
sensitive forest management than that carried out by the state. Carbon sequestration and other 
environmental services are also potential benefits to regional and global communities. Nepal 
has initiated carbon trading by entering the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+) program operating under the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facilities of the World Bank. Community forestry has been promoted as a 
viable forest institutional arrangement for implementing the carbon trading scheme (MFSC, 
2012; Cadman et al., 2012).   
 
3.11.4 CF PROVIDES ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
 
CF is currently focused on generating revenues and value adding. Many CFs have been 
selling timber and NTFPs and earning good incomes. It is claimed that more than a million of 
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Nepal’s poorest people are obtaining ‘green’ jobs (full time, part-time, and casual) in CF and 
associated activities.  Further, CFs have been leasing CF land to the poorest groups with 
rights to grow valuable perennial species, promote inter-cropping, seeding of grasses, 
aromatic species cultivation and processing. In most cases, CFUGs are selling forest products 
at competitive prices and have been surprisingly more efficient in generating revenues than 
central government (Kanel, 2008). In the fiscal year 2008/09, the DoF collected NR65 
million (~A$1 million) or 11 % of the total revenue of forestry sector from a sale’s tax it 
places on CFUGs (DoF, 2010). This suggests that CFs are not only contributing to local 
communities but also supporting the national economy.   
Recently, approved CF management plans are being altered to focus on the business of 
running a CF in addition to sustainable forest management, a move being referred to as the 
development of second-generation operational plans (SGOP).  This SGOP model also aims to 
be inclusive and to allocate 35% of total income for economic development to the poorest 
sections of society, especially Dalit, Janajati, and women. Various community forest user 
groups have also developed cooperative management approaches and delivered micro-
finance to local communities. Moreover, the projected potential for selling carbon credits on 
the international market through REDD+ is creating hope in Nepal's government and 
community forestry user groups alike that they will be able to strengthen both the national 
and local economy respectively through the earning of carbon dollars (MFSC, 2012).  
 
3.11.5 CF HELPS LOCAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
 
A portion of the revenue generated from CFs is often earmarked to fund community 
development initiatives such as school buildings, teachers’ salaries, and various infrastructure 
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developments such as drinking water supply and the construction of village roads, bridges, 
canals, schools and clinics. Various case studies have shown that CFUGs positively 
contribute to local community development which ultimately improves the livelihoods of 
rural people (Collett et al., 1996; Dev et al., 2004; Pokharel et al., 2007; Chapagain and 
Banjade, 2009).  The major investment made by CFUGs has been on community 
development activities (36 % of their expenses), which includes road construction, school 
support and other infrastructure development (Kanel, 2008). These costs otherwise would 
have to be borne by the government or would not be undertaken. 
 
3.11.6 CF PROMOTES WOMEN EMPOWERMENT 
 
CF is recognised as having the potential to increase women’s participation in natural 
resources management. In Nepal, a recent initiative for gender balance in CFUG includes the 
provision of incorporating both men and women as members of CFUGs from each household 
as opposed to the traditional practices in which only males were considered the members 
because of their social status as the 'head of the households' (Ojha et al., 2009). An increasing 
trend of women’s participation in community forestry has been documented by various 
authors (Kanel and Kandel, 2004; Luintel and Timsina, 2008; Giri et al., 2010).  
Increasing female participation and their representation in the executive committee can 
provide them with more opportunities to put their agenda clearly (Upadhaya, 2005). 
Agrawal (2009) notes that engaging women as members of executive committees alone 
may not affect management decisions. However it certainly opens up new possibilities for the 
way that they see and react to the world around them (Fussel, 1996; Mohanty, 2002), which 
ultimately helps women’s empowerment. 
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3.11.7 FORESTS ARE BETTER MANAGED UNDER CF THAN 
GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT 
 
A key claim made about CF is that management practices result in forests with an improved 
biophysical condition compared to forests under government control (Gautam et al., 2002). 
Most of the recent studies clearly indicate that CF is especially successful in forest 
conservation (Yadav et al., 2003; Thoms, 2008). Recent forest cover change analysis in 
various Districts indicates that forest cover has increase under CF management whereas it has 
decreased in government-managed areas (see for example Niraula et al., 2013). Growing 
stock (volume and number of trees) is also better in CF management compared to 
government-managed forest. The key reasons cited are: local pride in ownership, local 
regulation especially of illegal activities, and fund raising, fund mobilisation and reduced 
government costs for forest management. 
 
3.11.8 CF PROMOTES INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
According to Ostrom’s ‘theory of common property regimes’ the creation of local 
institutional arrangements overcomes the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and enables it to be 
successfully managed (Ostrom, 1990). CFUGs are the basic organization in CF management 
and many CFUGs have federated in Village Development Committee (VDC), District 
Development Committee (DDC) level and National level and are thought to be working well. 
CFUG federations have a strong voice at different levels and work to formulate policy and 
legal instruments to advance CF management in Nepal. Recently, there has been an emphasis 
on the institutional development of CFUGs to improve their capacity to undertake forest 
management effectively and efficiently (Kanel and Varughese, 2000). SGOPs also focus on 
88 | P a g e  
governance in CFs and to institution strengthening. Other examples of institutional 
development are: group/community formation, leadership development, training, workshops, 
and interaction among groups, team building, co-operatives and microenterprise 
development. 
3.11.9 CF PROMOTES GOOD FOREST GOVERNANCE 
 
A community forest user group’s constitution and operational plan defines the governance 
arrangements for that CFUG (Ojha et al., 2009). Within the framework of CF guidelines, 
each CFUG prepares its own constitution which defines its social arrangements, roles, rights 
and responsibilities of the members and office bearers. The Constitution is registered to and 
approved by the DFO. Ojha and Pokharel (2005) assert that, from a governance point of 
view, local-level institutions for forest management and their networks provide a model for 
democratic governance. In recent years, local communities have gradually been able to claim 
their rights over forests by making themselves active political agent rather than passive 
recipients of government services as in the past (Paudel et al., 2008). Through the expansion 
of CFUG networks nationally via the Federation of Community Forestry Users Group Nepal 
(FECOFUN) and ongoing wider civic movement, the traditional top-down state power has 
been challenged. To this end the discourse and practice of community forestry in Nepal is 
now shared evenly by the government and civil society (Luintel, 2006).
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3.11.10 CF HELPS OVERALL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
CF follows the basic principle of sustainable development, which focuses equally on social, 
economic and environmental issues/problems. In CF, forest-based enterprises are established 
to make use of harvestable resources utilising a sustainable management approach.   
Sustainable development refers ‘to meeting the needs of the present generation without 
compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their needs’ (FAO, 1978; FAO, 
2001). Furthermore, it is a progressive economic and social approach to human society that 
aims to maintain people’s quality of life in accordance with their dignity and well-being, 
without compromising the ability of the future generations to do likewise (Wolfensohn and 
Fuller, 1998). Nepal has a long history of community based forest management and the initial 
primary goal is to achieve self-sufficiency in all aspects of forest production (Kanel, 2005). 
Recent studies indicate that community groups and small holders have been protecting and 
managing common pool resources for sustainable manner (Ojha et al., 2009; Pokharel et al., 
2012). Many households within the community groups are highly dependent on the 
management of remnant wood-lands, on-farm trees and agro forestry farming both for 
subsistence need (fruit, fuel wood, fodder, medicinal products) and income generation. 
Localised management of forest resources is viewed as more likely to supply the resources 
that ultimately achieve overall community development than centralised management 
(Maharjan et al., 2009).
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3.12 GOOD FOREST GOVERNANCE IN THE NEPALESE CONTEXT 
 
A variety of forest governance approaches have been practiced globally under diverse 
nomenclature including participatory forestry, social forestry, community forestry, 
collaborative forest management, joint forest management and so forth (Hobley, 1993; 
Petheram et al., 2002). In the Asia-Pacific region, approximately 27 percent of forests are 
managed under some form of community-based governance, whereas the forest area under 
similar arrangements in Latin America and Africa is around 30 and 0.5 percent respectively 
(Dahal et al., 2011). Overall, there has been a trend in all these three continents towards 
community-based governance despite the complexities and the frequent resistance of forest 
bureaucracies. 
As employed here, forest governance covers the full range of issues relating to how forest 
resources are managed. These vary from how decisions about forest use are made and who is 
involved in the planning and decision-making process to the administration of forest laws and 
policies on the ground (World Bank, 2003). Better governance practices provide 
opportunities for stakeholders to engage in dialogue with government agencies and share 
their practical knowledge about local forest management practices and institutional reform of 
the forest sector.  
Forest governance can be conceptualised as the set of principles and rules of forest resource 
management  under which power is exercised and practiced in all spheres from private to 
public and the relationship among the state and its citizens, civil society and the private sector 
( Pokheral et al., 2008; Pokharel and Niraula, 2004). Better communication linkages between 
people, community groups and local institutions in terms of sharing of power and 
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responsibilities have been recognised as a component of good forest governance (Ojha, 2008; 
Ojha et al., 2003). 
Although a number of policy changes and forest reform practices were implemented in the 
past (see Table 2-2), they failed to protect the forest resources and fulfil the basic needs of the 
local communities. Previous forest reform initiatives did not include adequate public 
participation and ownership by local communities and incentives to bring about the important 
changes to policies, approaches and institutions required for effective reform (RECOFTC, 
2001). Weak institutions, inconsistent laws, corruption, poor law enforcement, lack of public 
participation, inadequate regulations, centralised control, and a lack of transparency; in 
summary poor forest governance threatens the success of forest management initiatives.  
For more than two decades, widespread policy reforms have transformed the basic 
institutional conditions for natural resource governance in most developing countries. In 
Nepal, governance practices are becoming increasingly important to achieve the national goal 
of poverty reduction, sustainable forest management, and overall sustainable development. 
However, enormous differences between rich and poor, low caste and high caste, women and 
men coupled with weak institutions has resulted in the poor becoming poorer and the rich 
becoming richer (HMG/N, 2003). For Nepalese poor, improved governance may mean a 
better chance of civil servants acting responsively, and create greater opportunities for their 
participation in resource planning and decision making processes (Pokheral and Grosen, 
2001).
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3.13 SOME CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH CF 
 
 
Despite the success and considerable contribution of CF to local communities recognised in 
the literature, there are still a number of unresolved issues and challenges regarding various 
aspects of CF (Ojha et al., 2009;Pokharel et al., 2012; Pokharel and Tiwari, 2013). The 
meaningful participation of different actors in CF processes is one of the major challenges for 
CF in Nepal (MFSC, 2013; Pokharel and Tiwari, 2013). Studies indicate that many CFUGs 
remain controlled by local elites, while the participation of socio-economically disadvantaged 
groups is often absent, and poor households tend to benefit less than those rather better off 
(Pokharel et al., 2008, 2012; Pokharel and Tiwari, 2013). While the number of CFUGs is 
increasing in all districts, it is reported that there are inadequate financial resources available 
to the DFO to provide for the growing number and diverse types of support CFUGs require 
(Springate-Baginski et al., 2003b; Kanel and Kandel, 2004). 
 Another issue, identified by Kanel (2004), is the need to make the CFUG and its committees 
more accountable and approachable to the majority of CF users including poor, women and 
disadvantaged groups. Structurally, a CFUG is formed as an autonomous organization to 
govern the group and manage an area of forest land handed over by the government under an 
agreed 'constitution' (to operate the group’s business) and 'operational plan' (to manage the 
group’s forests). Each CFUG forms (by election or consensus) an executive committee 
comprising of office bearers and executive members for a specific tenure, such as two years, 
and the committee is renewed upon the completion of the tenure on an ongoing basis. 
In many cases, the CFUG executive committee carries out everyday decisions regarding 
forest management on behalf of the CFUG. It is due to the exercise of power by the executive 
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committee that the CF has been susceptible to elite control over the forestry related decisions 
in the absence of effective mechanisms for the committee to be accountable to the entire 
CFUGs (Kanel and Kandel, 2004). Maharjan et al (2004) report that the transformation of 
power from elites to the marginalized and poorer people is often a challenging undertaking in 
CF.  A key element in improving governance of community-forestry user groups appears to 
be transforming these power structures toward more equitable, inclusive and sustainable 
forestry institutions at local level.  
A number of authors have claimed that community forestry has improved the overall forests’ 
condition including biodiversity. In contrast, the frequent removal of thorny bushes, climbers, 
and other weeds is very common in community forestry during bush clearing (Khadka and 
Schmidt-Vogt, 2008), which might convert all shrub-land into high forest area and reduce the 
structural diversity of forest (Shrestha et al., 2010). Along with shrubs, Pteridophytes, 
especially the ferns are other neglected groups, are removed as weeds which may lead soil 
erosion in some cases. 
 
3. 14 CONCLUSION 
 
CF is acknowledged to be a globally expanding model of decentralised forest governance. It 
has been implemented in Nepal for the past three decades, mainly driven by the failure of 
centralised forest management.  Legislative policies have gradually become more favourable 
to community participation. In the early 1990’s, legislation was changed and community 
forestry was fully legalised and this encouraged greater involvement of local communities. 
The situation of forest governance is gradually improving although it not free from 
challenges. Good forest governance is critical to sustainable forest management in Nepal, 
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particularly because of caste, gender and class-based discrimination, and political instability 
and corruption.  
Both the forests and communities co-evolve over time and change is context specific and can 
be positive and negative. The roles that forests play are changing from their primary role for 
wood production to one where they provide a wide variety of goods and ecological services. 
CF commenced in Nepal as a result of a number of external and internal interventions and, 
given the mostly positive results that it has delivered, there is no possibility to go back as 
millions of peoples now rely on CF for their livelihood.    
The World Bank and various authors regard Nepal as a global leader in engaging local 
communities in forest resource planning and management. Similarly, the role of leasehold 
forestry in poverty reduction and recent collaborative forest management policies for greater 
inclusion of various stakeholders in forest management for mutual benefits are well regarded. 
It is now evident that community based forest management programmes have been 
established as a successful program to improve forest and livelihood of people. However, 
some challenges remain especially those related to the full empowerment of women and 
marginalised people. The focus on women and marginalised groups directs our attention to 
CF governance and the degree to which these groups are empowered socially and 
economically. As Agrawal (2005) argues it is the 'mode of environmental government' or 
'environmentality' that dialectically shapes ecological and social outcomes by creating 
‘subjectivities’ around forest resource management. Theoretically drawing on Agrawal 
(2005), I develop my enquiry framework based on different governance modalities 
documented by various development organizations. Chapter 4 discusses the theoretical 
underpinning and research framework and methodology. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH APPROACH, CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The review of decentralized good forest governance within the global context (Chapter 2) and 
of the evolution of community based forest management and forest governance arrangements 
in Nepal (Chapter 3) have paved the way for an evaluation of how community forestry is 
performing in Nepal and whether it is being governed for the benefit of marginalized groups. 
However, prior to undertaking the evaluation, this chapter details the methodological 
framework and research methods adopted in this study. Firstly, it reviews some conceptual 
underpinnings of governance associated with natural resource management, particularly those 
related to community-based forest management. It also provides a theoretical explanation 
about how and why previously unorganized people team up around an environmental 
resource, such as a forest, exercising power and producing a mode of environmental 
governance.  Secondly, it reviews the different governance frameworks employed by various 
international organizations and synthesises elements of these frameworks into an appropriate 
framework for use in this dissertation. Thirdly, the chapter outlines the general research 
methodology employed for the fieldwork, including the selection of study districts and 
community forests and the associated data collection and analysis methods. The final section 
provides details of how the field research was conducted including ethics approval, field visit 
schedule, data storage and security procedures. 
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4.2 CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF FOREST GOVERNANCE 
 
While, as noted in Chapter 2, the concept of governance is contested, it has been often 
understood as a form of governing via the fusion of public and private sectors to produce 
better outcomes by promoting the strengths and eliminating the shortcomings of both. From 
this neoliberal perspective, 'governance consists of a revitalized and efficient public sector 
based on markets, competition, and management techniques imported from the private sector' 
(Bevir 2002:10). In a subsequent analysis, Bevir (2011) further underscores how neo-liberal 
narratives of governance dominate in the field of international development, serving to 
reinforce the idea and practice of privatization. However, while multilateral financial 
institutions such as the World Bank have certainly promoted a neoliberal perspective on 
governance, they do not promote the automatic privatization of natural commons such as 
forests.  Actually, governance arrangements need not build on a binary conception of 'state 
versus market' and there are numerous examples of common property institutions that engage 
in 'governance' but involve neither the state nor the corporate/private sector (e.g., Dietzqwa et 
al., 2001; Ostrom, 1990).  
How can 'governance' then be understood as an encompassing concept to include all 
processes of governing?  Fukuyama (2013:350) interprets the concept as requiring a powerful 
state and contends that 'governance' means ‘government’s ability to make and enforce rules 
and to deliver services'. This conception is even more problematic than the neoliberal one 
since it narrows down or centralizes the scope of governance around only public institutions 
and overlooks the roles of community institutions and private sector alike in making rules and 
delivering services. It is, hence, better to understand 'governance' in terms of 'how' something 
is governed, instead of 'which' organizations or actors govern. Further, there are two more 
fundamental questions about 'governance' which are important to address in the 
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environmental sector. Firstly, how should 'governance' be understood in more complex 
situations such as 'community forestry' where people, on the one hand, resist both 
government and private sector interference but on the other hand, gradually turn out to 
exercise the same sanctions within themselves as the government or the private sector 
intends? Secondly, how does this transition from resistance to compliance in a community 
institution result in creating 'community-based governance'?                
Actually the notion of 'governance' is misunderstood if it is viewed simply as a technical tool 
instead of a political process and if the question of how and why 'governance' happens is not 
explored. The root of 'governance' hence can be found in Michael Foucault's synthesis of 
'governmentality' (Foucault, 1991). This narrative of 'governmentality' broadly explains how 
'governance' is imported, reproduced and exercised within an institution by its actors (Bevir, 
2011). Governmentality, as Foucault (2011:102) argues, is actually an 'art of government' or 
the 'ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of 
power'.  
Drawing on the Foucauldian idea of governmentality, Agrawal (2005:12) introduces the 
concept of 'environmentality' making it particularly relevant to the forestry sector. From this 
perspective, environmental governance in institutions such as community forestry 
organizations is better understood more specifically as the 'governmentalization of the 
environment'. In this process, people engaged in forest management are gradually 
transformed into 'subjects' of government or other powerful institutions such as international 
environmental organizations who benefit from this subjectivity. It is by 'environmentality' 
that 'people's identities, activities and attitudes come to internalize previously external norms 
or mandates' without being forced (Peet et al., 2011: 33).    
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The neoliberal idea of governance in resource management put forward by the FAO and 
World Bank has been challenged by many governmental organisations and local groups 
actually involved in forest management. The frameworks, and associated principles and 
criteria, imposed from outside, either by the sovereign government or international agencies, 
are resisted and challenged by local groups. Local communities are reluctant to adopt the new 
technologies, skills and knowledge that undermine or at least challenge the prevailing forms 
of indigenous knowledge embedded in local resource management. Nonetheless, the 
dichotomy between the universal forms of forest governance on the one hand and so called 
'indigenous' management of forest resources on the other has been found to be overstated in 
the case of community forestry in Nepal. While at times people have confronted government 
policies that employ universal frameworks of resource governance and defended their own 
positions of sustainably using forest resources. Yet, a deeper understanding into these 
'community-based' organizations suggests that local institutions are actually adopting the 
universal governance framework, which is filtering down to them through government and 
donor funded agencies. As a result of this process of 'environmentality', local people engaged 
in community forestry become subjects of these powerful institutions and ultimately 
reproduce the desired 'environmental governance' within themselves.  
‘Environmentality’ is the major approach employed in this dissertation to conceptualise 
community forest management. However, because environmentality is an overarching 
framework, to understand the governance associated with 'community forestry', I draw on 
literature from three additional approaches. These are:  i) common property theory, ii) 
feminist institutionalism and iii) decentralization (Fig 4-1). 
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Figure 4-1. Conceptual framework for this research 
 
4.2.1 THEORY OF THE COMMONS  
 
The governance of natural resources as a ‘commons’ used by many individuals is an issue of 
increasing concern to researchers and policy makers. The 'theory of commons' deals with 
common property resources, where individuals do not have exclusive property rights. In other 
words, any common pool resources such as forests which are shared by many people under 
some institutional arrangement fall under the 'common property' concept (Bromley and 
Cernea, 1989). Commons may comprise a wide variety of natural environments and can 
include village pastures, bush-lands, uncultivable fields, community forests, waste lands, 
village ponds, rivers and lakes (FAO, 2002). First employed by Gordon in 1954 (Gordon 
1954), the 'theory of commons' became popular after Hardin’s (1968) paper on The Tragedy 
100 | P a g e  
of the Commons. Hardin highlighted that when individuals act independently and rationally 
and follows their own self-interest, it ultimately leads to the destruction of the common 
resource in question. Hardin and others suggested that the possible solution to the tragedy 
was either to regulate the commons through the central governmental agencies or to convert 
the commons into private property. 
The 'tragedy' theory, however, has been heavily criticised (Agrawal, 2001). Ostrom (1990) 
disputed that the 'only way' to solve the problems of common pool resource was via the state 
or the market and that there was a role for voluntary organizations (Ostrom, 1990). Many 
scholars have researched how local institutions using common property arrangements can 
result in efficient use, equitable allocation and sustainable conservation of resources Agrawal, 
2001). By focusing on case studies and findings, the theory of the commons contributes to a 
more thorough understanding of the effectiveness of local resource governance (Agrawal and 
Chhatre, 2006). The management of community forests as commons requires a more 
grounded understanding of local knowledge, community needs, and differences in access to 
and control over resources between user groups within local communities (Dessler et al., 
2010). In the theory of commons, the role of local communities has been crucial as it is seen 
as the basis for organizing users groups, managing common resources, distributing benefits, 
and sharing burdens between economic and social groups.  The theory of the commons and 
the concept of 'environmentality' complement each other and offers another way of thinking 
about the norms that are embedded in communities and that influence what and why people 
do things. 
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4.2.2 FEMINIST INSTITUTIONALISM  
 
Feminist institutionalism is a version of 'new institutionalism', elaborated from a gender 
perspective. Political institutions profoundly shape social life and are also gendered. In 
general, a focus on gender, politics and institutions defines the parameters of the new field of 
‘feminist institutionalism’ which address the significance of gender (Krook and Macky, 
2012). Feminist political scientists have been concerned with institutions of state and society, 
particularly in explaining why women are constantly in the position of a chronic minority in 
public institutions. Witz and Savage (1992) argue that early feminist work on gender and 
institutions generally overlooked the role of institutional processes and practises in 
reinforcing and reproducing gender inequality.  In brief, feminist institutionalism is a new 
institutionalist approach that looks at ‘how gender norms operate within institutions and how 
institutional processes construct and maintain gender power dynamics’ (Lowndes, 2010:65).  
Women’s contribution to household activities and managing common property resources is 
usually not accounted for. In fact, the definition of ‘work’ has often been limited to paid work 
and has mainly been with reference to the productive sector, ignoring women’s dominant 
work experience. Feminists’ argue that it is these gender biases that get perpetuated in society 
through lived experience and get sanctioned by theory which has been formed through these 
experiences. Feminists have, therefore, stressed the urgency of critiquing existing theories 
and change practices that discriminate against women. More specifically, the causes of 
gender inequality are understood to exist at the macro-level, rooted in a stratifying system or 
structure known as ‘patriarchy’ (Krook and Macky, 2012). A line of feminist research 
influenced by Ferguson’s (1984) critique of bureaucracy viewed the institutions of the state 
and state bureaucracy as essentially and consistently patriarchal.  
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In recent years, feminist political science has progressively moved on from a focus on 
‘women and politics’ to more relational and institutional conceptions of ‘gender and politics’ 
(Beckwith, 2005; Childs and Krook, 2006). Studies are more focused on the complexities of 
institutional gender dynamics. Feminist institutionalists recognise that political explanation 
about ideas, interests and institutions are interlinked.  
To this end, feminist institutionalism enhances analysis and makes for more effective 
explanations.  Feminists bring to the study of institutions a specific lens that makes visible 
constitutive gendered power relations and the processes that support or undermine them. In 
identifying changing gender relations as a potential cause of institutional change feminism 
increases the capacity of ‘new’ institutionalists to model causality. In community-based forest 
management, women are an integral part of managing and using the resources. Space 
provided by community-based institutions for women to decide on forest management 
activities matters in understanding whether the institution is suitably governed or not. 
Women’s participation lays the ground for the effective management of common pool 
resources; however, there is still a lack of empirical knowledge on how to institutionalize 
women’s participation in the formal institutional structures of community-based forest 
resources. Establishing the legal basis for women’s participation in common pool resources is 
essential to ensure their access, use and control over resources within complex rural 
communities. 
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4.2.3 DECENTRALIZATION  
 
It is often argued that democratic decentralization can improve efficiency, equity, democracy 
and resource management (Larson and Soto, 2008; Larson and Ribot, 2004). Based on these 
ideas, shifting responsibility from central to local government authorities or to local level 
actors and institutions for natural resource management is being increasingly practiced in 
many developing countries (Nygreen, 2004). However, as Tacconi (2007) notes, our current 
understanding of the theory of decentralized forest management, in  the form of political and 
institutional decentralization, needs to be investigated to assess the circumstances that lead to 
positive outcomes, particularly in relation to forest governance . 
Decentralization in forest management is an often debated issue. It has been used 
interchangeably to mean the transfer of control over resources from the state to local level 
(Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Tacconi, 2007), or from the central government to local 
governments (Larson, 2002; Anderson, 2003). However, in either case, decentralized forest 
management refers to the transfer of authority and management functions related to resources 
from state to local institutions with the goal of promoting community control and 
management of resources (Tacconi, 2007). Analysing the theory of decentralized forest 
management, Larson (2003) groups the key factors that influence the ‘socio-economical and 
environmental outcomes’ of decentralized natural resources  management into three spheres: 
(i) legal arrangements, (ii) mediating factors, and (iii) local government decision-making 
processes. 
To this end, the necessary conditions for achieving decentralization in forest resources are as 
follows (Balooni et al., 2008:21-23): 
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 Provide  adequate access to forest resources to local communities; 
 Enhance the influence of local communities in resource planning and decision-making 
processes;  
 Allow local communities to challenge traditional state authority; 
 Expose conflicts over resource interests; 
 Set up accountable institutions from local to central level  government; 
 Increase human and financial resources for local governments that assign high priority 
to natural resources management.  
 
However, the overall outcomes of decentralisation and the conditions encouraging effective 
implementation vary considerably based on local circumstances, particularly socio-economic, 
legal, and political conditions (Balooni et al., 2008).  
Decentralizing forest governance is particularly relevant to community-based forest 
management for several reasons. First, community-based forest management is founded on 
local, community actions not large, centralised institutions. Rendering authority to local 
institutions to manage forest resources is hence crucial to make these institutions more 
accountable. Second, community-based forests are often initially owned by the state, but 
subsequently handed over to local communities. These local communities are not able to 
exercise power and decision making associated to forestry related activities without having a 
devolved authority to do so. Third, decentralization not only relocates authority, but also 
creates an incentive for the local people to invest their resources in community forestry in the 
expectation of gaining a return. Fourth and most importantly, a tendency of governments to 
centralise authority often poses a threat to community institutions and thereby their capacity 
to sustainability manage common resources (Ribbot et al., 2006; Phelps et al., 2010). 
Decentralization contributes to ‘environmentality’ among local forestry users by providing 
them the authority to sanction themselves. Making them authorized to formulate and practice 
rules in resource management and use, a central government can create ‘community-based 
governments' in order to achieve its broader environmental objectives. Hence, 
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decentralization turns out to be one of the tripods of 'environmentality', while the other two 
being the 'theory of the commons' and 'feminist institutionalism'.  
To this end, building on the 'governmentality' ideas of Foucault and others, 'environmentality' 
captures the idea of the ways in which formal and informal institutions channel individuals 
and groups into disciplining themselves with regard to environmental practices such as forest 
management. In the forest sector, such disciplining occurs within a set of specific political 
(centralised/decentralised), social (equal/discriminatory) and economic (public, private or 
common pool resources) arrangements. In the context of Nepalese forest governance 
characterised by decentralised, discriminatory, common pool resources, a specific form of 
'environmentality' will emerge. The nature of this 'environmentality' can be captured by 
examining some of the key aspects of how community forestry is governed.  These three 
elements enrich each other as a foundation of 'environmental governance', and the following 
section discusses various forms of governance promoted by different organizations as 
methodological frameworks.   
 
4.3 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The literature identifies a number of international organizations and interest groups, with a 
variety of mandates, which promote institutional arrangements for natural resources policy 
and governance (e.g., World Bank, 2009; WRI, 2009; FAO, 2011).  The current set of 
arrangements associated with forestry and natural resources is best seen as a complex, hybrid 
mix of international law, national law and regulations, and non-governmental performance-
based measures such as international certification schemes and industry codes of conduct 
(World Bank, 2009). All of these actors are devoted to supporting the diverse functions of 
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forests, and developing and implementing measures designed to protect and enhance forest 
benefits. However, despite the fact that their interaction and support of forest governance 
arrangements often results in competition, the key elements of governance and associated 
indicators are in fact quite similar. Research and practice appears to show, therefore, that 
complex issues related to forest management require the adoption of synergistic approaches 
involving a wide range of policy instruments associated with forestry professionals and 
communities.  
Building on the discussion in Chapter 2, this dissertation reviewed a number of different 
frameworks associated with good forest governance promoted by various international 
institutions. These included the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1997), the 
Asia Development Bank (ADB, 1999), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID, 2009), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN, 
2009), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP, 2009), the World Bank (2009), World Resources Institute (WRI, 2009), and 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 2011).  Three of these were 
considered to be especially useful for this study and are outlined in more detail below. 
4.3.1 WRI’S GOVERNANCE OF FORESTS (GFI) FRAMEWORK 
 
The Governance of Forests Initiative (GFI) seeks to bring broadly accepted principles of 
good forest governance to bear on the challenges of sustaining forests in developing countries 
(WRI, 2009). The GFI Framework includes a complete set of qualitative indicators for 
conducting civil society led assessments of forest governance at the national level (Figure 4-
2). The GFI toolkit(WRI, 2009) provides the following resources: 
 A common definition and conceptual framework for understanding the meaning of 
good forest governance across different countries’ local socio-political contexts; 
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 A practical toolkit for civil society organizations to independently, reliably, 
systematically and comprehensively diagnose the integrity of institutions and 
processes that govern forests in their countries; and  
 A set of specific, measurable, reportable and verifiable indicators of good governance 
of forests. 
 
  
Figure 4-2. Governance of Forest Initiative (GFI) Framework (Source: WRI, 2009) 
 
The five principles of good governance (transparency, participation, accountability, 
coordination and capacity) provide the basic criteria against which the components of forest 
governance (actors, rules, and practices) can be assessed. The indicators are clustered 
according to six thematic areas (forest tenure, land use planning, forest revenues, forest 
management, cross-cutting institutions and cross cutting issues).   
This framework provides convincing principles for analysing governance outcomes in natural 
resource management. However, it is too broad to capture specific aspects of governance 
outcomes that are of interest to local communities. The specific indicators to measure 
governance outcomes at the community level are lacking in this framework. Furthermore, 
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there is no weighting attached to the elements in the framework which implies all indicators 
are equally important which may not be the case.  
4.3.2 WORLD BANK FRAMEWORK 
 
The World Bank has noted that the lack of an appropriate analytical framework makes it is 
much harder to identify the major shortcomings in a country’s forestry sector when it fails to 
deliver multiple benefits and has proposed a set of tools to diagnose forest governance 
weaknesses and pinpoint appropriate reforms (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank’s 
approach is underpinned by five building blocks (or key roots) that are envisaged to cover all 
important dimensions of forest governance (World Bank, 2009: 21). These are: 
• Transparency, accountability, and public participation; 
• Stability of forest institutions and conflict management; 
• Quality of forest administration; 
• Coherence of forest legislation and rule of law; 
• Economic efficiency, equity, and incentives. 
 
This framework was constructed by the World Bank based upon its previous experiences, an 
extensive literature review, and complemented with a wide range of expert opinion. The key 
elements of forest governance available in the literature were used to develop the appropriate 
set of subcomponents (Figure 4-3).  
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Figure 4-3. Analytical Framework for Forest Governance (World Bank, 2009) 
 
Although the World Bank’s framework for governance is comprehensive and prepared after a 
substantial literature review, this framework is also too broad to cover the specific aspects of 
community forestry in Nepalese context. Similar to WRI, this framework does not weight the 
elements which are therefore effectively equal. Furthermore, this framework is heavily 
focused on state institutions such as stability of forest institutions, quality of forest 
institutions, coherence of forest legislation and so on. Therefore it is unlikely to be useful to 
assess the specific practices associated with community based forest governance.    
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4.3.3 FAO/PROFOR FRAMEWORK  
 
A recent and comprehensive framework developed by FAO and the World Bank-managed 
Program on Forests (PROFOR) identifies three key components or ‘pillars’ of forest 
governance: (a) policy, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks; (b) planning and 
decision-making processes; and (c) implementation, enforcement, and compliance policies. 
As set out in Figure 4-4, it grades performance on these pillars across six areas: 
accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, fairness, participation, and transparency (FAO, 
2011: 11). 
 
Figure 4-4. Analytical Framework for ‘Good’ Forest Governance (FAO, 2011) 
 
 
This framework provides a comprehensive checklist and useful tool to identify and address 
problems in the governance of forest resources. It can also be used to ensure that efforts to 
reduce carbon emissions from forests in emerging and developing economies are properly 
managed(FAO, 2011). Although no weighting is applied to the indicators under this 
framework, it can be used to assess the quality of decentralized community based governance 
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with little or no modification. This more recent and comprehensive framework can be used to 
assess governance at the country level. However, some additional local-level indicators must 
be identified and incorporated within the scope of this framework to make it operational at 
the community level.  
4.3.4 REVIEW OF OTHER FRAMEWORKS  
 
Several other frameworks have been proposed by various international institutions including 
UNDP (1997), ADB (1999), USAID (2009), IUCN (2009), and UNESCAP (2009), each 
utilising varying elements of governance (Table 4-1). Three key elements of governance— 
participation, transparency, and accountability—are common to all selected international 
frameworks. Other important elements of governance identified are effectiveness, rule of law, 
equity, efficiency and coherence. There are certain other elements such as combating 
corruption, regulatory quality and political stability that are recognized by the World Bank as 
important. Similarly, a commitment to the public good and enhancement of the stock of 
social capital are recognized as important elements of governance by USAID.  
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Table 4-1. Summary governance framework proposed by various international organizations and associated key elements 
Key Elements World Bank 
2009 
UNDP, 1997  ADB, 1999  USAID, 
2009  
IUCN, 
2009 
UN-ESCAP, 
2009 
FAO 2011 
Participation        
Transparency       
Accountability       
Effectiveness            
Rule of law             
Equity                
Efficiency                
Coherence               
Note: UNDP – United Nation Development Programme, ADB – Asian Development Bank, EU- Commission of European Union, USAID – US Agency for 
International Development, UN-ESCAP – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific, and FAO –Food and Agriculture 
Organizations of the United Nation 
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The methodological framework for this study was developed by reviewing the governance 
frameworks proposed by various institutions listed in Table 4-1 and also from discussions 
with a wide range of stakeholders associated with Nepalese community forestry. These 
included the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation, the Department of Forests, the 
Federation of Community Forestry Users Group of Nepal, and various NGOs involved in the 
forestry sector (Figure 4-5).  
 
 
Figure 4-5. Methodological framework for this study (Figure based on FAO, 2011; GFI, 
2009; World Bank, 2009 and stakeholders consultation) 
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From this analysis, a series of indicators have been identified and synthesized under the key 
elements of governance proposed by FAO. An explanation of what these indicators are and 
why they have been chosen is provided in the analysis section (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). I employ 
this framework to assess governance quality in community forestry in Nepal, focusing on 
nine CFUGs in three districts representing three different ecological zones.  
 
4.4 STUDY AREA AND COMMUNITY FORESTS 
 
This study focuses on three districts in the central and western region representing all of 
Nepal’s ecological zones: Terai, Mid-Hills and High Mountains regions.  Altogether nine 
CFUGs are purposely selected, three from each of the three districts. These are (i) Dolakha 
District in the High Mountain which borders China to the North; (ii) Lalitpur District 
neighboring the capital Kathmandu in the North; and (iii) Rupandehi District in the Terai, 
which borders India to the South (Fig 4-5). Each district represents one of Nepal’s three main 
ecological zones. The study districts also vary in terms of the history of community forestry 
practice with the Mid-Hills and High Mountains CGUFs located in areas where natural forest 
was previously destroyed but is now improving with community-based management 
practices. In contrast, in the Terai region, CF policy is relatively new and Rupandehi District 
represents a good example of the early introduction of CF activities with the support of 
international donors. 
The key criteria for selecting the nine CFUGs were (i) at least 5 years of community forestry 
practice, (ii) the composition of CFUG executive committee and general members, (iii) 
participation of women, (iv) ethnic composition, and (v) number of households. Similarly 
forest related attributes that influenced the selection included (vi) original forest condition 
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and forest types, (vii) accessibility (distance from motorable road), and (viii) size of forest 
and value of timber and non-timber species. The key socio-economic attributes of CFUGs are 
presented in Table 4-2.  
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Figure 4-6. Political map of Nepal showing three ecological zones (High Mountains, Mid-hills and Terai) and case study districts from each 
ecological zones. Three study districts (red) represent Terai (blue) bordering to India, Mid-Hills (light blue), and High Mountain ((Purple) 
bordering to China. 
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Table 4-2. Summary table of location and socio-economic information of the nine community forests from three study districts 
Ecological zones High Mountain Mid Hills Terai 
District Dolakha  Lalitpur Rupandehi  
Name of CF Sitakunda CF Jhareni CF Chhyar Chhyare 
CF 
Godawarikunda CF Saraswati CF Bandevi CF Janapriya  CF  Navadurga CF  Saina Maina  CF  
Description  Mixed community, 
more independent, 
enough forest to 
meet their 
requirement. 
Typical 
mountain 
village. Far from 
urban centre 
Mixed community 
with diverse 
interest.  
Close to the capital 
city and Lalitpur 
district headquarter 
Close to 
Kathmandu but 
very conservative 
and traditional 
culture 
Very close to urban 
area but very 
disadvantage 
community; mainly 
ethnic groups 
Mixed community 
of Terai Tharu and 
migrated from hill 
Purely Terai 
Madhesi ethnic 
community 
Purely hill 
originated migrated 
community 
Location (address)/  Bhimeshwor 
Municipality 10 
Suspachimabati 
VDC 4 and 7 
Bhimeshwor 
Municipality 7 
Gilu Piple 
Godawari VDC 5  Lele VDC 1 Badikhel VDC 5  Devdaha VDC 9,8 
Bhaluhi 
Bishnupura VDC 
1,5,6,7,8 
Parroha VDC 
2,5,6,8 K bangai 3 
Number of 
households in 
CFUG 
135 186 110 130 78 94 306 386 1562 
User population 675 935 478 650 468 513 1722 2585 8685 
Year of registration 1997 2000 2000 1995 1999 1994  2008 1997 2002 
Number of 
members in the 
current executive 
committee 
15 13 7 11 11 9 13 21 11 
Proportion of 
female to male 
executive members 
6:9 4:9 5:2 6:5 6:5 4:5 9:4 3:8 3:8 
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4.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY DISTRICTS   
 
4.5.1 DOLAKHA DISTRICT – HIGH MOUNTAIN 
 
Dolakha District is located in the Central Development Region (Fig 4-5). The District lies on 
north latitude 27º 28" - 28º 0" and east longitude 85º 50" - 86º 32" and the altitude varies 
from 732m to 7,148m above sea level. The District’s headquarters is Charikot, which is 133 
km northeast from Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal. Dolakha District was selected because of 
its experience with community forestry and location within the High Mountain ecological 
zone. Additionally, this district is a pilot community forestry project area that is supported by 
a Swiss forestry project called the Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project.   
The district covers approximately 2,191 km
2
, of which 35 % is High Himalayan Mountains, 
40 % High Hills, and 25 % Mid-Hills (DDC, 2011). This District represents a typical Mid-
Hills landscape with a variety of ecosystem types (Niraula et al., 2013). The average annual 
rainfall is 2,043 mm (DDC, 2011). Due to altitudinal variations and local microclimatic 
effects Dolakha District exhibits remarkably diverse climatic conditions and is rich in bio-
diversity and natural resources. The area covered by forest is approximately 47%, which is 
more than the average for all Nepal, which is 39%. Agriculture land (26 %) and pasture land 
(13 %) make up the balance (DDC, 2011). The main native tree species are Khote Sallo 
(Pinus roxburghii 45 %), and associated species such as Chilaune (Schima wallichii 14 %), 
Gobre Sallo (Pinus wallichiana 12 %), and Sal (Shorea robusta 11 %). The balance (18 %) is 
composed of a variety of other minor species (DDC, 1999). 
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The District has a variety of ethnic groups and languages. The major ethnic groups and castes 
are Bramin, Chhetri, Tamang, Newar, Thami, Sherpa, Kami, Jirel, Damai, Magar and Sharki 
(DDC, 2006). Nepali is the major spoken language in the District (more than 70%), followed 
by Tamang (15%), Sherpa (6%), and Jirel (2%). The major religion is Hindu (71%) with just 
over a quarter of the population (28%) being Buddhist (DDC, 2006). 
A table summarising the socio-economic and biophysical information of the three community 
forests selected in Dolakha District is provided in Table 4-3.  
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Table 4-3. Socio-economic and biophysical information of study CFs in Dolakha District in High Mountain 
Name of CF Sitakunda CF Jhareni CF Chhyar Chhyare CF 
Location (address) Bhimeshwor Municipality 10  Suspachimabati VDC 4 and 7 Bhimeshwor Municipality 7 Gilu Piple. 
Number of households in CFUG 135 186 110 
Total Population /User population  n/a 935 478 
Year of registration 1997 2000 2000 
Number of members in the current executive  
committee 
15 13 12 
Proportion of female to male executive members 8:7 4:9 7:5 
Ethnic groups Mixed Mixed Mixed 
Forest Area (ha) 154.9 208.85 9.52 
Forest type ( Natural, Planted, Both)  Both Both  Both 
Main tree species Chir Pine, Chilaune, Quercus Gobre, Chir Pine,Chilaune,Uttis, Chir Pine, Natural Shrub land 
Forest condition  (Good, medium, poor) Good Medium Poor 
Distance to road 500m 570m 500m 
Elevation (m asl) 1000-1400 2100-3000 1350-1450 
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4.5.2 LALITPUR DISTRICT – MIDDLE HILLS 
 
Lalitpur District is located adjacent to the capital city, Kathmandu in the Central 
Development Region (Fig 4-5). The District lies on north latitude 27° 22' to 28º 50' and east 
longitude: 27° 22' to 28º 50'. The altitude ranges from 457m from the mean sea level to 
2831m. It has 41 Village Development Committees and one sub-metropolitan i.e., Lalitpur 
sub-metropolitan and the District headquarters is Patan. Due to a significant altitudinal 
variation and abundant rainfall Lalitpur District exhibits diverse climatic conditions and is 
rich in bio-diversity and natural resources. Lalitpur District was selected because of a long 
history of community involvement in the Mid-Hills ecological zone and because it represents 
urbanised as well as rural populations.  
The District covers approximately 38,500 ha, of which agriculture land occupies 15,296 ha (~ 
40%), forest occupies 15,253 ha (~40%) and remaining area 7,951 ha (~20%) is occupied by 
shrubs and grazing land (DDC, 2004). The main native tree species are Sal (Shorea robusta), 
Bamboo (Bambusa spp), Katus (Castanopsis spp), Chilaune (Schima wallichii), Uttis (Alnus 
nepalensis), Khasru (Quercus species), Khote Sallo (Pinus roxburghii), Gobre Sallo (Pinus 
wallichiana), and Paiu (Prunus species) (DDC, 2004). A large number of wildlife is found in 
the District including the endangered Spiny babbler (Turdoides nipalensis). Other important 
wildlife species include leopards, bears, deers, and a variety of birds and reptiles. The District 
is also rich in medicinal and aromatic plants such as Neem (Azadirachta indica), Gurjo 
(Tinospora sinensis), Dhasingre (Gaultheria fragrantissima), Tejpatta (Cinnamomum 
tamala), Jatamasi (Nardostachys grandiflora), Pakhanved (Bergania ciliate), and Jethimadhu 
(Glycyrrhiza glabra) (DDC, 2004). 
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The District has a variety of ethnic groups and languages. The major ethnic groups and castes 
are Bhramin, Chhetri, Newar, and Tamang (DDC, 2004). A brief summary table showing 
socio-economic and biophysical information of the three community forests selected in 
Lalitpur District is depicted in Table 4-4. 
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Table 4-4. Socio-economic and biophysical information of study CF in Lalitpur District in Mid-hills 
 
Name of CF 
 
Godawarikunda CF Saraswati CF Bandevi CF 
Location 
 
Godawari VDC 5  Lele VDC 1 Badikhel VDC 5 
Number of households in CFUG 
 
130 78 94 
User population  
 
650 468 513  
Year of registration 1995 1999 1994 
 
Number of members in the current executive  
committee 
11 11 9 
Proportion of female to male executive 
members 
 
6:5 6:5 4:5 
Ethnic groups 
 
Mixed More Dalit Pahari (Bamboo materials making caste) 
Forest Area (ha) 147 
 
9.75 89.9 
Forest type ( Natural, Planted, Both)  
 
Natural Both Both 
Main tree species 
 
Chileune, Katus  Pine  Chirpine, Blue pine, Katus 
Forest condition  (Good, medium, poor) 
 
Good Medium Good 
Distance to road 
 
500m 500m 0.5km 
Elevation (m asl) 
 
 
1650 – 1750m 1600-1793m 1450m 
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4.5.3. RUPANDEHI DISTRICT – TERAI  
 
Rupandehi District is located in the Western Development Region of Nepal (Fig 4-7). The 
District lies between 27º 20' N and 27º 45' N latitude, and 83 º 10' E and 83 º 30' E longitude. 
The District headquarters is Bhairahawa which is located 270 Km south West of Kathmandu. 
Rupandehi District contains very high value timber species and is located between the 
foothills and the Nepal-India border, a region where the land is almost flat and is popularly 
known as ‘Terai’. Community forestry programs are relatively new but becoming 
increasingly popular in Terai so this District was selected to understand the CF status in 
Terai.   
The District covers approximately  136,770 ha out of which agriculture land, urban regions, 
and roads cover about 73%, forest covers 23% and the remaining 4% is occupied by water 
bodies (i.e., rivers) (CBS, 2008). Rupandehi District experiences a sub-tropical type of 
climate with an average minimum temperature of 22º C in January and average maximum 
temperature of 36 º C in June (CBS, 2008). The average annual average precipitation is 
approximately 2,220 mm  (OFMP, 1995). Out of the total forests, 58% is protection forests, 
22% production forests and the remaining 20 % potential community/leasehold forests. The 
forests of the District have been categorized into three distinct types: Sal, Terai Hardwoods 
and Sissoo-Khair  (OFMP, 1995). 
Rupandehi represents a district with a high population growth rate (3.05%) coupled with 
relatively low literacy rate (46%).  The District has a variety of ethnic groups and languages 
and the major ethnic groups and castes are Tharu, Brahmin, Yadav, Chetri, Musalman, Lodh, 
Gurung, Newar, Harijan, Kewat, Kurmi, Mallah, Damai, Kami, and Sarki (CBS, 2008). 
Major occupations of the people of Rupandehi are agriculture 80%, business 7%, industry 
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3%, and others 10% (CBS, 2008). A brief summary table showing socio-economic and 
biophysical information of three community forests selected in Rupandehi District is depicted 
in Table 4-5.  
126 | P a g e  
 
Table 4-5. Socio-economic and biophysical information of study CF in Rupandehi District in Terai 
 
Name of CF  Janapriya  CF  Navadurga CF  Saina Maina  CF  
 
Location (address)/  
 
Devdaha VDC 9,8 Bhaluhi 
 
Bishnupura VDC 1,5,6,7,8 Parroha VDC 2,5,6,8  Bangai VDC 3 
Number of households in CFUG 
 
306 386 1562 
Total Population /User population  
 
1722 2585 8685 
Year of registration 2066 1997 2002 
Number of members in the current executive  
committee 
13 21 11 
Proportion of female to male executive members 
 
 9:4 13:8 3:8 
Ethnic groups 
 
Mixed Mixed n/a 
Forest Area (ha) 190  
 
197.33 688 
Forest type ( Natural, Planted, Both)  
 
Natural Natural + 5ha Sisso Plantation Natural 
Main tree species 
 
Sal, Asna,  Karma, Jamun, Jhingad  Sal, Siso Sal, Asna, Satisal, Bajhi, Bot Dhaero  
Forest condition  (Good, medium, poor) 
 
Good Poor Medium 
Distance to road 
 
100m 200m 500m 
Elevation (m asl) 
 
 
300 – 500 250 - 500 300 - 550 
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4.6 DATA COLLECTION 
4.6.1 THE DATA SOURCES 
 
Quantitative data were collected in the form of a structured questionnaire, where answers 
were collected during a household survey. The qualitative data were collected in the form of 
further comments and clarifications within the structured questionnaire or in field notes 
collected during the household survey. The respondents’ expressions, comments, 
observations and feelings were reproduced through their ‘words’, both in the household 
survey questionnaire and field notes, to the best of the researcher’s ability. Both the 
questionnaire and field notes were written in Nepali language, which is the native language of 
the researcher and also the participants. 
4.4.2 PRIMARY DATA 
 
4.6.2.1 INTERVIEWS WITH INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Interviews are recommended as good sources of information in a case study (Patton, 2002). 
Semi-structured interviews with individual households were carried out in order to gather 
information about their experiences and opinions with regard to the factors influencing their 
access to the forests. Bryman (2001) notes that a semi-structured interview is a suitable 
interview method to address more specific issues and also to provide some structure to ensure 
cross-case analysis. The purpose of these interviews was to explore the access of the rural 
poor to forests from the perspective of the interviewees, and to understand how and why the 
interviewees came to have their particular perspectives. 
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4.6.2.2 PARTICIPANT SELECTION FOR INTERVIEW  
 
Fifteen members from each CFUG were selected for interview, representing a range of 
groups (women, poor, elite, and so forth).  Participants from each sub-group were selected at 
random from a list of CFUG members.  Altogether 135 participants were recruited and 
interviewed as shown in Table 4-6. 
The expressions and views of the interviewees were recorded as field notes and in their own 
words. Both the researcher and assistant took field notes and compared them in order to 
reduce the bias from a single interpretation (O’Leary, 2004). Another strategy used to reduce 
researcher bias was that the key points were verified with the interviewee at the end of each 
interview (Patton, 2002). 
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Table 4-6. Numbers of household interviewees showing men, women and indigenous communities from various CFUGs 
 
 
Ecological zones 
 
 
High Mountain 
 
Mid Hills 
 
Terai 
 
Study Districts 
 
 
Dolakha  
 
Lalitpur  
 
Rupandehi  
Name of CF Sitakunda 
CF 
Chhayre 
Chhayre CF 
Jhereni CF Godawari 
Kunda CF 
Saraswoti 
CF 
Bandevi CF Janapriya 
CF 
Navadurga 
CF 
Saina 
Maina CF 
Total number of 
interview 
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 
Men  
 
10 7 8 10 10 12 7 8 5 
Women 5 
 
8 7 5 5 3 8 7 10 
Member 
representing 
indigenous 
communities*  
2 4 0 4 8 15 5 8 5 
*member of indigenous communities are either male or female  
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4.6.2.3 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION  
 
Krueger (1988) described a focus group discussion as a powerful means for gaining opinions 
and beliefs of a particular group of people. Focus group discussions were employed in order 
to understand whether people of different socioeconomic categories had different access to 
the forest. Focus groups are suitable to record the experiences of all people, even those who 
are normally left out in general group discussions in Nepalese society (Waldegrave, 2003). A 
focus group is defined as a group of people with a similar background on a specific topic 
(Waldegrave, 2003). A total of 10 focus group discussions were carried out in the 
communities (Table 4-7). Separate focus groups were arranged for specific groups of local 
key informants (e.g. female, low caste members, poor members, ethnic group members.). A 
key advantage of such focus groups was that people having the same background feel more at 
ease in interacting with each other (Greenbaum, 1993), and such group interaction generates 
a variety of views and stimulates the discussion of new perspectives (Morgan, 1997; Gray, 
2004). 
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Table 4 -7. List of focus group discussions carried out in various CFUGs 
Categories of Participants 
Women users                                       
Janajati users 
Mixed group 
Low caste users  
Local key informants 
Number of Focus Groups 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
 
The order and the way of asking the questions were adjusted to fit the specific group 
situation. This type of semi-structured guideline has advantages in terms of flexibility, which 
motivates the participants to express their experiences (Finch and Lewis, 2003). A team of 
two people (the researcher and an assistant) facilitated the focus group discussions. The team 
exchanged the roles of facilitating and note taking in the series of discussions across focus 
groups. 
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Figure 4-7. Photos showing active focus group discussion in Chhyar Chhyare CF in Dolakha 
District (Photo taken with permission from focus group participants). 
4.6.2.4 PARTICIPANT/FIELD OBSERVATIONS 
 
Observation is one of the major means of collecting field data in a qualitative research study. 
Various scholars claim that observation allows the researcher to understand the behaviour of 
people and the processes in a context that was more natural than formal interviews (Lindsay, 
1997;Schutt, 2006).  According to Merriam (1998:111): 
Observation offers a first hand account of the situation under study and, when 
combined with interviewing and document analysis, allows for a holistic 
interpretation of the phenomenon being investigated.  
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Participant and field observation usually always takes place in community settings, in 
locations in and around study site. In this study, field observations supplemented the data 
collected in household interviews, focus group discussions, and from documents. Observation 
was also used to triangulate emerging findings from the interviews and document analysis. 
This observation technique provided the researcher with an opportunity to observe the 
participation of people representing different socioeconomic categories, positions and gender 
in meetings (such as general assembly, executive committee meeting, group meeting, etc.). 
The researcher attended two general meetings of the executive committee of Sitakunda 
CFUG and Bandevi CFUG.  The researcher observed and recorded data without 
predetermined observation schedules or checklists. The researcher took detailed field notes of 
her observations, and included descriptions, direct quotations, and her own comments in the 
field notes. Data from the observations contributed to the results. In addition, pictures were 
taken of community forest operations and associated features. For example, a typical 
agricultural landscape is shown in Figure 4-8. 
 
Figure 4-8. A typical agricultural landscape in the study area. Trees on farm help to fulfil 
some basic needs reducing pressure on community forests 
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 4.6.3 SECONDARY DATA  
 
Reviewing documents is a key source of information. Merriam (1998:126) notes, ‘data from 
documents are particularly good sources for qualitative case studies because they can ground 
an investigation in the context of the problem being investigated’. Policy documents provided 
useful information on forest policies and the government’s implementation strategies, part of 
the context of the research problem for this study. Documents collected from the relevant 
government agencies and NGOs provided useful preliminary information for understanding 
the social, economic and political context at the national level. Operational plans and the 
constitutions of the CFUGs provided information about the formal rules and rights of forest 
management. Data from these documents were also used as a means of triangulating the data 
from focus group discussions and interviews. 
 
4.7 FIELD VISIT FOR DATA COLLECTION 
 
A total of four months were allocated for the field research which included a first preliminary 
field visit of one months and second field visit of approximately three months.  Prior to the 
first field trip, two weeks were spent for field visit planning, preparation and communication. 
The preliminary field visit took place mainly in Kathmandu and focused on the secondary 
information collection which included the following: formal and informal discussions with 
government officials, forestry-sector donor agencies/projects and relevant I/NGOs; and the 
identification of potential study areas.  
 The second field visit involved communicating with the selected CFUGs, the DFOs, project 
organisations and NGOs; the recruitment and training of local researchers for data collection; 
and the pre-testing and finalisation of the project questionnaire, its translation into Nepali and 
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printing. A detailed schedule of the household survey and other qualitative data collection 
methods, including individual and group interviews, was prepared after communication with 
the CFUGs involved. 
Another seven weeks were spent in the field conducting the household survey, the key 
informants interviews and focus group discussions, in addition to observing group meetings 
and other group activities. Both the household survey and other qualitative information 
collections were generally conducted by the researcher herself with help from an assistant. 
Following the field work, approximately three weeks were spent checking the questionnaires 
and coding the answers, in addition to sharing the initial findings with local experts from 
government offices, forestry-sector donor agencies/projects and relevant NGOs, in order to 
gather their feedback, comments and suggestions. In addition, any remaining secondary 
information was collected at this time. 
 
4.8 DATA ANALYSIS  
 
4.8.1 DATA CHECKING AND ENTRY  
 
The quantitative data collected from the initial household survey using the structured 
questionnaire was carefully checked and coded before being transferred to a computer. The 
qualitative data, collected via additional feedback, comments and informal discussions, was 
edited and entered in bullet form and triangulated from different sources, in order to validate 
them.
136 | P a g e  
4.8.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS  
 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the characteristics of both the survey and sample 
populations. These included the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and the 
distribution of households, in terms of existing participation in group activities and other 
variables. Descriptive statistics, such as percentage and mean, were used to summarise and 
present the analysed data. The results were presented in the form of a bar diagram, and 
spider-diagram using the Excel computer program. The reliability and validity of quantitative 
data is likely to be moderate due to the somewhat small sample of each CFUG.  
 
4.8.3 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Qualitative data analysis involves moving back and forth iteratively between the original data 
and the conceptualisation, abstraction and interpretation derived from the data (Spencer et al., 
2003).  According to Schutt (2006) the qualitative data analysis helps the researcher to 
generate concepts and make linkages, in order to discover whether the concepts and 
interpretations made are reflected in the process.  
Firstly, the qualitative data and notes were collected in bullet form, and the comments and 
explanations thoroughly considered. While the use of qualitative data analysis software, such 
as N-VIVO, can be useful for managing large volumes of of qualitative data, in this study the 
moderate amount of data was analysed manually. 
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4.9 ETHICS APPROVAL AND CONFIDENTIALITY  
 
This research followed the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) Tasmania Network’s 
Code of Ethical Conduct for Research. Initial thoughts were to interview key informants from 
government agencies and NGOs involved with community forestry therefore minimal ethics 
approval was obtained. However, given the comprehensive nature of study and detailed 
questionnaire full human ethics approval was obtained from HREC Tasmania. Obtaining full 
ethics approval was major hurdle associated to this study which took more than three months 
and several reviews. To meet ethics requirements, a series of processes were followed during 
this research as outlined in the next paragraph.  
The participants in this research were provided with an information sheet which outlined the 
researcher’s background, project description and invitation to participate, participant 
identification and selection criteria, project procedures, including time involved, data 
management, and a statement of participant’s rights to decline to participate (Annex II). The 
information sheet also includes the contact details of the researcher and supervisors for the 
participants to make contact, if they had any questions about the project.  
Participants were invited to participate in the research and their informed consent was 
obtained. The consent form included the title of the research and the time period for retaining 
the signed form (a minimum of five years from the research completion date). It also includes 
the participant’s statement agreeing to participate in the research and the participant’s full 
name, signature and date. 
Data is being stored on the researcher’s, password protected computer hard drive which is 
locked away while not in use. According to Human Research Ethics Committee Tasmania 
Network’s guideline after the completion of this research, the data will be placed in the safe-
138 | P a g e  
keeping of the researcher and it will only be accessible to the researcher and her supervisors. 
The data will be stored for 5 years after completion of the study and then destroyed. 
 
4.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has given an overview of the conceptual, analytical and methodological 
framework, study area and site selection for this study.  The chapter reviewed some 
conceptual underpinnings of governance associated with forestry and natural resource 
management applicable in the Nepalese context. It also reviewed and synthesized different 
forms of governance frameworks offered by various international organizations and a new 
methodological framework was developed for assessing forest governance focusing on 
participation, transparency, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and fairness/equity.  
A mixed approach was employed using both quantitative and qualitative data analysis to 
analyse community forest governance in Nepal. Quantitative data were collected to construct 
and analyse basic descriptive statistics in order to estimate the status of various elements of 
governance. The primary survey provided the necessary quantitative and some qualitative 
information to evaluate the governance status of the study CFs. A number of indicators under 
each governance element were employed using a simple numeric ranking. To operationalise 
the approach, a user group member household was used as the lowest unit of analysis in this 
study. 
Quantitative analysis is considered to be insufficient, however, for a comprehensive analysis 
of the issues, and thus qualitative data were collected from the field, in order to triangulate 
the data and gain an understanding of the institutional settings and overall governance and 
management practices and performances of the selected user groups. Focus group 
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discussions, key informants interviews, and informal discussions/observations were carried 
out, to collect the requisite qualitative information.  
This study was carried out in three Districts located in three physiographic zones of Nepal, 
namely Terai, Middle Hills and High Mountains of Nepal and the results are reported out in 
the three ensuring chapters (in Chapter 5, 6 and 7). 
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CHAPTER 5: ASSESSING DECENTRALISED COMMUNITY 
BASED FOREST GOVERNANCE – PARTICIPATION AND 
TRANSPARENCY  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Of the six key elements of forest governance—participation, transparency, effectiveness, 
efficiency, accountability and fairness/equity--this chapter presents the results of the study 
focusing on the first two, participation and transparency. First brief descriptions of household 
characteristics are presented; then, the two elements of governance are assessed using a 
variety of quantitative and qualitative indicators.  The household survey provided the 
necessary quantitative information for assessing the level of participation while focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews and informal discussions/observations were used to 
collect the qualitative information. 
 
5.2 HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS  
 
The household has been taken as the unit of data collection and analysis. A brief description 
of these household characteristics is helpful to understand the socio-economic status of the 
forest users being studied and to explain how these characteristics may influence users’ 
perceptions concerning incentives and participation in the governance of their community 
forest resources. 
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5.2.1 GENDER OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 
 
The majority of the surveyed households (67%) are headed by males (Figure 5-1). This is 
mainly due to the Hindu religion and the patriarchal socio-cultural structure that prevails in 
the study districts, in which women are subordinate to men, both at the household and 
community level. The women-headed households are those by a single woman or where male 
members have gone away from home, usually in search of a job. 
 
Figure 5-1 Proportion of Respondents by Gender 
 
5.2.2 THE WELLBEING RANKING  
 
The respondents are categorised into three socio-economic classes in terms of relative 
poverty. These are poor, medium and well-off groups based on local criteria of wellbeing.  
The major criteria used, as outlined by Gentle and Maraseni (2012) in their study area in the 
High Mountain District of Nepal, are food sufficiency, land ownership (amount and quality), 
education, income, employment and financial loans. The results (Figure 5-2) show that, from 
the total number of respondents, the highest proportion (53%) came from the medium 
socioeconomic class, followed by the poor (27%) and the well-off (20%). 
Male Female 
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Figure 5-2 Socio-economic class of respondents 
 
5.2.3 CASTE GROUP COMPOSITION 
 
The respondents were categorised into three broad groups according to caste as recognised by 
the Government of Nepal: high caste, Janajatis and lower caste (Dalits). The caste system is 
deeply rooted in Hindu society and is based on four primary divisions (Rao, 2010; Shrestha, 
2002). Brahmins, Chhetries and Thakuris are categorised as high caste, and Sudras as lower 
caste (Rao, 2010). The Janajatis include the forty-four ethnic groups identified as Janajatis 
in the 2001 population census. The lower caste, or Dalits, includes sixteen groups 
representing low Hindu castes, who suffer most through discrimination based on this 
hierarchical Hindu caste system (CBS, 2002). 
Data analysis shows that the majority of respondent households are from the higher caste 
(73%), followed by Janajatis (13%) and Dalits (13%) (Figure 5-3).  
Well-off Medium Poor 
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Figure 5-3 Caste composition of respondents in the study CF 
 
5.2.4 INCOME SOURCES 
 
The major income sources of the households are summarised in Figure 5-4. Agriculture 
(including forestry) is reported as the main occupation and hence the main source of income 
by 47% of households. Similarly, government service and business are reported to be the 
second major source of income for 20% of households, followed by remittances received 
from foreign employment (13%).  
 
Figure 5-4  Major source of income of the respondents in the study CF 
Brahmin/Chettri Janajatis Dalit 
Foreign employment Service Business Agriculture 
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5.3 ELEMENTS OF GOVERNANCE: PARTICIPATION  
 
The participation of people is a key element of forest governance and it is even more difficult 
to initiate change without the inclusion and participation of excluded or marginalised groups 
in local governance (Agarwal, 2001). Participation has long been viewed by development 
scholars and practitioners as a crucial element that allows poor and marginalized groups to 
influence institutions and decisions that critically affect their lives (Mayoux, 1995). 
Particularly in the community forestry sector, participation has been viewed as a pathway 
towards improving good forest governance, promoting sustainable use and management, 
while securing livelihood benefits and opportunities for local communities.  
The involvement of people in executive committees (EC) and assembly meetings is 
important, especially when it comes to the preparation of the operational plan (OP). It is 
hypothesised that assembly meetings that encourage participation in the preparation of the OP 
provide more benefits to poor and disadvantaged people. CFUG assembly meetings are more 
relevant than the EC meetings in influencing the preparation of the OP, CF constitution and 
management of the CF. This is because, when the majority of EC members belong to the elite 
and wealthier households, the EC will not reflect the needs and aspirations of the poorer and 
socially disadvantaged members (Thoms, 2008). Nayak and Berkes (2008) found that 
assembly meetings were more representative of the diversity of communities and there was 
less chance of elite dominance. Hence, the more involved the assembly in the preparation of 
the OP including forest management, harvesting, and protection, the greater is the chance that 
the benefits will be shared fairly compared with involvement in only the EC.   
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In this study, participants’ perceptions of governance with regard to the participation element 
were assessed by examining six different indicators. These were women’s participation in 
annual general meeting (AGM) and positions on executive committees, participation of 
ethnic groups in various CF activities, mediation of numerous interests in CF decision 
making process, meaningful participation by users in revenue collection, and consultation 
with CF users and other concerned stakeholders on the CFUG constitution and CF 
operational plan. 
 
5.3.1. WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY FORESTRY 
 
Women’s participation in CF activities is viewed as a crucial element for successful 
implementation. A CFUG’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) is an important event in CF 
processes because it approves the constitution and operational plan and also elects the 
executive committee. Women collect forest products from CFs and these products play an 
important role in their daily household activities. Therefore women’s participation, either 
directly or through legitimate representatives, is a key cornerstone of good governance. To 
participate effectively, women need to be well informed and well organised, and free to 
express themselves about any concerns they have. Household survey results indicate different 
levels of participation in different CFUGs. Navadurga CFUG in Terai showed the lowest 
level of women participation in the CFUG’s AGM, while Janapriya CFUG (Rupandehi 
District and Godawarikunda CF (Lalitpur) indicated the highest level of women’s 
participation in AGMs (see Figure 5-5).  
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        (Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-5. Participation of Women in CF annual general meeting (AGM) in study CFs. 
Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of participation (5 highest and 1 lowest) and 
name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain(right) shown 
in X-axis.   
 
The Household Survey indicated a range of different views of women members regarding 
their participation in AGM. They cited the male dominated culture, involvement in household 
chores, and the unwillingness of elites to listen to women’s voices as some of the key reasons 
for their lack of interest in attending CF AGMs. Further, the situation of women in Terai is 
also critical. Madhesi communities (people live in Terai) do not allow women to participate in 
public. A Madhesi woman, for example, from Navadurga CF explained the socio-cultural 
nexus that informally restricts her participation and opportunities to raise her concerns at a 
CFUG AGM: 
In my opinion, social and cultural factors associated to Madheshi communities 
(people live in lowland) is key factor for lower women participation in CF activities. 
Due to traditional cultural beliefs of Madheshi ethnic group of Nepal, women are not 
allowed to go outside the house and participate in social meetings and social events 
(Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi). 
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In spite of many changes in the modern Nepalese society, a strong belief endures within 
Madheshi communities that women should not be allowed to participate publicly in meetings 
with male members. This issue was also raised by focus group participants and was also 
understood during the household survey. In addition to this cultural belief, women’s 
household chores and limited awareness regarding forest rules and regulations among 
Madhesi women also limited their participation in CFUG AGMs. Women members of 
Navadurga CFUG of Terai expressed their dissatisfaction over men’s claims regarding their 
capability and time availability to work in CF: 
...other factors associated with lower participation are that male users think that 
women don’t know anything about forest rules and regulations. In addition we 
(women) are very busy cooking food, looking after kids and husband and in-laws... 
there is lot of work pending at home so how can we go to attend the meeting? Even if 
we go to attend the meeting with husband, we have nothing to say in the meetings and 
when we get back home we have to do all household duties... (Interviewee, 
Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi). 
 
In contrast to above, women are active participants in Middle Hills of Nepal where a number 
of CFs were run by female members alone. In other cases, there is equal participation of male 
and female members. The key reasons for such a high level of female participation varies 
across CFUGs, as the following two interviewees explain: 
Forest products such as fuel wood, fodder and bedding material for cattle is mostly 
collected by us and we know the importance of these goods and services. Therefore 
we think women are more attached to the forest than males and forests are best 
conserve when managed by women...we have to go to AGM to express our interests 
(Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur).   
 
Men usually go to work either locally or overseas for employment and we need forest 
products for our daily use... further many NGOs and CBOs have helped to create 
awareness regarding importance of women’s participation in community forestry 
activities which has motivated us to participate in AGM and other forestry related 
meetings and training (Interviewee, Jhareni CF, Dolakha). 
148 | P a g e  
 
A division of labour between men and women still exists in Nepalese society. Men usually 
seek outside employment to earn money while women remain responsible for managing the 
daily household activities and family. In such a situation, active participation of women is 
most apparent in CFUG AGMs.   
 
5.3.2 PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES  
 
Article 169 of the International Labour Organisation of the United Nations highlights the 
right of indigenous nationalities (INs) to participate in forest management activities and 
obtain benefits from forests. Furthermore, Nepal’s CF Guidelines (2008) also state that 
participation of indigenous communities (Janajati) in CFs is regarded as a means of 
strengthening governance and improving the livelihoods of forest users. The Guidelines note 
this can be achieved through: 
Improved access to information, resources/benefits and decision-making; improved 
social and political gains; improved accountability of decision-makers towards 
general users; and improved conditions of resources and associated forest goods and 
services (CF guidelines, 2008).  
 
In many cases indigenous communities participate to protect forests as they are highly 
dependent to them; it is also the case that ethnic groups are located close to the forests while 
high caste groups are located close to town centers and road heads.  
Respondents of Godawarikunda, Saraswoti and Sitakunda CFUGs stated that they had 
ensured participation of indigenous nationalities and accommodated their voices in CF 
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management (Figure 5-6). They perceived that the executive committee encouraged them to 
participate in various CF activities and to put their views at meetings: 
Most of the users are Janajati (Tamang). The EC encourages us to participate and put 
our voices in CF meetings and interactions. So, we have been involving in protecting 
forests since past and we also dependent mostly on the forests for daily needs. We are 
very interested in forestry activities including AGM (Interviewee, Godawarikunda 
CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-6. Participation of ethnic groups in CF AGMs in study CFs. Numeric score in Y-
axis represents the level of participation of ethnic groups (5, highest and 1, lowest) and name 
of study CF located in Terai (left), Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis  
In contrast, poor participation of ethnic communities was observed in Janapriya, Navadurga, 
Sainamaina and Chhyarchhyare CFUGs. These CFUGs experienced more domination from 
high caste members. Respondents from INs stated that high caste groups did not consider 
their concerns when they arose in meetings and at AGMs. For example, one member of an 
ethnic community noted: 
... I attended the AGM many times in the past but I felt uncomfortable at the way the 
meeting was organised as I could not get opportunity to put my issues ... even when I 
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got opportunity to tell, my voice was not heard by the elite so I thought it is best to do 
my work rather than wasting time to attend the CF meetings including AGM... 
(Interviewee, Janapriya CFUG, Rupendehi District). 
 
The study finds that most of members from Indigenous Nationalities have been heavily 
involved in CF management in Mid Hills and High Mountain, while there is much lower 
involvement in Terai region. The research finding concluded that role of indigenous 
nationalities is essential in decision making process because of their proximity of CFs and 
because their livelihoods depend on forests and forest-based small traditional enterprises. 
 
5.3.3 MEDIATION OF DIFFERENT INTEREST GROUPS 
 
CFUG members contribute to forestry activities to secure access to forest resources. Different 
groups participate in forest management for different reasons. For example, women are 
interested in ensuring the supply of fuelwood and fodder, while men are interested in timber 
production for construction. Poor members, on the other hand, are interested in the collection 
of minor forest products and income generation activities.  
 
Some CFUGs are able to mediate different interest groups at AGMs ensuring that everyone’s 
interests are protected; other CFUGs, however, are not able to do so. This study finds 
significant variation in the level of such mediation in different CFUGs (Figure 5-7). 
Respondents from Godawarikunda and Saraswoti CFUG stated that interest mediation was 
fairly successful and taken as an example for others in the District.  
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As stated by one of the key members of the District Federation of Community Forest Users 
Nepal (FECOFUN, Lalitpur), contesting interests of forest management can be addressed 
easily through participation of conflicting interest groups in decision making processes.  
I visit once in a year to Saraswoti CFUG at the time of AGM. Managing contesting 
interests of fuelwood, timber and other forest products from a comparatively small 
forest area is always challenging. However, I personally discuss with those members 
of different interest and found that the CF executive committee is efficiently 
managing these interests in decision making process. The chairperson and secretary of 
the CFUG take a lead role to manage such interests. They provide options for 
mediation and allow members of interest groups for critical discussion and take an 
appropriate decision. They facilitate the meeting and call us as a witness. I 
recommend other CFUGs of the district to follow them (Informal discussion with 
member of District FECOFUN, Lalitpur).
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-7. Mediation of different interest groups in various community forests. Numeric 
score in Y-axis represents the level of participation (5, respondents strongly agree and 1, 
strongly disagree) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High 
Mountain (right) shown in X-axis 
 
However, respondents from Bandevi, Jhareni and Navadurga indicated that they are not 
satisfied with the current state of mediation processes being practiced in their CFUGs. A 
member of Chhyarchhyare CFUG said: 
We are not far from city, but capacity of committee is very poor. Only degraded 
forests are given us from where our demands cannot be made. Thula bada manchhe 
(rich and social elite people) want to protect forests by restricting the access to the 
forests for 5 years. Many of them either use LP gas or they can bring firewood from 
their own lands. But, we poor members need firewood to cook and need to access 
community forests. We put our concerns to the executive committee, which is headed 
by women and is positive to our concerns. However, Thula bada manchhe come and 
quarrel every time in the meeting and committee cannot take proper decision. I feel 
that our CF is serving rich people instead of its principles. We are requesting DFO 
office, district FECOFUN for mediation. Let’s see if any support will be given by 
them (Interviewee, Chhyarchhyare CFUG, and Dolakha District).  
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The empirical results of the study show that a timely and appropriate mediation system 
enhances the overall performance of community participation in CF management.  Some 
CFUGs invite a representative from DFO and FECOFUN to the mediation process which 
helps make it smoother and more transparent. 
 
5.3.4 WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES 
 
Representation on a CFUG executive committee (EC) is another clear indicator of users’ 
level of participation in the governance of community forests. Studies reveal that EC 
members participate more in the governance of their groups than non-EC members (Pokharel 
et al., 2012) and may gain more benefits. 
As per Nepal’s new community forestry Guidelines, half of executive committee members 
should be women who should also hold at least one of the key positions such as chairperson 
or secretary. However, in many cases these guidelines are not implemented due to male 
domination, cultural beliefs and so forth. In the case of one of the well-functioning CFUG in 
this study (i.e., Godawarikunda CFUG) six of eleven executive committee members are 
women (see Table 4-2).  
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However, in some of these better performing CFUGs, women’s inclusion is indicative of a 
desire to obey the rules and their voice is not heard much at meetings. However, women 
representatives did not express discontent with these committees. A woman executive 
committee member of Sitakunda CFUG put her view as follows: 
Women involvement in executive committee is increasing these days compared to 10 
year ago. I feel that male members of our CFUG have been changed. I am happy that 
they hear our voice and concerns. We are interested to work on executive committee 
but we cannot avoid our domestic responsibilities for the meeting. Sometime I feel 
that we are double loaded. However, male members do not care much in domestic 
affairs and easily attend the meeting. Sometime, male members finish discussion 
before I arrive and I feel that they are avoiding me systematically. However, I mostly 
agree on their decisions. I want committee should understand our problem and request 
for special arrangement (Women committee member of Sitakunda CFUG, Dolakha 
District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-8. Representation of Women in executive committee
2
. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the level of participation (5, 50% or more female participation in the executive 
committee and 1, less than 20% of women in the executive committee) and name of study CF 
located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.   
                                                                
2
 As the actual number of women on  executive committees varies from time to time,female participation is 
rated on a 1-5 scale rather than simply using the absolute number from the HH survey which only captures 
the situation at a particular point in time. 
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In contrast, in Navadurga and Sainamaina CFUGs from Rupandehi and Bandevi CF from 
Lalitpur showed very poor to poor representation of women on executive committees. The 
FGDs of various CFUGs in Terai show that women representation in committee is considered 
a legal burden for them and including women on the committee is just to abide by the law 
without any intension of giving them a platform for active participation. A women member of 
Navadurga CFUG explained her perceptions of why she thought this was the case: 
Elite members of CF want themselves to be always in CF executive position. They 
just keep women on the committee to obey the CF Guidelines and to show there is 
women participation to the District Forest Office. But, they (elite members) give more 
priority to men than women. They think women’s duty is to look after only domestic 
work and look after kids. Moreover, we are just listeners while in meetings. They do 
not listen us when we put our concerns. Therefore we are discouraged in participation 
of executive committee meeting (Women Interviewee, Navadurga CF, Rupandehi 
District). 
 
This empirical study shows that female representation on executive committees is increasing 
in Mid-Hills and High Mountain regions, but there remains a challenge to make their 
involvement productive. Capacity building in managerial skill enhancement and special 
provisions for women will be important to foster their more active participation. 
 
5.3.5 CONSULTATION OF INTEREST GROUPS IN CF CONSTITUTION AND 
OP PREPARATION 
 
The CF Constitution and community forest Operational Plan (are the basic primary long-term 
strategic documents (~5 to 10 yrs period) that are used to guide CFUGs in terms of 
organisation functioning and community forest management. CFUGs prepare detailed annual 
activity implementation plans based on the OP to implement day-to-day activities. Therefore, 
consultation with various interest groups during the preparation of the OP is important to 
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secure the CF users' ownership of the various decisions made. The consultation process is 
believed to be very important for successful CF operation. 
The respondents’ views from the nine CFUGs on the consultation that occurred with the 
various interest groups during operational plan preparation are shown in Figure 5-9. CFUG 
users claim that many consultative meetings and discussions were conducted during OP 
preparation in Godawarikunda, Saraswoti and Sitakunda CFUGs. They further express their 
high level of satisfaction overall with consultation processes and take ownership of the 
constitution and operational plan of the CFUG and other associated decisions: 
We have a very good process so that everyone can get involved to prepare OP and CF 
constitution. The EC organises meetings in different tole (village) and collects their 
opinion so that every member including poor, women and members from ethnic group 
can put their view forward ... finally EC compiles everyone’s idea and presents a draft 
in larger group meetings for final suggestion and necessary correction. Finally, OP is 
passed by general mass meeting and forwarded to District Forest Office for approval 
(Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District).  
 
From such expressions of CF members, it can be concluded that the CFUG follows the most 
democratic process since its inception. This participatory process enhances the users' 
ownership of their community forests and improves the internal governance of CFUG.  
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-9. Consultation of various interest groups in CF operation plan preparation. 
Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of consultation of different interest groups (5, 
the respondents strongly agree and 1, strongly disagree) and name of study CF located in 
Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
 
However, the situation in Godawarikunda CFUG is not replicated in many other CFUGs. In 
many cases the OP is prepared by key members of the executive committee with support 
from the forest rangers either from district forest office or from the project. A lack of 
consultation with various interest groups often leads to conflict among users as many users do 
not know what is included in the OP and for what reason. It is often claimed that the 
chairperson and secretary produce the OP with the help of DFO staff who do not then inform 
all members. Severe dissatisfaction expressed by general members of Navadurga and 
Janapriya CFUGs illustrates the undemocratic processes followed during formulation of such 
important CF documents:  
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 ... In fact, we do not know what is written in the Karyayojana (operational plan). 
They do not involve us in the consultation process. We are never asked what to 
include and what not... as far as I know it was the job of samiti (executive committee) 
and chairperson (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District).  
 
Based on the empirical results, the study concludes that adequate consultation among 
different interest group enhances both CF participation and ownership of decisions. 
Conversely, a lack of consultation hinders overall participation and indicates poor CF 
governance. 
 
5.3.6 PARTICIPATION IN REVENUE COLLECTION  
 
To run CFs and undertake other community development activities requires funds. How 
women, dalit, indigenous nationalities and other interest groups participate to secure sources 
of income, and how much funds they can secure from membership fees, selling of forest 
products, fines and collecting revenues is an important component of CF success. Several 
studies have shown that such functional financial participation enhances CF users’ 
involvement in decision making in community forestry and ultimately improves CF 
governance (Pokharel et al., 2012; MFSC, 2013). 
In the CFUGs studied a variety of ways to collect revenues were used including sale of forest 
products, fines, entrance fees and annual membership fees. For example, Godawarikunda 
CFUG is successful in collecting revenues from those sources from each household as per its 
AGM decision. The CF users report being pleased with the annual fee charged by the AGM. 
As one interviewee noted: 
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As per the decision of AGM all member of CFUG have to pay NRS.100 per year 
(A$1.20) membership fee. This money goes to the CFUG fund and is utilised 
transparently for CF protection and management activities. We decided the annual fee 
unanimously and pay happily on time (Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur 
District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-10. Status of financial participation in various CFUGs. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the level of financial participation (5, respondents strongly agree and 1, strongly 
disagree) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High 
Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
 
However, in many cases ensuring participation in decision making and revenue collection is a 
difficult undertaking as members of the CFUG are contributing their time to protect and 
manage the forests. These members believe there should not be any further payment for the 
goods and services they receive from their CF. In many cases, the process of decision making 
and revenue collection occurs with the participation of a few elite members, a situation that 
reduces the ownership of general CFUG members. A respondent from Navadurga CFUG 
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perceived that the system of revenue collection was unfair and designed to benefit key CF 
members: 
In my observation, collection of revenue is for the benefit of thulathalu (key people of 
CF) ... actually we don’t know where the fund goes how and why ... why should we 
pay more as we are spending our valuable time to protect the forest? (Interviewee, 
Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District) 
 
In the studied CFUGs, there was unanimous agreement that participation of CF users in 
decision making including the revenue collection mechanisms increased their ownership and 
resulted in a higher percentage of people implementing such decisions.  
 
5.3.7 STATUS OF PARTICIPATION IN HIGH MOUNTAINS – THE CASE OF 
DOLAKHA DISTRICT 
 
The views of respondents on the various indicators of participation in Dolakha District are 
summarised by a radar diagram (Figure 5-11). Sitakunda CFUG, located close to road head, 
is the most well functioning CFUG compared to Jhareni and Chhyarchhyare CFUG. 
However, women’s participation in AGM seems to be lower in Sitakunda CFUG compared to 
the two other CFs. The main reasons for lower women participation are:  lack of time 
available to attend meetings due to household responsibilities, lack of self-confidence, and 
lack of awareness despite the fact the CF is not far from the district headquarters. In addition, 
women in the Sitakunda CFUG are no longer using firewood to cook which was key 
motivating factor to participate in the CF in the past. Chhyarchhyare CFUG has the highest 
level of female representation in the executive committee, which explicitly encourages the 
participation of general women members in CFUG activities. 
The study reveals that the representation of women in the executive committee alone does not 
necessarily result in the efficient management of a CF. In spite of strong women 
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representation in Chhyarchhyare CFUG, the other indicators of participation show poorer 
performance. In contrast, Sitakunda performs better on other indicators of participation 
despite having relatively lower female participation.   
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-11. Participation status in study CFUG in Dolakha District 
 
5.3.8 STATUS OF PARTICIPATION IN MID-HILLS – THE CASE OF 
LALITPUR DISTRICT  
 
Perceptions regarding participation varied in the three CFUGs in Lalitpur (Figure 5-12): 
Godawarikunda possessed the highest level participation, Saraswoti moderate, and Bandevi 
CFUG poorer performance. The superior performance of the Godawarikunda CFUG is 
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because of it is one of the oldest CFUGs in the district, located close to the city and Ilaka 
Forest Office, and has received a lot of support from the district forest office. The education 
level of the CFUG members is also high as many of them have access to computers and the 
internet in comparison to the other two CFUGs. On the other hand the majority of members 
in the Bandevi CFUG are from disadvantaged groups and poor socio-economic backgrounds. 
Consequently, they have a poorer level of awareness and lower participation in CF 
conservation and management.  
 
 
 (Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-12. Participation status in study CF in Lalitpur District 
Many scholars argue that status of participation is better in Mid-Hills compared to the Terai 
region (Pokharel et al., 2008; Pokharel and Tiwari, 2013). However, this study shows that 
participation varies considerably even in the Mid Hills Region (Figure 5-12). 
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5.3.9 STATUS OF PARTICIPATION IN TERAI – THE CASE OF RUPANDEHI 
DISTRICT  
 
The various indicators of participation in Rupandehi District reveal a mixed situation. 
Sainamaina and Janapriya CFUGs are relatively better performing CFUGs, while Navadurga 
CFUG appears to function poorly (Figure 5-13). A comparison of Sainamaina and Janapriya 
CFUGs reveals that some indicators are better in Janapriya (i.e., women participation in CF 
AGM and in CF executive committee), while other indicators are better in Sainamaina 
CFUG. In contrast to the Mid-Hills and High Mountain regions, there is a poor consultation 
among the various interest groups during the preparation of the CF constitution and OP in the 
Terai Region, which also results in relatively poor performance.  
Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-13. Participation status in study CF in Rupandehi District 
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The poor performance of Navadurga CFUG is mainly due to the diverse ethnic groups from 
Madhesi communities who have low level of awareness of CF management. The CF 
executive committee is controlled by those with an interest in the financial benefits of the 
forest. In addition, the Madhesi communities do not generally believe that women belong in 
public or should meet/talk to other male which hinders women’s participation and 
representation. Janapriya CFUG is close to the road head and evidences a relatively better 
level of public awareness. Further, the Janapriya CF is mainly run by women members who 
believe that they are the real users of forest products. There is also very close coordination 
between men and women members in this CF.  
 
5.4 TRANSPARENCY  
 
Transparency in various community forestry activities is an important component of good 
forest governance. It is often argued that transparency is a benchmark to assess the quality of 
CF governance (Davis et al., 2013). For example, CF promotes transparency by guaranteeing 
public access to information. Further, those CFUGs that are transparent in their decision 
making processes and benefit-sharing mechanisms are more successful and better governed. 
Despite the internationally commended successes of Nepal’s CF programme, many recent 
studies indicate concern about the availability of information regarding benefit sharing, 
annual auditing and reporting (e.g., Paudel et al., 2011; Pokharel et al., 2012). In the CFUGs 
studied here, members responses associated with various indicators of transparency were 
collated in an ordinal ranking, interview comments compiled and CF documents and 
decisions of CFUGs reviewed to assess the situation of transparency.  
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5.4.1 AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION  
 
The availability of information related to CFUGs and their activities is critical to help 
members to understand what is happening in their forests and secure their participation in 
community forestry activities. It is hypothesised that the success of CFs depends on readily 
accessible information to users and stakeholders. 
The amount of information available and how it flows within CFUGs is a primary concern of 
CF users. Some CFUGs provide all available information to users when requested, while 
others do not do so for one or another reason. This could be, for example, because the elite 
members of a CFUG are making decisions in their own favour which they do not want to 
disclose to general users. 
This study reveals that there are some CFUGs where all information is freely available to all 
CFUG members (e.g., Godawarikunda and Janapriya CFUG), while in other cases 
information is not transparent and only key members have access to critical information (e.g., 
Bandevi, Navadurga and Saraswoti CFUG). Respondents from Godawarikunda and Janapriya 
CFUGs expressed their higher level of satisfaction regarding the availability of information: 
Availability of information is not an issue in our CFUG... we are like an open book 
and nothing is hidden here... each and every member of the CFUG gets the 
information easily as per the request at any time.... (Interviewee, Godawarikunda 
CFUG, Lalitpur District).
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 ...we use a messenger (a staff employed by CFUG) to convey the information related 
to the members so each and every household knows the key decisions made by the 
committee ... any member wanting further details is welcome to visit CFUG office... 
so in my opinion the information is not hidden from anybody else... (Interviewee, 
Janapriya CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-14. Status of availability of information in various CFs. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the level of information availability (5, respondents strongly agree and 1, strongly 
disagree) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills(middle) and  and High 
Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
 
In contrast, respondents of Navadurga and Bandevi CFUGs expressed their concern regarding 
the availability of information and claimed they were not aware about recent happenings in 
their CF. 
...key people of CFUG executive committee keep the information and do not provide 
it to other members. In my view the main reason to hide the information is not letting 
other members know about their corruption in financial resources... 
(Interviewee,Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
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...only elite keep the information and others are not interested to get any information 
which they think is neither useful nor necessary to have such information... 
(Interviewee, Bandevi CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
The research and indicative views of respondents specify that the availability and flow of 
information is critical to the success of CF management. Those CFUGs with better 
information flow mechanisms performed better and had improved status of governance while 
poor information flow was associated with a weakening in the overall transparency of many 
CFUGs. 
 
5.4.2 DECISION MAKING IN BENEFIT SHARING  
 
Local communities put a great deal of time and effort into the protection and management of 
community forests. As a result of those efforts, a CF produces a considerable amount of 
goods and services. A key reason that individuals and communities participate in CF 
activities is to share in the benefits. Therefore most CF members are interested in 
participating in decision making processes over benefit sharing. Although many of the 
CFUGs studied have adopted clear and transparent benefit sharing mechanisms, some have 
not done so. It is hypothesised that a lack of transparency in benefit sharing mechanisms can 
lead to conflict among users and a failure to adequately protect and manage their forest 
resources.  
From the study, two CFUGs, Godawarikunda and Sitakunda, display a higher level of 
transparency in benefit sharing decisions than others. Respondents of these two CFUGs 
noted:  
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We are satisfied with the situation of decision-making process of CFUG regarding 
benefit sharing mechanism, which is very clear and transparent among CF users. 
Various provisions of benefit sharing are first discussed within the EC and then 
forwarded for the public notice. Finally these provisions are approved from AGM, 
where every member can verify and amend their concerns (Interviewee, 
Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
 
Our CFUG decided unanimously to implement various pro-poor friendly activities 
such as income generation activation within the CF, providing free timber for poor 
people and low interest loans for those in need. We feel that the process is clear and 
transparent (Interviewee, Sitakunda CFUG, Dolakha District). 
 
  
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-15. Status of benefit sharing from CF. Numeric score in Y-axis represents the 
transparency of decision making process regarding benefit sharing (5, respondents strongly 
agree and 1, strongly disagree) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills  and 
High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
 
In contrast respondents from Navadurga and Bandevi CFUGs expressed concern regarding 
weak and opaque mechanisms of benefit sharing in their community forests. In these two 
CFUGs, the EC appears to work in isolation during decision making for benefit sharing, 
which lowers the level of transparency.  
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Many CFUG members are interested to participate in decision making for distribution 
of immediate financial benefits... whatever they collect they spend as soon as it is 
received ... they have also a conflict with the District Forest Office therefore the 
approval process is taking longer than usual... (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, 
Rupandehi District). 
 
... We do not have clear and transparent meetings during the finalisation of provisions 
for benefit sharing mechanism in our CF... only the elite members are involved in the 
decisions and keep the useful information with them. They do not share such 
decisions and relevant information with the general members... (Interviewee, Bandevi 
CFUG, Lalitpur District).  
 
The study concludes that successful CFUGs have ensured transparency among their members 
and stakeholders in decision making and benefit sharing as many other scholars argue 
(Chhatre et al., 2012; Ojha et al., 2013). Long time practice of maintaining transparency in 
benefit sharing has led to successful CFUG and robust or well governed CF institution.  
 
5.4.3 ANNUAL REPORTING 
 
Annual reports are important indicators of transparency in community forestry. A variety of 
reporting mechanisms are used in different community forests (Figure 5-16). The empirical 
result shows that CFUGs that have a longer history of CF management and higher education 
status of EC members prepare and distribute reports among stakeholders (e.g., 
Godawarikunda and Sitakunda). In contrast, some relatively newly formed CFUGs with 
fewer years of experience, a lack of education and limited resources have weaknesses in 
reporting, which ultimately leads to users who are unaware of activities and associated 
outcomes.  
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-16. Status of annual reporting mechanism in various CFs. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the transparency status of annual reporting to relevant authorities (5, reports 
submitted to general assembly and the DFO and 1, no annual reporting) and name of study 
CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
 
In addition, the study shows that reporting and dissemination of CF activities is being either 
blocked or postponed because of ill motivation of EC members. A respondent expressed the 
reality: 
I have not heard yet that EC prepares any report and gives us although I cannot read 
and write. I do not think that we need such reports. We are poor so, we need firewood 
and fodder from CFs, but EC do not allow us to collect. When we raised such issues 
the chairperson was angry with us and blamed us and said that we do not know the 
rules and regulations of CFUG (Interviewee, Janapriya CFUG, Rupandehi District).  
 
In contrast, a lack of capacity of EC members causes problems in effective report writing and 
dissemination. One interviewee said: 
The previous men dominant in the EC had worked for personal benefits. We were 
against their work. Therefore, leadership opportunity was provided to us.  We also 
accepted the challenge given by men. We are mostly women in the EC and do not 
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have previous experience. I have heard that we have to prepare annual report of our 
activities. As a chairperson I should say I do not have skill in report writing. Even we 
are facing problems in minute taking and writing official letters. We have requested to 
DFO and FECOFUN to provide us training (Interviewee, Chhyarchhyare CFUG, 
Dolakha District in FGD). 
 
The research shows that reporting is a key means of communication with users as well as 
other stakeholders. In many cases, a lack of capability in writing reports causes problems in 
many CFUGs. Capacity building of EC in report writing and dissemination will enhance the 
governance of CFUGs that are relatively new and inexperienced. 
 
5.4.4 AUDITING AND REPORTING  
 
Annual auditing and reporting is a key requirement for all CFUGs under Nepal’s new 
community forestry guidelines. Regular auditing and reporting can help users and District 
Forest Office staff understands the financial status of CFs and also serve to enhance 
transparency. Audits can also identify weakness in a CFUG’s financial structure that then 
becomes a focus of future improvement.  Furthermore an audit can uncover any inaccuracies 
and discrepancies in record keeping and further contribute to overall transparency.  
In this study, the views of respondents of CFUGs regarding the status of auditing and 
reporting systems in various CFUGs are depicted in Figure 5-17. A mix of responses on 
auditing reporting system can be observed.  
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-17. Status of auditing and reporting system in various CFUG. Numeric score in Y-
axis represents the transparency status of auditing and reporting to relevant authorities (5, 
audit reports submitted to general assembly and the DFO and 1, no auditing and reporting) 
and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) 
shown in X-axis. 
 
Sainamaina CFUG (Rupandehi District), Godawarikunda CFUG (Lalitpur District) and 
Sitakunda CFUG (Dolakha District) show better auditing and reporting systems; in contrast, 
Janapriya CFUG (Rupandehi) and Bandevi CFUG (Lalitpur) show poor auditing and 
reporting system. Remaining CFUGs are perceived to be at a moderate level of reporting 
systems.  
Two contrasting opinions from two different CFUGs about auditing and reporting are 
presented below: 
Our CFUG recruits a certified auditor to audit our financial transactions annually and 
verify the account keeping and prepare a report by the treasurer. The audited report is 
discussed and passed by the executive committee and then presented to the AGM. A 
copy of audit report is sent to District Forest Office for their records. We believe in 
the report (Interviewee, Sitakunda CFUG, Dolakha District). 
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... frankly speaking I have not seen any audit reports from our CFUG so far since 
many years... in my opinion why would they produce a report that could tie them as 
they have misused the large sum of money from kosh (community fund)... they 
probably share some money with Rangers so that they do not have to do any auditing 
and reporting... (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
The contrasting voices of users in the above two cases describes the different status of 
financial transparency in CFUGs. It is obvious from the two cases that the intentions of the 
executive committee are a key factor in maintaining financial transparency. Many 
respondents express the need for standardized account keeping and auditing systems to 
further improve the financial transparency of all CFUGs.  
 
5.4.5 COMPREHENSIVENESS OF REPORTS 
 
Well-written reports regarding activities undertaken in the previous year are an important 
indicator of transparent CFUG functioning. According to Nepal’s CF Guidelines, every 
CFUG must prepare a report in an approved standard format that should include the activities 
and key outcomes for the year. The executive committee is mainly responsible for preparing 
the annual report. However in many cases annual reports do not reflect all activities and 
present a few selected activities to meet formal legal requirement. CF users were asked about 
their perceptions of the comprehensiveness of the reports prepared by the executive 
committee, and the results are presented in Figure 5-18. Most of the respondents from 
Godawarikunda and Sitakunda CFUGs reportedly felt that the reports were comprehensive, 
elaborate and usefulness. They therefore understand those reports easily and express their 
satisfaction with the reports provided by executive committee:
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Our executive committee provides a report every year, which contains the information 
about each and every activity undertaken by the committee including annual income 
and expenditure of the CFUG. Audit report is also inserted in the report. Beside this, 
executive members provide us requested information as per our request. I am really 
happy with most of people working in the executive committee (Interviewee, 
Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-18. Comprehensiveness of reports in various CF. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the comprehensiveness of annual reports (5, strongly agree and 1, strongly 
disagree) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High 
Mountain shown in X-axis. 
 
Members in other CFUGs such as Janapriya, Navadurga and Bandevi perceived that the 
reports produced and supplied to them are incomplete. Respondents of Navadurga CFUG 
revealed they did not know of reports produced by their CF executive committee or about the 
comprehensiveness of those reports:
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I have no idea if our CFUG produces any report...in fact they (executive committee 
members especially Chairperson and Secretary) do not provide any information to us 
so how do we know about the report and content in the report... what they would 
provide is what they think – the CF belongs to them and they are the managers ... I 
will certainly ask about the report in next AGM... (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, 
Rupandehi District). 
 
The study shows that active executive committees have been preparing comprehensive 
reports and distributing them to users as well as relevant stakeholders. It is also obvious that 
the quality and robustness of such reports is largely subject to the motives of office bearers 
and key position holders of the CFUG. 
 
5.4.6 EXTENT OF INFORMATION ACCESSIBILITY  
 
The degree to which information is accessible is an important indicator of transparency. It is 
generally argued that the better the access to information is, the more transparent the CFUG 
and vice versa. Many CFUGs prepare only a few pages for a report, which is not even 
circulated to stakeholders. While they may actually have completed many activities, some 
CFUGs are reluctant to provide access to the information either to CFUG members or 
outsiders, including the District Forest Office. 
In the study CFUGs, respondents’ views on the extent of accessibility of information are 
shown in Figure 5-19. As with other indicators, Godawarikunda (Lalitpur District), Sitakunda 
(Dolakha District) and Sainamaina (Rupandehi District) CFUGs provide a high level of 
access to information through extensive reports and/or other means to CF members and other 
stakeholders. High level of satisfaction of users is noted over the easy and quick accessibility 
of information, which is appreciated and recognized by many respondents of those CFUGs: 
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When I visited the CFUG office and requested information, the executive committee 
provided me a variety of information associated to CF activities such as, training 
opportunities, amount of forest products provided to each household and harvesting 
time and so on. They also gave other forests related information such as seedling for 
fodders to plant at farmland. They contacted nearby forest office and provided 
information in some cases. I found that most users were happy with information 
accessibility (Interviewee, Sitakunda CFUG, Dolakha District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-19. Status of accessibility of information in various CF. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the extent of information accessibility (5, information publicly available and 1, 
only kept by chairperson and secretary) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid 
Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
 
In contrast, Bandevi (Lalitpur), Navadurga (Rupandehi), Jhareni and Chhyarchhyare 
(Dolakha) CFUGs provide limited information which is of limited use to the members and 
other stakeholders including the District Forest Office. Many respondents from Jhareni 
CFUG expressed their dissatisfaction over the status of access of the information and felt that 
restrictinginformation to users was because of hiding irregularities: 
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It is difficult for me to access the extent of information available in the CFUG. I have 
not seen any report and information compiled provided to CFUG members and any 
other agencies. In my opinion they either do not prepare any reports or provide them 
to audiences or for fear they hide their irregularities done in CF. I would not want to 
comment further as we have reported this issue many times to the District Forest 
Office. However, DFO office did not listen much. I think they have also some stake in 
hiding such information... (Interviewee, Jhareni CFUG, Dolakha District).  
 
The study supports the argument that access to the information is one of major concerns of 
CFUG members and also a vital indicator to measure transparency. Where good access to 
information is provided, the CFUG functions well. It fosters cohesion and coordination both 
among CF members and with external agencies. CFUGs with poor access to the CF 
information system have reduced credibility.  
 
5.4.7 USEFULNESS OF INFORMATION  
 
Community-based forest management and greater public involvement implies civil society 
groups, forest managers and researchers should be working more closely with the local 
community. A better understanding of what information CFUG members and relevant 
stakeholders trust and pay attention to is important as it can assist long-term management of 
community forests. Further, useful information is a powerful tool to make CF operations 
more transparent and robust. Therefore, the information available from CFUGs must be 
correct and useful to the CF users and relevant government authorities. However, while many 
CFUGs provide information, much of it is not especially useful, while other CFUGs provide 
very little information and certainly not enough to understand the CF’s activities. 
In the CFUGs studied, respondents rated the usefulness of the information provided by their 
CFUG, which is presented in Figure 5-20. As with other indicators, the study reveals that 
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Godawarikunda CFUG (Lalitpur District) provides relevant and trustworthy information to 
CF members and stakeholders, meeting user satisfaction at the desired level. Janapriya and 
Sainamaina (Rupandehi), Saraswoti (Lalitpur) and Sitakunda (Dolakha) CFUGs provide also 
provide good information to their members and other stakeholders. Individual opinion of 
respondents to the HH survey and collective views of users at FGD indicate that they believe 
the information provided by the CFUG and are fully satisfied in this regard in case of 
Godawarikunda CFUG:  
In my opinion, we are getting the information we are looking for such as activities of 
CFUG, future plan and fund and its use, so I fully agree that information available to 
the CFUG members is in useful format. In addition, the information is published in 
tole to 'tole (village to village) notice board. In an emergency, CF information flows 
to individual households through community forest guards (Interviewee, 
Godawarikunda CF, Lalitpur District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-20. The usefulness of available information in various CF. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the usefulness of information (5, respondent strongly agrees and 1, strongly 
disagrees) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High 
Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
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However, the information flow system in the CFUG and usefulness of information provided 
is comparatively lower in the case of Bandevi CFUG (Lalitpur) and Navadurga CFUG 
(Rupandehi). A respondent’s view on the usefulness of information is presented below: 
I have not asked yet executive committee for CF information, but I have heard that 
either they do not provide information to members when they ask or give information 
that may not much useful to the users regarding CF activities and future plan. I think 
it is because of low education level among members of executive committee. DFO 
and other stakeholders should provide training to the executive members to strengthen 
the capacity in this field (Interviewee, Bandevi CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
The empirical results of the study support the argument that providing useful information 
develops integrity among CF users and executive committee members as well as generating 
support from the District Forest Office and stakeholders. 
 
5.4.8 STATUS OF TRANSPARENCY IN HIGH MOUNTAINS – THE CASE OF 
DOLAKHA DISTRICT  
 
A comparative analysis of the seven transparency indicators has been carried out for the High 
Mountain region, Dolakha District, and is depicted in the radar diagram in Figure 5-21. 
Sitakunda CFUG performs very well across many indicators indicating its management 
system is transparent.  Also while Sitakunda CFUG is showing moderately lower 
transparency in the preparation of useful information and its availability to users, it performs 
much better than other CFUGs like Jhareni and Chhyarchhyare. Participants in 
Chhyarchhyare CFUG, in particular, report low transparency across most indicators, while 
the results for Jhareni CFUG lie between the two.  
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-21. Transparency status in study CFs in High Mountain region – the case of 
Dolakha District 
 
5.4.9 STATUS OF TRANSPARENCY IN MID-HILLS – THE CASE OF 
LALITPUR DISTRICT  
 
A comparative analysis of transparency indicators in the Lalitpur District CFUGs is depicted 
in Figure 5-22. The results indicate that the Godawarikunda CFUG is perceived to be the 
most transparent of the three studied. It is noted that Godawarikunda CFUG is an exemplary 
CF, because of strong project support, long experience in CF management, and well 
developed management mechanisms. 
In contrast, Bandevi CFUG performs poorly in transparency across most of the assessed 
indicators except availability of information. In this Region, the Saraswoti CFUG evidences a 
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moderate level of transparency across most indicators, but fails to provide satisfactory 
information to CF users.  
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-22. Transparency status in study CFs in Mid-Hills region - the case of Lalitpur 
District 
 
5.4.10 STATUS OF TRANSPARENCY IN TERAI - THE CASE OF 
RUPANDEHI DISTRICT   
 
The level of transparency among the three CFUGs of Rupandehi District is analysed and 
presented in Figure 5-23. Unlike the Mid-Hills and High-Mountain districts, the level of 
transparency is comparatively lower in Rupandehi District, Terai Region. Sainamaina CFUG 
has a relatively higher level of transparency across most indicators including benefit sharing, 
auditing and annul reporting and comprehensiveness of reports prepared and provided to 
wider audience. Users of Janapriya CFUG evaluate their CFUG as evidencing a medium 
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level of transparency. However, performance on information availability and the usefulness 
of such information is better compared to other indicators.  
As in the case of participation, the level of transparency in Navadurga CFUG is lower across 
most of the indicators because of its complex demographic structure and the low socio-
economic status of women. However, it remains at a moderate level with regard to annual 
reporting and auditing.  
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 5-23. Transparency status in study CFs in Terai region– the case of Rupandehi 
District 
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5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
The main focus of this chapter has been to present and discuss two of the six elements of 
good, decentralized, community-based forest governance, participation and transparency. To 
do this, a variety of indicators were identified, explained and used to assess participation and 
transparency. The chapter commenced by describing household characteristics such as gender 
and ethnic composition, well-being ranking and income status of respondents of the study 
CFUGs. The status of participation was assessed through six indicators that included 
women’s participation in AGMs, participation of indigenous communities, mediation 
processes of different interest groups, women’s representation on executive committees, and 
consultation with various interest groups during the development of the CF’s constitution and 
preparation of its operation plan. Similarly, transparency was analysed through seven 
indicators: information availability to members, decision making process in benefit sharing, 
annual reporting, auditing and financial reporting, comprehensiveness of report, extent of 
information availability, and usefulness of information provided.  
In the next chapter, I examine the status of another two elements of good, decentralized, 
community-based forest governance, accountability and effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 6: ASSESSING DECENTRALISED COMMUNITY 
BASED FOREST GOVERNANCE – ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the results for two important elements of good forest governance: that 
is, accountability and effectiveness of community forestry in the three study districts. Both 
elements were assessed using a number of quantitative and qualitative indicators relevant to 
the study region. The primary household survey provided the necessary quantitative 
information while focus group discussions, key informants interviews, informal discussions, 
field observations and document review were carried out to collect the qualitative 
information. 
 
6.2 ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Accountability has emerged over the past decade as a key way to address both success and 
failure of community based forest governance.  Accountability is the requirement to accept 
responsibility for one’s actions. In principle, CFUG chairpersons, secretaries and office 
bearers are expected to be accountable to executive committees and CFUG members. 
Similarly, executive committee members are expected to be accountable to CFUG users.  In 
practice, in many cases this has failed to occur for a variety of reasons. While in theory the 
control over a community forest rests with the CFUG (with the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) making important decisions about how to run the CF effectively and efficiently, what 
the content of the constitution and operational plans will be, and determining the direction for 
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future management), in practice in many cases it is the executive committee that makes most 
of the decisions on behalf of users with approval obtained from the AGM at a later date.  
 
6.2.1 CHAIRPERSON AND SECRETARY ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Decision-makers and implementers, whether they are officials or the whole committee, 
should be accountable for the way they use or abuse power. In community forestry, the 
chairperson and secretary of a CFUG have an influential role in making and implementing 
decisions as they are also responsible for maintaining regular contact with external agencies 
such as the DFO and civil society organisations. Therefore how they are held accountable to a 
CFUG is crucial for ensuring successful CF management. However in practice in some cases 
chairpersons and secretaries are neither responsible nor accountable to CFUG members. They 
are ready to accept accountability for positive outcomes but decline to be accountable for any 
failures. 
Survey results from the nine CFUGs in the three study districts are depicted in Figure 6-1. 
The results show that the chairperson and secretaries of Godawarikunda and Sitakunda CFs 
are highly accountable to CUFG members. During interviews, individual respondents of both 
CFUGs expressed repeatedly their satisfaction over the performance of both chairperson and 
secretary: 
The chairperson and secretary come to office on alternative days. When I go to office, 
I always meet either chairperson or secretary. They give enough time to listen to our 
problems and try to resolve as much as possible. If they are not able to resolve it, they 
call a meeting of executive committee. Sometimes, they bring us to VDC office and 
DFO office for solution. I have to appreciate their persistent work... (Interviewee, 
Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
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In contrast, the least accountable CFs appeared to be Jhareni and Navadurga CFUGs. 
Similarly, the results depict that the remaining five CFUGs are moderately accountable. 
Unaccountable people have difficulty mobilising CFUG members in CF activities and a 
consequent lacking of team effort reduces the efficiency and the effectiveness of a CF’s 
programme, which result the poor performance of CFUG. Many CFUG members are worried 
about why their CFUGs are regarded as poor performing, when they have enough resources 
in CFs: 
I have not seen our CFUG office open in this year. I heard from my neighbour that the 
chairperson operates an office from his home. I feel that nepotism is a big problem in 
CFUG. Chairperson and secretary support only those nearest to them. They neither 
hear us nor act seriously on our problem. To ignore us, they postpone our concerns 
from one meeting to another even on simple issues. The agenda never comes for a 
discussion in succeeding meetings. After following it for a while, we also drop the 
agenda. I do not have much positive feeling to their work (Interviewee, Jhareni 
CFUG, Dolakha District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-1 Respondents views on chairperson and secretary accountability to CFUG.  
Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of accountability (5, chairperson and secretary 
are accountable to the CFUG and 1, not accountable at all)
3
 and name of study CF located in 
Terai (left) Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
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The research indicates that the role of chairperson and secretary is influential in decision 
making. Internalisation of downward and upward accountability among executive committee 
members affects the success of community forest processes. The research finds evidence that 
well established CFUGs with long term operational experience in CF management exhibit a 
higher level of accountability in comparison with newly formed CFUGs. The accountability 
of chairpersons and secretaries appears to increase with years of experience in CF 
management. 
 
6.2.2 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ACCOUNTABILITY TO CFUG MEMBERS 
 
An executive committee is a managerial body elected at a general assembly of CF users. It is 
responsible for carrying out the CFUG’s day to day activities, including the implementation 
of forest management plans and the mobilisation of the users to work on the CF programme. 
Therefore the accountability of an executive committee to a CFUG is an important factor for 
successful CF operation. 
Research results shows that the executive committee of Saraswoti, Godawarikunda and 
Sitakunda are highly accountable to CFUG members (Figure 6-2). Users of these CFUGs 
expressed their contentment that executive committee members listen carefully to their 
problems and give priority to resolve those problems as soon as possible:  
I do not have any complaint against CF executives. Most of them are working 
sincerely in committee even at the expense of their personal work. Each of them 
works in CF office in their turn according to the approved rules for office operation. 
They also give additional time to guard the CF. I feel that our executives are working 
fairly in compare to adjoining CFUG (Interviewee, Saraswoti CFUG, Lalitpur 
District). 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-2 Respondents views on executive committee accountability to CFUGs.  Numeric 
score in Y-axis represents the level of accountability (5, executive committee accountable to 
the CFUG and 1, not accountable at all)
4
 and name of study CF located in Terai (left) Mid 
Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
 
In contrast, the least accountable committees were reported to come from Navadurga, Jhareni 
and Chhyarchhyare CFUGs, with executive committee moderately accountable in the 
remaining three CFUGs. Most respondents of these CFUGs expressed disgruntlement with 
the attitude and function of their executive committees.  
I feel that the executive members of CF show a kind of hegemony over general 
members. I do not like such behaviour and do not even talk in case of serious 
problem. I have not seen such a moment of initiating discussion regarding problems 
of CF management and its users. I am from poor family. We use cow dung as source 
of cooking fuel. We have been facing a big problem of firewood for daily cooking. 
Our CF has the potential for firewood collection. But committee members do not give 
much importance to the collection and distribution of firewood. We are working with 
the CF with expectation of positive change in future… (Interviewee, Janapriya 
CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
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It is commonly assumed that a CFUG’s executive committee is itself accountable to CFUG 
users who implement the rules and regulations stated in approved constitutional and 
operational plans. The results of this study indicate that where a CFUG chairperson and 
secretary are active and accountable, the whole executive committee is also accountable. In 
contrast, a CF executive committee that is less accountable is associated with a chairperson 
and secretary that are less accountable.  
 
6.2.3 ACCOUNTABILITY OF OFFICE BEARERS FOR DECISIONS 
 
Each CFUG appoints staff to manage daily official activities and forest protection duties. 
Such staff must be accountable to the executive committee and general membership at large 
regarding various CFUG decisions. The research results show that the accountability of office 
bearers varies among the studied CFs. Office bearers in Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CF 
were perceived to be highly accountable to CUFG members. In contrast, they were perceived 
to be least accountable in Navadurga, Jhareni and Chhyarchhyare CFUGs. In the remaining 
three CFUGs office bearers were perceived to be moderately accountable.  
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-3 Respondents views on officeholders’ accountability regarding the decisions made 
by them.  Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of accountability (5, executive 
committee accountable to the CFUG and 1, not accountable at all)
5
 and name of study CF 
located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.   
 
The office bearers and staff are supposed to work under the direction of the executive 
committee. However this is not the case in many CFUGs such as Navadurga CF, Jhareni CF 
and Chhyarchhyare CF.  The de-motivating factor here for community forestry staff is the 
low salary paid. In order to subsist, staff members have to find additional work besides work 
done in community forestry. It is understood that the executive committee does not provide 
clear instructions and guidelines to staff in many CFUGs. As a result, performance of those 
staff is diminished and CF decisions are not implemented. Many staff also unsatisfied by the 
ad hoc situation that exists in CF offices: 
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I am a staff of the CF since last five year. The CFUG gives me Rs. 2500 (~A$30) per 
month for full time work. My salary is not enough and I need to find additional work 
for living. In fact, I do not have much work in the CF office and I do not know much 
about the decisions made by executive committees.  CF members come and ask me 
many questions regarding CF activities, but I do not know what to answer so I ask 
them to contact to the Chairperson and secretary (Interviewee, Sitakunda CFUG, 
Dolakha District). 
 
The empirical results show that the hiring of office bearers without having proper CF plan in 
place causes diminished accountability. However, supervising and directing office bearers 
also reduces the time executives have to improve overall CF governance. 
 
6.2.4 INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL AGENCIES 
 
Many external organisations and agencies or ‘outsiders’ such as the Federation of 
Community Forest Users Group of Nepal (FECOFUN), local NGOs and local government 
authorities may directly or indirectly influence a CF’s activities. Sometimes, the influence 
can produce positive outcomes such as supporting a CFUG in preparation of their 
management plan, conflict resolution and so forth. In other cases, however, outsider influence 
takes the form of a struggle for power between local government and those CFUGs that have 
significant resources.  In such cases a local government may seek to control the resources that 
a CFUG would prefer to manage autonomously.  
Respondents’ views on the influence of external agencies in CF activities are represented in 
Figure 6-4. Saraswoti CFUG is perceived to run with little or no influence from external 
agencies. However, executive and general members are not satisfied with the support they 
receive from the DFO office which undertakes limited visits and gives them low priority: 
192 | P a g e  
Our CF is small, only 9.0 ha but dependent households are 78. The condition of the 
forest is also poor and degraded with salla ban (Pine forests). We requested for 
additional area but have received no response so far. Forest Ranger and other officers 
seldom visit our CF.  So, in fact, we are managing our CF independently with hope to 
improve the forest and fulfil members’ needs in future (Interviewee, Saraswoti 
CFUG, Lalitpur District).  
 
Although many governance indicators show Godawarikunda and Sitakunda CFUGs are well 
functioning CFs, their decision making appears to be highly influenced by outsiders. Both 
CFUGs are influenced by donor-supported forestry projects and government officials. 
Godawarikunda CF is also located close to the Regional Forestry Training and Extension 
Centre and also to the Ilaka Forestry Office.  
We had been protecting surrounding forests informally since long ago – without any 
management, just protected, not allowing people to collect timber and firewood. As 
far as I remember, in early 1991, a Ranger from Forest Office (forgot the name!), 
came and informed us about CF process and provisions and asked to manage this 
forests as community forests with certificate and authority from DFO. Then we 
discussed and agreed to form a committee and manage forest as per CF guidelines. 
After formally registering the CF in 1997, we received support from DFO office, 
donors and many research institutions. We’ve changed many times our CF 
management objectives as per their advice. I think we have been made good progress 
from support of many people. I do not want say undue influence, but we got chance to 
learn new thing and can network with many organisations (Interviewee, 
Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-4 Respondents views on influence of external agencies.  Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the level of influence (5, no influence by external agencies and 1, high influence 
by external agencies)
6
 and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (mi ddle) and 
High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
 
The Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulations 1995 assume that a CFUG is an autonomous and 
self- sustaining institution. They should be able to make their own decision. Furthermore, the 
influence of external agencies may be counterproductive in terms of governance outcomes. 
However, empirical evidence gathered for this research suggests that the larger the 
contribution from external agencies such as DFO, FECOFUN and other civil society 
organisations, the better the governance outcomes. For example, Godawarikunda and 
Sitakunda CFUGs are more influenced by external agencies but they also perform better on a 
range of other governance indicator. The research concludes that external facilitation is still 
important for the sustainable management of CFs, as this provides opportunities for CFUG 
members to better access information and interact with, and learn from, outside experts. The 
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main reasons for such improved governance outcomes from external facilitation are 
interaction, synergy, and cross fertilization among CFUGs and other stakeholders. This point 
will be further elaborated on in the synthesis and conclusion (Chapter 8). 
 
6.2.5 CLARITY OF GOALS AND TARGETS 
 
CFUGs identify long, medium and short term goals in their operational plans and also 
establish annual targets at annual planning meetings or AGMs. Clear goals and targets assist 
CF management and facilitate the monitoring of progress. The main objective of CFs is to 
provide the daily required forest products for local communities. However, in many cases 
they often protect the forest without considering immediate user requirements. Further, many 
users prefer to manage the forest for easy access to fodder and fuelwood, while the CFOP 
often focuses on timber management for revenue collection. Respondents’ opinion regarding 
the clarity of CF goals and targets is represented in Figure 6-5. The Godawarikunda and 
Saraswoti CFUGs have very clear goals and targets to meet members’ demands.  
Our CF is located in strategic place and near the city. We receive many visitors from 
country and abroad. Therefore we are trying to make our CF as a model CF. Besides, 
focusing on supply of fuelwood and timber, CF has set out a goal for ecotourism and 
facilitating CF research in collaboration with government and international 
organisation such as ICIMOD. This is a unique in our CF and all users are happy to 
agree in AGM with these goals and activities (Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, 
Lalitpur District).  
 
Many respondents express their satisfaction over CF management activities but were unaware 
of the goals and targets in those CFUGs: 
I do not know much about goals and targets. I feel that we need to protect the forest 
for firewood and timber. I can read and write but do not understand much about 
technical matters associated to forest management. The chairperson of the committee 
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says that our CF is very small and we have to participate in the plantation of firewood 
species. I agree with others and am participating in CF management process without 
much knowledge (Interviewee, Saraswoti CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
In contrast, Navadurga CF is a degraded forest with very poor growing stock while 
Chhyarchhyare CF has a small forest area compared to user numbers and is unable to supply 
the required forest products as set out in its operational plan. In some of these CFUGs, 
members were poorly consulted about CF programme development: 
I do not know what the goals of our CF are and are to be. Only few people are active 
in CF process and they do not consider the views of the majority of members. I feel 
that goals of CF are also set by those elite people benefitting from them. They do not 
give access for firewood collection but I heard they sell timber from CF to outsiders 
(Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-5 Respondents views on clearness of CF goals and targets.  Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the level of clearness of CF goals and targets (5, very clear goals and targets and 1, 
no clear goals and targets)
7
 and name of study CF located in Terai (left) Mid Hills (middle) 
and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
                                                                
7
 See Annex I part D for futher details   
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
3.00 
3.50 
4.00 
4.50 
5.00 
Clarity  of CF goals and targets 
196 | P a g e  
Lack of knowledge is often seen as a problem in setting appropriate CF goals:  
We do not know much about CF goals and how to set them. We are not receiving 
much support from male members of CFUG.  We have also not received timely 
supports from Forest Office and Ranger in our CF. So we are working on ad hoc 
basis, and do not know whether we are going in right direction or not.... (Interviewee, 
Chhyarchhyare CFUG, Dolakha District). 
 
The empirical results of the study show that many CF users are not oriented to the changing 
goals and targets of CF, moving from conservation to manage forests for livelihoods and 
economic prosperity. In the changing context, appropriate and clearly spelt out goals and 
targets help in assessing the success of a CF. In the past, CF management had focused on 
conservation. After many years of conservation, many CFs are now very dense and have high 
potential for commercial management. Based on field observations, document review, 
discussion with key informants and visual observation of the bio-physical condition of CFs, 
there is an opportunity for business oriented CFs to enhance revenues by revising their 
CFOPs. However, due to lack of timely revision of CFOPs and the failure to modify 
management goals and targets, CFUGs are not currently capitalising on their potential.  
 
6.2.6 STATUS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN DOLAKHA DISTRICT – HIGH 
MOUNTAIN  
 
The context, associated issues and status of community forestry varies according to 
physiographic zone: from the Terai to High Mountain regions. The assessment of various 
indicators of accountability and its meaning in community forestry is based on context and 
geography. In this section, CFUG members’ views on various indicators of accountability are 
assessed for three CFUGs in Dolakha district. The comparison of various governance 
indicators among three CFUGs is presented in the form of a radar diagram in Figure 6-6. 
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An inspection of the radar diagram shows that Sitakunda CFUG is accountable to CFUG 
members and performs well compared to Jhareni and Chhyarchhyare CFUGs across four out 
of five indicators.  However, decision making process in Sitakunda is highly influenced by 
external agencies, primarily because of the proximity of forest offices. Jhareni and 
Chhyarchhyare CFUGs show a moderate level of accountability across all five indicators. 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-6 Status of accountability in study CFUGs in Dolakha District
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6.2.7 STATUS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN LALITPUR DISTRICT - MID-
HILLS  
 
Three CFUGs-- Saraswoti, Godawarikunda and Bandevi of Lalitpur district-- were taken as 
the sample for the comparative study of level of accountability in the Mid-Hills.  The data 
presented in Figure 6-7 reveals that Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CFUGs have relatively 
high levels of accountability. Furthermore, the Godawarikunda CF is one of the oldest CFs in 
the district and, being located close to the city and Ilaka Forest Office, has received a lot of 
support from the District Forest Office. The education level of the Godawarikunda CFUG 
members is high as many of them have access to computers and the internet. The chairperson 
and secretary of Saraswoti CFUG were perceived to be less accountable to CF members.  
Many decisions of Godawarikunda CF were perceived to be influenced by the external 
agencies such as District Forest Office, Ilaka Forest Office and donor agencies. In contrast, 
Bandevi CFUG is functioning poorly across all indicators of accountability used in this 
analysis. Bandevi CFUG users come from indigenous ethnicities and dalits with a poor socio-
economic background, which is critically affecting their capacity to exercise accountability. 
Moreover, they have comparatively poorer levels of awareness and very few CF members are 
active in CF conservation and management. 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-7 Accountability status in study CF in Lalitpur District 
 
6.2.8 STATUS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN RUPANDEHI DISTRICT - TERAI  
 
Three CFUGs -- Janapriya, Navadurga and Sainamaina of Rupandehi District -- were 
selected as the sample for a comparative study of the level of accountability in the Terai. The 
data presented in Figure 6-8 in the form of radar diagram. Similar to Lalitpur District in the 
Mid-Hills, a clear difference in performance across the various indicators of accountability is 
found among CFUGs in Rupandehi district. Navadurga CFUG was perceived to perform the 
poorest in accountability; while Sainamaina performed better and Janapriya CFUG the best.  
The poor accountability of Navadurga CFUG was mainly due to the presence of Madhesi 
people with low level awareness of what CF management entails. The key people who 
control the CFUG are mainly interested in the financial benefits, and CF management is 
carried out without clear goals and targets.  
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-8 Accountability status in study CFs in Rupandehi District 
The study confirms that status of accountability in the Terai Region is comparatively weak 
compared to CFUGs in the High Mountain and Mid Hills regions. This appears to be due to 
the Terai region’s heterogonous population, the very short history of CF management, and 
corruption at various levels.  
 
6.3 EFFECTIVENESS 
 
CFUGs are expected to achieve the expressed objectives of CFUG members as set out in the 
management plan. The effectiveness of governance arrangements is assessed using the 
following set of indicators: effectiveness of constitution and operational plan, objectives of 
forest management, implementation of meeting decisions, and CFUG’s dispute resolution 
process. Each indicator was assessed and the results are presented in the following sections. 
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6.3.1 STRUCTURE OF CF OPERATIONAL PLAN 
 
The CF operational plan (CFOP) should deliver the desired outcomes of CFUG members. 
The CFOP is expected to secure high quality forest management as well as deliver needed 
forest products to users.  Further, the structure and content of the CFOP is not determined by 
the CFUG alone, but is guided by Forest Regulations and associated directives. According to 
Nepal’s CF Guidelines (2009), the  key content of a CFOP are: (i) details of the CF, such as,  
name, boundaries, areas, condition and types of forest; (ii) map showing block division and 
associated details such as areas, major species , slope, aspect soil type, age and situation in 
respect to natural regeneration and tree planting; (iii) forest management objectives; (iv) 
silvicultural activities such as bush clearing, thinning, pruning etc; (v) community nursery,  
tree plantation, income generating activities; (vi) details of areas suitable for medicinal and 
aromatic plants cultivation programmes and time schedule; (vii) provisions relating to use of 
income accruing from the sale of forest products and other sources; (viii) provisions for 
penalties which may be imposed on users, ix) provisions relating to the protection of the 
wildlife; and (x) other matters prescribed by the Department of Forests. Based on this 
template, CFUGs can modify the structure of the operational plan to best meet their needs.  
Respondents’ opinions about the structure of their CFOP and its goals and targets are 
summarised in Figure 6-9. Members of Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CFUGs reported 
having a better understanding of the structure of their operational plans. Comments from key 
informants indicate a better perception of the content of OPs: 
In the preparation of the OP, the Forest Ranger and another technician provide help to 
the executive committee and other key members of CFUG to identify various 
management options and possible activities. Based on this, the committee prepares a 
draft OP, which is discussed with general members. I too contributed my ideas and I 
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am aware of the content of our OP (Interviewee, Godawarikunda CGUG, Lalitpur 
District). 
In many CFUGs, however, the understanding of the content and importance of the CFOP 
among some executive members and most of general members is relatively poor. For 
example, participants in Sainamaina, Janapriya and Sitakunda CFUGs only moderately 
understood the structure of their operational plans. In the remaining CFUGs, users reported 
having a limited understanding of their operational plans which constitutes evidence of low 
user interest, weakening effectiveness. Because capacity building process adopted for general 
users is poor, the understanding of the content of CFOP OP is limited: 
I do not know what the content of CFOP is. No one comes and discusses those issues 
with us. Now, I know little bit about the content from you. We need firewood and 
fodder from the forest, so we always request to be allowed to collect those products. 
We have very limited access so far... (Interviewee, Bandevi CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-9 Respondents’ views on the structure and content of CF operational plan. Numeric 
score in Y-axis represents the level of clearness of CF goals and targets (5, the OP is 
appropriately structured to achieve expressed objectives of the user and 1, poorly structured) 
and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) 
shown in X-axis.  
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As the CFOP is a fundamental document for sustainable community forest management and 
for meeting the aspirations of a CFUG, it is thought to be important that it be prepared 
through rigorous discussion among users and that different interests be accommodated during 
its preparation. However, the results indicate that there are only a small number of CFUGs 
where the appropriate discussions are occurring with regard to the preparation of the CFOP. 
 
6.3.2 STRUCTURE OF CF CONSTITUTION 
 
The CFUG’s constitution is a key element for CF governance. A CF general assembly 
promulgates the CF constitution and the success of a CF depends on having an effective and 
functional constitution.  
A CFUG’s constitution should be guided by Nepalese Forest Regulations and associated 
directives.  These specify that a  CFUG’s constitution  should include (CF Guideline, 2009):  
(i) name and address of the CFUG, (ii) objectives of the CFUG, (iii) stamp of CFUG, (iv) 
name and address of users, (v) number of households within the CFUG  and estimated 
population, (vi) roles, responsibilities and rights of CFUG members, (vii) formation of 
executive committee , (ix) working procedures of the executive committee, (xi) methods to 
control forest violations, (xii) provisions for the punishment of user group members who 
violate the operational plan, (xii) working procedures to be followed whilst punishing user 
group members for violation of operational plan, (xiii) fund mobilisation procedures, (xiv) 
auditing procedures, and a range of other administrative matters. 
In spite of clear guidelines in the forest regulations and directives, the structure of CFUG 
constitutions varies enormously (Figure 6-10). Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CFUGs have 
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well structured constitutions that help to meet CFUG objectives; other CFUGs, however, lack 
certain elements which affect their achievement of sustainable forest management and users’ 
expectations. The expression of contentment by CFUG members about the drafting process is 
an indication of ownership by them of their CF constitution: 
The community forestry facilitator from District Forest Office in Lalitpur encouraged 
us to meet together and initiated initial discussion about importance of community 
forestry where a piece of nearby forest can be managed as CF. After we agreed to 
manage the patch of forest, we were involved in a series of meetings and discussions 
to prepare the CF constitution, the forest protection and management mechanisms, 
and benefit sharing mechanisms. We unanimously decided on the contents and 
structure of the constitution which was subsequently and approved... (Interviewee, 
Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
In contrast to Godawarikunda CFUG, the situation is different in Navadurga CFUG in 
Rupandehi district where the CF members were not much consulted. CF members expressed 
their ignorance and dissatisfaction over the process:  
We heard a good story about community forestry and were interested to manage a 
nearby forest patch as community forest. Meanwhile, some of the social leaders came 
to me and put forward a CF proposal. One of the forest rangers came and proposed 
content and structure of CF. They do not listen to our problems and finalised CF 
constitution and CFOP. Since then we received surrounding forests but I do not know 
much about the constitution and its usefulness (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, 
Rupandehi District). 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-10 Respondents’ views on structure and contents of CF constitution.  Numeric score 
in Y-axis represents the level of clearness of CF goals and targets (5, the constitution  is 
appropriately structured to achieve expressed objectives of the user and 1, poor ly structured) 
and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) 
shown in X-axis. 
 
It is generally understood that a CFUG’s constitution and operational plan are prepared by 
CFUG members. There is supposed to be a rigorous discussion about the provisions of 
CFUG’s operation and forest management options which are to be included in the CFOP. In 
fact, the CFUG constitution and operational plan are almost always prepared by forest 
rangers, supported by DFO or other donor-supported forestry projects, with minimum 
participation of CFUG members. Forest rangers provide a copy of the plan to the CF 
chairperson which are then put to executive committee meetings and/or general assembly 
meetings. Executive and general assembly meetings approve the constitution and CFOP and 
it is then submitted to the DFO to obtain final approval.  The lack of involvement of CFUG 
members in the preparation of their constitution and CFOPs reduces their willingness to 
engage in, and effectiveness of, CF activities.  
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6.3.3 ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CF MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 
 
CFUGs are the fundamental community forestry organisation existing under the community 
forestry regime in Nepal and have the authority to make their own rules regarding the 
governance of community forests and group mobilisation (MFSC, 2013). The latest 
Community Forestry Guideline (2009) outlines the activities that CFs are entitled to 
undertake and include among other things (i) to manage forests to meet the people’s basic 
needs for firewood, fodder, timber and other forest products, and also contribute to 
agricultural production through agro-forestry practices; and (ii) to protect the land from 
landslides and degradation by soil erosion, floods, and so forth. Some CFs have focused more 
on meeting peoples basic needs, while others have focused on timber management, ignoring 
members’ demands. Field surveys indicate that Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CFs are fully 
achieving their objectives (Figure 6-11). Many CF members were highly satisfied with the 
results achieved by successful implementation of CF constitution and operation plan: 
I am no expert on forest management and cannot explain what should be the best 
management objective of CF. However, we are happy because executive committee 
members come to discuss our needs and they are reflected in the management 
objectives and strategies of the CF and various meeting were conducted during 
preparation of CFOP. We also participated in various activities of the CF. I heard 
from a forest officer in the last AGM that our CFUG is very good in working 
according to meet its management objectives (Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, 
Lalitpur District).  
 
It is observed that there is considerable room to improve the management objectives of many 
CFUGs to address the present needs and economic prosperity of CF users. In line with this, 
some CF users urge that CF management at present is only adopting a subsistence approach, 
is working with limited objectives and scope, and ignoring a huge potentiality to develop the 
CF. One participant noted: 
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Our CF is in strategic location--one of the nearest CFUGs to the capital. There are a 
number of forestry related offices and research institutions also located in Godavari. 
Godavari is also famous for its botanical garden and picnic spot. Therefore, our CF 
has the opportunity to tap additional income from tourism. I feel that our CF can be 
managed for eco-tourism, which is for recreation, hiking, picnic spot, and can be 
developed as an open school for learning about community forestry. However, I do 
not see our executive committee putting any vision into these opportunities 
(Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
Of the CFUGs studied, Navadurga CFUG is remarkable in failing to achieve its management 
objectives in spite of clear efforts at implementation. There are many objectives contained in 
its CFOP, but these are not considered enough during implementation. The most important 
objective stated in the CFOP is supplying firewood to users, but most of respondents 
complained that they had limited access to firewood, which is a pressing problem in general 
for CF members. One participant noted: 
We heard that supplying firewood is an objective of our CF but we are not allowed to 
go to forests for firewood collection. They allow us just two days each winter but that 
is not enough for us. We poor members feel that executive committee members have 
no time to review the CFOP’s objectives and provisions. They do whatever they think 
and like keeping the CFOP in the cupboard. I am not alone and many others feel that 
they [executive members] are working for their personal benefits (Interviewee, 
Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District).  
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-11 Respondents’ views on accomplishment of CF management objectives. Numeric 
score in Y-axis represents the level of clearness of CF goals and targets (5, the objectives 
fully met and 1, objectives not met) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills 
(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.  
 
There is a general consensus in the literature that appropriately developed CF constitutions 
and OPs guide overall CF management (MFSC, 2013) and help to accomplish CF 
management objectives. However, this study found that a good constitution and OP are not 
sufficient to achieve such goals and that regular effective meetings are also important as they 
help to break down broad management objectives in to achievable time-bound outputs. 
Further, dedicated efforts of executive members and decision making through consultation 
with CF users help in achieving the management objectives of CF. 
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6.3.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF MEETING DECISIONS 
 
An executive committee is responsible for representing the CFUG and for carrying out the 
CFUG’s day-to-day activities, including the implementation of forest management plans and 
the mobilisation of the group. Usually, executive committees meet monthly and make a range 
of decisions associated with forest management and internal group management. In many 
cases, decisions are implemented effectively; however there are many cases where they are 
not implemented and followed up and various reasons are given (Figure 6-12). Saraswoti, 
Godawarikunda and Sitakunda are the best performing CFUGs in terms of implementation of 
meeting decisions so that the forest are better protected, managed and able to provide 
required products to  users. The implementation of meeting decisions is key process for 
successful outcomes:  
I am a new member in the executive committee. Experienced members of the 
committee take leading role in the meetings and decision making. The good thing in 
our CFUG is we give responsibility to one of the members of executive committee for 
coordination for implementation of specific plan. In the next meeting, the responsible 
member should brief the outputs of action as decided in the previous meeting. I am 
also learning gradually and feel proud for better result. Once in a meeting last year, 
the chief of the District Forest Office commended the process of decision making and 
implementation of our CFUG (Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
In contrast, the study found that Navadurga and Chhyarchhyare CFUGs are poor at 
implementing meeting decisions and thus frequently unable to meet users’ demands. Both 
CFUGs have degraded forests and produce insufficient forest products to supply users’ 
requirements. It was also found that several CFUGs do not review the decisions taken at the 
last meeting and thus do not uncover the problem if there are implementation difficulties. CF 
members do not believe that a CFUG's decisions made in a meeting will be implemented: 
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We request that the executive committee give priority to our demands associated with 
forest products. As a result of pressure from many users, they make several decisions 
about the use of forest products but do not implement the decisions. They always 
postpone the date of implementation of the decisions from this week to next week and 
so on. They usually implement the decisions that are beneficial to the elites. Most 
users including me do not believe that decisions on anything will be changed easily 
(Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-12. Respondents’ views on implementation and enforcement of meeting decisions.  
Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of implementation of meeting decisions (5, 
implemented all decisions and 1, not implemented at all) and name of study CF located in in 
Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
 
The empirical results reveal that preparation of good goals, plans and programmes alone is 
not sufficient to achieve the objectives of community forestry. Breaking down the overall 
goals and plans into detailed activities through successive meetings and discussions is equally 
important for effective implementation and contributes to overall group governance of 
CFUG. 
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6.3.5 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 
 
The term ‘dispute’ carries negative connotations. Dispute or ‘conflict’ may arise between 
various community forestry actors due to various reasons, such as forest management plan 
preparation, access to forest products and benefit sharing, and changing government policies.  
Disputes can be categorised into different types based on whether they occur among 
community groups or between community groups, private parties and civil society 
organisations. The various types of dispute arising in community forestry are summarised 
below (Nightingale and Sharma, 2014): 
 disputes over land ownership and associated resources (e.g., between private and 
communal land owners); 
 disputes over property boundaries between community groups and private 
landowners; 
 disputes because decision making process is controlled by elites;  
 disputes due to the breaking of CF constitutional or operational rules (e.g.,  illegal 
collection forest products); 
 disputes regarding the choice of forest management priorities; and 
 disputes over perceived unfair distribution of benefits. 
 
Appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms are the key to successful CF implementation. 
This study revealed that different dispute resolution processes are used in different CFUGs 
(Figure 6-13). Highly participatory, consultative and win-win dispute resolution processes are 
in operation in Godawarikunda and Sitakunda CFUGs. As one key informant described the 
situation when reflecting on community forestry and conflict resolution: 
Community forestry itself is a conflict resolution process. The success of CF depends 
on timely management of disputes. In the case of a serious dispute, we visit the 
CFUG, meet the conflicting parties, identify the sources of the dispute and mediate to 
resolve the dispute. We have noticed this is the key to successful implementation of 
CF in Dolakha district and believe that this can be replicated to other parts of Nepal 
(Interviewee, Dolakha district). 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-13 Respondents’ views on dispute resolution process. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents the level of clearness of dispute resolution process (5, highly participatory, 
consultative and win-win and 1, coercive OP is appropriately structured to achieve expressed 
objectives of the user and 1, poorly structured) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), 
Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis. 
 
The level of participatory and consultative processes for dispute resolution is moderately 
satisfactory in Sainamaina, Saraswoti and Bandevi CFUGs. A much lower participatory and 
less consultative process is being practiced in the remaining CFUGs. CF members have a 
number of grievances with regard to dispute resolution processes: 
There are a variety of disputes within our CFUG, such as competing interests in 
defining management objectives focusing on firewood verses timber production, the 
access time and season for the collection of firewood, priorities for the use of CFUG 
funds, decisions favouring elites, and so on. Elite members of executive committee 
form a dispute resolution sub-committee composed of persons they favour. They do 
not invite representatives from District Forest Office and FECOFUN district chapter. I 
think they are afraid of outsiders who might expose their wrong activities. So they 
also make drama by meeting to resolve conflicts but do not make concrete decisions - 
nothing more than time wasting time and postponing issue as far as possible. 
Sometimes, we users with different interests informally sit together and resolve our 
own problems. When we go CFUG executive committee with our solution, they do 
not agree claiming they needed to be present. I feel that intervention from the DFO 
office is necessary. But I do not see how they can do it, because social elites are able 
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to make good relations with governance officials (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, 
Rupandehi District).  
 
Another respondent from Bandevi CFUG, Lalitpur District also presented a similar response 
which shows the lack of clear and effective conflict resolution processes in those CFUGs. 
There is a general consensus among scholars that the lower the conflict, the better the 
governance is in community forests (MFSC, 2013; Poudel et al., 2011; Pokharel et al., 2009).  
This study showed that conflict is not necessarily a bad thing, providing timely and effective 
resolution mechanisms are in place to help a CF to perform better. This result also 
corroborates other studies undertaken by various scholars (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001; 
Banjade and Ojha, 2005). 
 
6.3.6 STATUS OF EFFECTIVENESS IN DOLAKHA DISTRICT – HIGH 
MOUNTAIN  
 
Respondents’ views on indicators of effectiveness in three CFUGs in Dolakha District are 
depicted in the radar diagram (Figure 6-14). Sitakunda CFUG seems to be the most effective 
CFUG and performs well across all indicators compared to Jhareni and Chhyarchhyare. 
However, the effectiveness in its dispute resolution process needs to be improved compared 
to other indicators. Sitakunda is one of the oldest CFUGs in Dolakha district, and the local 
community of Sitakunda was protecting the surrounding forest for 30 years before it was 
officially handed over to the communities in 1997. This long experience in CF management 
has enhanced its effectiveness. 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-14 Status of effectiveness in study CFUGs in Dolakha District 
 
6.3.7 STATUS OF EFFECTIVENESS IN LALITPUR DISTRICT - MID-HILLS  
 
Community forestry users’ views on various indicators of the effectiveness in three CFUGs 
in Lalitpur district is presented in a radar diagram (Figure 6-15). Godawarikunda and 
Saraswoti CFUGs seem to be the most effective CFUGs across all indicators compared to 
Bandevi CFUG. However, the effectiveness of Saraswoti CF’s dispute resolution process 
needs to be improved further in comparison to other indicators. The Godawarikunda CF is 
one of the oldest CFUGs in Lalitpur district, where local communities have been protecting 
surrounding forests for many years. Because of this long experience, the CF perceived to be 
effectively managed. 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-15 Status of effectiveness in study CFUGs in Lalitpur District  
 
6.3.8 STATUS OF EFFECTIVENESS IN RUPANDEHI DISTRICT - TERAI  
 
Three CFUGs, Janapriya, Navadurga and Sainamaina, of Rupandehi Districts were taken as 
the sample for comparative study of level of effectiveness in the Terai, with the data 
presented in Figure 6-16. Similar to Lalitpur District in Mid-Hills, there is a clear distinction 
between various indicators of effectiveness in Rupandehi District. Navadurga CFUG is 
perceived to perform the poorest in effectiveness, while Sainamaina performs better followed 
by Janapriya CFUG. The poor perceived effectiveness of Navadurga CF is mainly due to the 
low level of awareness of the Madhesi people in CF management and the fact that the key 
people controlling the CF are perceived to be interested only on the financial benefits they 
can obtain from it.  Furthermore, the CF management is perceived as being carried out 
without clear goals or targets.  
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The study confirms other studies MFSC, 2013; Pokharel et al., 2012) that the status of 
effectiveness of community forests in Terai Region is weak compared to its operation in Mid-
Hills and High-Mountains. This appears to be due to the heterogonous population dynamics 
in the Terai Region, the very short history of CF management, and the desire to exploit 
Tarai’s productive forests.   
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 6-16 Status of effectiveness in study CF in Rupandehi District
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6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY   
 
This chapter reported the results of two important elements of governance, accountability and 
effectiveness, using a range of associated indicators. Five indicators for each element were 
identified and analysed in order to assess the status of accountability and effectiveness in CF 
governance. The results demonstrate that accountability and effectiveness can be assessed at 
local level using five basic indicators. The substantial variations in accountability and 
effectiveness among CFUGs reflects differences in socio-economic status and biophysical 
condition as well as management objectives. 
It is generally considered that the CF program is successful in Mid-Hills but is not 
appropriate for the Terai Region. The empirical results of this study show that geography is 
not the determining factor for successful community forestry. A CF is successful providing 
that attention is paid to key indicators of governance during CF development and 
management. For example, Sainamaina CFUG in Rupandehi District is performing as well as 
many other CFUGs in Lalitpur (e.g., Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CFUG) and Dolakha 
(e.g., Sitakunda CFUG). In terms of accountability and effectiveness it is performing 
comparatively better than Janapriya CFUG of Rupandehi District and Chhyarchhyare CFUG 
of Dolakha District. 
The study confirms that CF success rests on how accountable key position holders and other 
executives are during decision making and implementation. The study shows that 
accountability in CFUGs increases with years of experience in CF management. In many 
cases, it is influential and key position holders such as an active chairperson and secretary 
that can make a CFUG accountable and effective. The research shows that a lack of capacity 
building and regular follow up monitoring from government and other stakeholders results in 
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a deterioration in the level of accountability among CFUGs. Being an autonomous and self-
sustaining institution, it is often argued that a CFUG must be able to make its own decisions 
and that external influence is counterproductive in many cases. However, in the case of 
Nepal, CF decisions are the result of joint inputs by many development actors including 
DFO, FECOFUN and other civil society organisations including international agencies and 
donor communities. In such cases, synergy, interaction and cross-fertilization of knowledge 
among CFUGs and other stakeholders can significantly advance the CF process. 
The operation of CFUGs is based mainly on the CF constitution and operational plan, 
prepared through consensus of CFUG members and implemented by the same process. In a 
few cases, these documents have been prepared mainly with the support of DFO and/or other 
donor-supported forestry projects with minimum input from CFUG members, resulting in 
poorer governance in those CFUGs. However, regular meetings and discussions are found to 
be equally important as these help to break down the management objectives into achievable, 
time bound outputs for effective governance outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 7: ASSESSING DECENTRALISED COMMUNITY 
BASED FOREST GOVERNANCE – EFFICIENCY AND 
FAIRNESS/EQUITY  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter assesses the final two elements of good, decentralized, community-based forest 
governance, efficiency and fairness/equity, using several locally identified indicators. First, it 
assesses the level of efficiency in each of the nine CFUGs using seven indicators. Next, the 
status of efficiency within each of the three different ecological zones is analysed. Third, 
fairness and equity in each CFUG is assessed using seven indicators. Finally, a regional 
assessment of efficiency, and fairness and equity, is undertaken for the Terai, Mid-Hills and 
High Mountains regions.   
 
7.2 EFFICIENCY  
 
Good governance is associated with the efficient management of forest resources, an 
enhanced managerial capacity of community group members, and adequate financial 
resources. In addition, efficiency denotes that the time and resources put in to forest 
management is adequately rewarded in outputs: that is, products and services available for 
users. In this study, a CF’s efficiency is assessed using criteria related to the financial benefits 
obtained by CF users compared to the time and cost involved, peoples’ rights to harvest forest 
products from a CF, use and adequacy of silvicultural systems, time management in 
meetings, forest products pricing systems and revenue collection systems.  
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7.2.1 FINANCIAL BENEFIT OF FOREST MANAGEMENT  
 
Local communities invest time and resources to manage their community forests and expect 
to receive financial benefits from using and conserving them. In fact, community-based 
forests must tangibly improve local economic welfare and generate local economic benefits at 
a sufficient level and in an appropriate form to offset the opportunity costs incurred of 
protection and management (Mogaka et al., 2001). There is generally little recognition by 
policy makers of the potentially high local economic costs of managing a community forest 
(Mogaka et al., 2001).  
An assessment of people’s perceptions of the financial benefits over the cost involved in 
community forest management in the study CFUG’s is depicted in Figure 7-1.  Respondents 
from Godawarikunda, Saraswoti, Sitakunda and Bandevi CFUGs perceived that the benefits 
outweighed the costs, while respondents from Sainamaina and Chhyarchhyare CFUGs 
perceived the benefits and costs were about the same. A member of Godawarikunda CFUG 
said: 
We are obtaining many products from our CF such as fodder, fuelwood and timber at 
minimum price. I don’t know the actual market value of all these products but they 
are not cheap. The main cost is the annual membership fee and the time devoted to 
forest management annually. We mainly work in the forest during the winter season 
when there is not much work in the khetbari (private farm). Therefore in my opinion 
we are receiving more from the prakirti ama (Mother Nature) than we giving to her.  
In fact we are managing our forest for ourselves and our future, not for others 
(Interviewee, Godarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
In contrast, respondents from the remaining CFUGs of Janapriya, Navadurga and Jhareni 
were of the opinion that costs outweighed the benefits. Their views are reflected in the 
following comments from a member from Chhyarchhyare CFUG, who expressed his concern 
regarding the costs of forest management: 
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To me management of forest shouldn’t be users role...as you can see I work seven 
days a week and it is often difficult to hathmukh  jorna (feed my family) so how can I 
go and work in the forest which returns nothing to me?... I am participating in CF 
activities only because I don’t want to be outside society but I can’t see the benefit of 
managing forest at the moment... I am often inclined to think that the forest should be 
managed by government authorities (Interviewee, Chhyarchhyare CFUG, Dolakha 
District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-1 Respondents’ views of the financial benefits of forest management compared to 
the costs of forest management. Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of financial 
benefits over cost (5, the benefits considerably outweighed the costs involved and 1, , the 
costs considerably outweighed the benefits) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid 
Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
 
The forests entrusted to Sitakunda, Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CFUGs have been well 
managed for several decades and are therefore in good condition. However, the Janapriya and 
Navadurga CFUGs only started managing their forests recently and have to invest more time 
and resources to improve the forests’ condition. Although Jhareni CFUG has managed for 30 
years what was initially almost barren forest land, revegetation has required considerable 
time and cost. CFUGs that have been well managed for a long time and/or where the forest is 
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in good biophysical condition can produce more products and services and associated 
revenues compared to those CFUGs which are poor and degraded.   
 
7.2.2 ACCESS TO FOREST PRODUCTS  
 
Generally, community groups protect and manage CFs to obtain access to forest products. 
According to Ribot and Peluso (2003: 153), ‘access’ to resources can simply be defined as, 
‘the ability to benefit from things’. Too many restrictions on a user’s rights to harvest and use 
forest products will be viewed as unfair and users that do not have sufficient rights to harvest 
forest products from their CF  may lose interest in participating in CF activities. Users require 
rights to harvest and utilise forest products to improve their livelihoods.  
CFUG members expressed different opinions regarding their right to harvest forest products 
in the study CFs as shown in Fig 7-2. Users from Godawarikunda and Sitakunda CFs seem to 
be highly empowered in harvesting and utilising forest products, while users from three other 
CFUGs have moderate levels of access. The study shows that in spite of the time and 
resources contributed by users from the remaining four CFUGs, they are discouraged from 
accessing forest products. This is mainly due to their lack of efficiency in forest management.  
While many users stated they have sufficient access to CF resources, some argued that they 
did not have sufficient rights to access forest resources compared to their contribution. This 
can be observed from the comment of one participant below: 
I think we are having an appropriate level of access to forest products. Our forest 
management plan has clearly mentioned when and how we can access the products 
and the executive committee follows the procedure mentioned in the operational plan. 
There is a special provision for those in need and those affected by natural calamities 
such as fire (Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
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In contrast, a respondent from Navadurga CFUG in Rupandehi district expressed his concern 
regarding the restriction imposed on CF activities by government authorities: 
From two years ago, the District Forest Office has banned us from harvesting and 
utilizing any forest products from our CF. We are not getting any support from the 
District Forest Office (DFO). They are controlling us in every activity, we are not 
happy with the activity of DFO towards the community forestry (Interviewee, 
Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
   
However, in the case of Navadurga CFUG, a focus group discussion and informal discussions 
with DFO staff and other stakeholders indicated that the current CFUG executive committee 
members were misusing the resources for their personal benefits. To control such misuses, 
the District Forest Office has banned the harvesting of forest products.  
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-2 Respondents’ views on right to harvest/collect forest products that compensates 
CFUG members for their in-kind contribution. Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level 
of rights to collect forest products (5, very high level of right to harvest forest products ) and 
name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown 
in X-axis.    
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7.2.3 APPLICATION OF SILVICULTURAL SYSTEMS 
 
The choice of an appropriate silvicultural system is an important prerequisite for sustainable 
management of community forests. A silvicultural system is simply defined as a method of 
forest management for tending, harvesting and regenerating the forest (Forestry Nepal, 2014). 
The choice of an appropriate system is normally determined by the CFUG in consultation 
with forestry officials and described in the CF operational plan. However, the choice of 
system may change over time due to changing resource use objectives and forest condition. 
Various silvicultural systems have been practiced by CFUGs, although selective logging is 
the most commonly used silvicultural system in Nepal. According to one participant:  
Every year, we work on forests for more than a month as per the prescription of the 
CFOP in the period of February and March following GA. First, a forest block is 
assigned to each of the small groups formed at the GA who are enlisted to undertake 
the necessary activities to be done by each group for the year such as weeding, 
pruning, thinning of dense trees, selective felling for timber, and so on. We receive 
enough fuel wood for domestic use from pruning and thinning, while timber demand 
will be fulfilled from thinning and selective felling of old and mature trees. We are 
happy from activities done in CF as we are getting forest products to meet our needs 
as well as because our forest is beautiful... (Interviewee, Sitakunda CFUG, Dolakha 
District). 
 
In contrast, a respondent from Navadurga CFUG in Rupandehi District expressed a concern 
regarding a perceived misuse of executive committee power related to CF management.   
In my opinion, the executive committee members of our CFUG are not following CF 
objectives and guidelines. They want immediate short term benefits and are not 
looking to the future. They interpret the silvicultural objectives and activities for their 
own benefit. For example, they are more focused on harvesting and selling timber 
products rather than on spending time on forest conservation and bush clearing, etc... I 
feel that there is mis-match between what they are saying and what they are doing... 
(Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
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Respondents’ views on the application of silvicultural systems as set out in approved 
operational plans are shown in Figure 7-3. Results indicate that Saraswoti and 
Godawarikunda CFUGs are perceived to apply the correct silvicultural systems while others 
are either perceived to apply it incorrectly or to follow inappropriate silvicultural systems.  
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-3 Respondent’s views on the use and application of a silvicultural system as set out 
in the approved operational plan. Numeric score in Y-axis represents respondents opinion (5, 
strongly agree and 1, strongly disagree) and name of study CF located in (left), Mid 
Hills(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
 
7.2.4 ADEQUACY OF SILVICULTURAL SYSTEM  
 
An assessment of the adequacy of silvicultural systems to deliver the defined objectives of a 
CFUG can help to identify how efficiently the community forest is being managed. A good 
silvicultural system is a long-term program of treatment tailored to a specific set of 
circumstances. In the case of community managed forests, a rational silvicultural system 
should fit logically into the overall management plan for the community forest of which the 
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stand is a part and be optimally designed to satisfy the CFUG’s requirements. More 
specifically (i) it should be in harmony with the CFUG’s long term goals, (ii) efficiently use 
growing space and site productivity, (iii) control damage, and (iv) secure a sustained yield.  
Respondents’ opinions on the adequacy of silvicultural systems are depicted in Figure 7-4. 
The results indicate that Saraswoti, Godawarikunda and Sitakunda CFUGs were perceived to 
apply the correct silvicultural system while others were perceived to apply it incorrectly or to 
follow inappropriate silvicultural systems as set out in the approved operational plans. 
Navadurga CFUG in particular was perceived as being very poor in implementing its 
silvicultural system. According to one respondent: 
There is huge misuse of forest products. Not enough trees are left for silvicultural 
purposes and only very old trees without many branches are left. Due to this misuse, 
the district forest office has banned harvesting old (dhelepadheka) trees. And 
committee members are now blaming the district forest office for not letting them do 
those activities (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-4 Respondents’ perceptions of the adequacy of silvicultural systems to deliver the 
objects of the CFUGs. Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of adequacy (5, more 
than adequate, and 1, not adequate) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills 
(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
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Some of the CFs, such as Saraswoti, Godawarikunda, Bandevi and Sitakunda, have applied 
many silviculture practices such as pruning, thinning and seasonal felling, resulting in forests 
that are in better condition. However, there is still a lot to be undertaken as prescribed in the 
CFOP. Janapriya and Chhyarchhyare CFUGs, for example, have focused only on protection 
of forests, despite including pruning, thinning and enrichment plantation activities in their 
CFOP. 
In spite of clear government rules, regulations and provisions in approved CFOPs, District 
Forest Offices recently (2013) instructed all CFUGs to stop any kind of logging operation 
until further notice. This has created great uncertainty among CFs with regard to silvicultural 
treatments. This is viewed as neither legally nor technically acceptable by local communities. 
The Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal has been lobbying to lift this informal 
ban but as of August 2014 little progress had been made. Neither the Ministry of Forest and 
Soil Conservation nor district forest offices are taking this issue seriously or are ready to lift 
the ban.  
 
7.2.5 TIME MANAGEMENT 
 
Good time management is a crucial element of success for any organisation.  CF members 
have many demands on their time and their contribution to CFUG management is largely 
voluntary.  Therefore, time management at meetings and general assemblies is an important 
indicator of efficiency. In many cases, time management was perceived to be poor as 
executive committee members and other members do not arrive on time and meetings are 
usually delayed.  
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Members of various CFUGs have different perceptions regarding how time is managed in 
meetings including annual general assemblies and these are presented in Figure 7-5. The 
results indicate that Sainamaina, Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CFUGs have better and more 
efficient time management arrangements in meetings while Janapriya, Sitakunda and 
Navadurga practise poor time management. The remaining CFUGs are perceived by their 
members to have moderate levels of time management. An example of poor time 
management practices and associated results is provided by the following interviewee: 
The meeting never starts on time. In the past, I used to arrive on time at the meeting 
venue but the organisers (chairperson and secretary) usually came one hour later ... I 
feel that the chairperson and secretary do not care about others’ time and they think 
they are important people who can come anytime ... I have to look after my children 
and cattle at home and I am unable to waste my valuable time without any output... I 
was not pleased with the situation and after few months I stopped attending the 
meeting... I feel that this is hindering women’s participation in community forestry 
(Interviewee, Jhareni CFUG, Dolakha District).  
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-5 Respondents’ views on time management of meetings (including the general 
assembly). Numeric score in Y-axis represents efficiency of time management (5, on time 
and very efficient and, 1, unmanaged time and very inefficient) and name of study CF located 
in Terai (left), Mid hills(middle) and High mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
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7.2.6 SURPLUS FOREST PRODUCT PRICING AND SALE 
 
Community forests generate multiple products and services which can be utilised by the 
members of a CFUG as per approved operational plans. In many cases, CFUGs generate 
surplus forest products that can be sold to others within or outside the district.  In some cases 
the timber and various medicinal and aromatic plants are sold to merchants from Kathmandu 
and other parts of the country. Usually, the CFOP outlines the pricing system and sale 
mechanism for surplus forest products but in many cases the executive committee makes the 
decision about the pricing system and obtains approval from the general assembly.  In 
principle, surplus forest products should be sold at a high price so that the CFUG can 
generate revenue for forest management and local community development activities such as 
improvements to local roads, supply of drinking water and support to local schools.  
However, in many cases key personnel (i.e., executive members or local elites) influence the 
prices paid so that the products are sold to them at a lower prices enabling them to obtain 
undue benefits. Respondents’ views on forest product pricing in the study CFUGs is depicted 
in Figure 7-6.  
Many CFUGs (e.g., Godawarikunda, Sitakunda and Saraswoti) that perform well in terms of 
other governance indicators have a poor performance in regard to surplus forest pricing. In 
contrast, a poor performing CFUG on many governance indicators like Bandevi is perceived 
by its members to have a good performance on forest product pricing. An example of poor 
governance in the sale of surplus forest products is provided by the following interviewee:
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I really don’t know how the surplus timber is sold to outside users ... In fact we do not 
have sufficient timber for ourselves but the committee made the decision to sell 
timber to outsiders so that more revenue can be collected... The rate for CFUG users 
is much lower than for outsiders therefore the committee wants to sell to outsiders 
without fulfilling local demand... There must be some hidden interest to sell the 
product to outsiders so that they can get a commission during the auction... 
(Interviewee, Janapriya CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-6 Respondents’ views on the forest products’ pricing system compared to the 
market price of the products. Numeric score in Y-axis represents the price comparing to 
prevailing market price (5, products sold at more than market price and 1, >50% below 
market price or given away for free) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid 
Hills(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.  
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7.2.7 REVENUE COLLECTION SYSTEM IN COMMUNITY FORESTS 
 
CFUGs generate revenues from the sale of forest products and services such as timber, 
fuelwoood, recreation and tourism. Many CFs charge entry fees to outsiders and they also 
fine people for non-compliance with CF rules and the unauthorised collection of forest 
products and services. The revenue generated from the sale of CF products and services and 
fines are to be deposited in a CFUG saving account which can be used for protection and 
management of the CF and community development activities. An executive committee will 
have difficulty enforcing its revenue collection system (e.g., both its sources and amounts) 
unless these are clearly stated in the CFOP and approved by the general assembly. 
The perceptions of CF members of their revenue collection systems in the study CFs are 
shown in Figure 7-7. The results indicate that Saraswoti and Godawarikunda are perceived to 
have most efficient revenue collection systems while Navadurga, Chhyarchhyare and 
Sitakunda are perceived to have poor revenue collection systems. The remaining CFUGs 
were perceived to have a moderate level of revenue collection. According to one participant 
from the latter CFUG: 
I used to pay the annual fee in the first few years, but I stopped paying such a fee 
since the last two years. I did not see the proper use of our money. The Chairperson 
and Secretary control the financial resources of the CF. Many CF members, including 
myself, have asked them to clearly show the source of income and to detail the annual 
expenditure. However, they have failed to do so in spite of making commitments in 
each meeting (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-7 Respondents’ perceptions of revenue collection systems from sale of forest 
products, fines and other activities. Numeric score in Y-axis represents the respondents 
opinion on revenue collection system (5, strongly agree on the CFUG has an efficient system 
for collecting revenues and 1, strongly disagree on the statement) and name of study CF 
located in Terai (left), Mid Hills(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
 
7.2.8 CF EFFICIENCY IN HIGH MOUNTAIN – A CASE OF DOLAKHA 
DISTRICT 
 
Respondents views on indicators of efficiency in Dolakha District assessed in this study are 
depicted by a radar diagram (Figure 7-8). Based on the seven indicators Sitakunda performs 
better than other CFUGs across the three indicators of time management, surplus forest 
products pricing, and revenue collection system. Jhareni CFUG performs better across the 
three indicators of financial cost/benefit, right to harvest forest products and adequacy of 
silvicultural systems. In contrast, Chhyarchhyare CFUG performs poorly across all of the 
efficiency indicators assessed in this study.  
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-8 Status of efficiency in study CFUGs in Dolakha District. 
 
7.2.9 CF EFFICIENCY IN MID-HILLS – A CASE OF LALITPUR DISTRICT 
 
Results from the three CFUGs in Lalitpur district clearly indicate that one is performing well 
(Godawarikunda CFUG), another moderately (Saraswoti CFUG) and a third poorly (Bandevi 
CFUG) in terms of efficiency. Godawarikunda CFUG, one of the oldest CFUGs in the 
district, is located close to the district headquarters and Ilaka Forest Office from which it 
receives considerable support. The education level of CFUG members is high, with many 
having access to computer and internet facilities. In contrast, Bandevi CFUG performed 
poorly across the majority of indicators; however, it performed better on the indicator of 
surplus forest products pricing and sale. Bandevi does not have sufficient products to sell to 
outside users at this stage; however, their major focus is to fulfill users’ demand.    
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-9 Status of efficiency in study CF in Lalitpur District. 
7.2.10 CF EFFICIENCY IN TERAI – A CASE OF RUPANDEHI DISTRICT 
 
Similarly to Lalitpur district in Mid-Hills, there is a clear distinction in performance across 
efficiency indicators across the three CFUGs in Rupandehi district. Navadurga was perceived 
to be functioning poorly while Janapriya performed the best among the studied CFUGs from 
the Terai Region. It is important to note, however, that the best performing CFUG in the 
Terai Region performs poorly compared to CFUGs of Mid-Hills and High Mountains 
regions. The key reasons for the perceived low level of efficiency in Terai are: a 
heterogeneous community, the behaviour of local elites including DFO staff, a relatively new 
CF programme, and level of support from DFO and project staff. 
In the study CFs the forests were not mature or highly productive, resulting in users having 
less incentive to manage their forests. Conflict among users and also between the DFO and 
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the CFUGs also reduced efficiency. Users claim that they get little support from DFO staff, 
while the DFO staff members interviewed argue that the CFs have many irregularities in 
forest management and CF fund mobilisation. The CFs are also remotely located and the 
frequency of DFO staff visits is very low.  
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-10 Status of efficiency in study CF in Rupandehi District 
 
7.3 FAIRNESS AND EQUITY 
 
The concept of good forest governance is strongly related to that of fairness and equity in the 
distribution of costs and benefits and to procedural aspects that determine who participates in 
the definition of rules and norms. It is also related to how scientific information is used to 
make informed decisions (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). Equity is a concept that has various 
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meanings and refers to ‘whether something is fair, just, or impartial’ (Poteete, 2004: 3). 
Equity issues in Nepalese community forestry sector are dynamic, have many dimensions, 
and occur at different operational and organisational levels (Luital, 2011). These issues are 
made more acute in Nepalese society as a result of historically and culturally constructed 
unequal power relations based on caste, class, gender and geographic region (RECOFTC, 
2011).   
Discussions about environmental governance reflect the centrality of equity to just and 
sustainable environmental outcomes yet lack clarity regarding how it can be defined and what 
its components are (McDermott et al., 2012). Promoting equity is an implicit goal of many 
initiatives including community-based natural resources management. However, it is often 
unclear which of the different facets of equity is being discussed. Is it equity in the 
distribution of costs and benefits? Or is it equity in the distribution between households 
within communities, or between local and national stakeholders, or between generations? Or, 
again is it a concern about fairness in decision-making processes? Without a clear definition 
of which aspects of equity are being considered and recognition of the problems involved in 
evaluating the impact of policies and programmes on equity, it is difficult to effectively 
assess it (McDermott and Schreckenberg, 2009; McDermott et al., 2012). The current 
dialogue around equity revolves predominantly around how it is measured. One view is that 
equity refers to increasing equality of opportunity, or equal access to services. Others argue, 
however, that equity should be measured in terms of substantive outcomes.  
In this study equity is assessed using a variety of  internal and external indicators that include 
CF fund mobilisation and use, subsidies to marginalised groups, benefit sharing, time 
allocation versus benefit sharing among users, equity in rules and regulations, and the forest 
product pricing system. 
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7.3.1 FUND MOBILISATION AND USE  
 
The mobilisation and use of CF funds is an indicator of fairness and equity within the group. 
Community forestry aims to create income generation opportunities and to promote local 
employment for poor and marginalised group members. The Forest Act (1993) and Forest 
Regulations (1995) and CF Guidelines (2007) all mandate that 35% of total income should be 
channelled to the benefit of poorest and most marginalized users of community forests for 
income generation and capacity building activities. Many studies argue that the 35% target is 
a basic and strong indicator against which one can evaluate the governance of any community 
forest. Many CFUGs do use their funds to support the poor and marginalised in income 
generating activities. However, in some cases, the funds are used to support elite members’ 
interests such as in building roads, temples, and schools. These are not the immediate concern 
of poor and marginalized users and do not provide them much direct benefits.  
Respondents in this study expressed a range of opinions regarding CF fund mobilisation as 
shown in Figure 7-11. The results indicate that Sitakunda (High Mountain) and 
Godawarikunda (Mid Hills) CFUGs have the fairest fund distribution mechanisms. Further, 
Janapriya and Sainamaina (both from Terai), and Saraswoti (Mid Hills), CFUGs have been 
performing moderately well with regards to fund distribution.  As noted by one respondent: 
There is a fair income distribution mechanism in our CFUG. The Executive 
Committee presents details of income and expenditure of the previous year and an 
estimate of income and expenditure for coming year in the Annual General Assembly. 
In recent years, they have focused on special programs for poor, dalit and 
marginalised communities such as buying goats and piglets for income generation and 
providing skill training to at least five poor families in each year. The CFUG also 
provides a bursary for the education of the poorest users. I am happy with the 
decisions of Executive Committee and AGM in our favour... (Interviewee, 
Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
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In contrast, Bandevi CFUG has adopted an equal distribution system. Many respondents from 
Bandevi CFUG expressed the view that “development is for all, not for particular group”. In 
another community, and in contravention of government rules and regulations, Navadurga 
CFUG is perceived by its members to have unfair mechanisms for fund distribution. One of 
the members of Navadurga CFUG expressed this concern as follows:   
Our CFUG has many provisions of fund collection such as annual fee from users, 
selling of forest products, and others. There is neither provision to invest CF income 
in poorest users nor a transparent accounting system. I do not know how much money 
is in CFUG’s accounts or how the fund is allocated and used. The Executive 
Committee does not provide clear information or present audited reports at meetings 
and the Annual General Assembly. Many users have asked them many times for 
transparency regarding fund collection and utilisation. However, they have so far not 
provided detailed information (Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District).  
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-11 Respondents’ views on mobilisation of CFUG funds. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents respondents’ views (5, fund is mobilised to wider community and special program 
for marginalised group and 1, fund is mobilised for the benefits of a few people only) and 
name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) 
shown in X-axis.  
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7.3.2 SUBSIDES/ DISCOUNTS TO MARGINALISED GROUPS 
 
Poor and marginalised members of the community cannot afford the same price for forest 
products as wealthy members. Therefore many CFUGs adopt a different pricing mechanism 
based on the wealth ranking of CFUG members, while other CFUGs use an equal pricing 
system. The 2008 CF guidelines have highlighted the importance of providing subsidised 
products to the poor and marginalised groups as a basic requirement.   
 
The contribution of community forests in providing users with basic forest products is quite 
variable across the nine study CFUGs. In general, most of the CFs are making a considerable 
contribution to meeting subsistence needs for fuelwood, leaf litter and small timbers. 
However, in a few cases, occupational groups like blacksmiths are experiencing difficulty as 
they are restricted in how much charcoal they can collect in violation of their customary use 
rights. 
It is generally argued that well-governed CFUGs provide products and services to poor and 
marginalized groups at subsidized rates. However, in this study the respondents opinions 
show a very different result as summarized in Figure 7-12. Despite displaying very good 
governance across many indicators, Saraswoti and Godawarikunda CFUGs do not subsidise 
products and services to poor and marginalized groups. In contrast, Sitakunda, Jhareni and 
Sainamaina CFUGs are perceived to provide sufficient subsidies on products and services to 
marginalized groups. Bandevi CFUG does not provide funds to marginalised groups but does 
provide subsidies on products and services. A respondent from Janapriya CFUG reflects the 
views of those who support subsidies. 
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We provide timber at a subsidised rate to the poor people within our CFUG. We also 
give interest free loans to poor members of our CFUG when they request them. We 
provide firewood wood for religious ceremonies and kajkriya (cremation of dead 
body) (Interviewee, Janapriya CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-12 Forest product pricing system for marginalised groups. Numeric score in Y-axis 
represents respondents’ opinion on subsidy/discount (5, respondent strongly agrees that the 
product is subsidised, and 1 strongly disagrees) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), 
Mid Hills(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
 
The empirical results of this study show that it is not necessary to provide a subsidy for a 
CFUG to be perceived as well-governed and successful. If there is adequate transparency and 
wise use of resources, the poorest and marginalised CF members can also buy CF products 
and services at the same rate as other users.
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7.3.3 FAIRNESS IN BENEFIT SHARING - PRODUCTS 
 
Community forestry not only aims to meet a basic requirement for forest products at the local 
level but also to support the poor and marginalised members of the community(McDermott 
and Schreckenberg, 2009). Many researchers concur that community forestry practitioners 
must take proactive steps to advance equity (Buffum et al., 2009; McDermott and 
Schreckenberg, 2009; McDermott et al., 2013). Despite poverty reduction being an important 
goal of CF management, livelihood improvement is generally neglected in favour of 
improving forest management (Schreckenberg and Luttrell, 2009).  
McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009) argue that poor and marginalised members of the 
community must first be identified so that community forestry groups and associated 
initiatives can avoid harming their interests and fairly target them for benefit sharing. In 
Nepal this is achieved in many CFs through a participatory wellbeing ranking, a mandatory 
step in the community forestry process (Schreckenberg and Luttrell, 2009). In particular, it is 
important to understand how poor people use forest products and services, the degree of their 
reliance on them, and the likely impact of community forestry activities (McDermott and 
Schreckenberg, 2009). 
In many cases, community forestry is found to contribute to sustainable livelihoods of the 
CFUG members, including delivering essential forest products and services, enhancing 
natural capital, creating local organizations for collective action, contributing to policy 
reforms, and supporting income generation activities (Gautam, 2009; MFSC, 2013). It is 
considered by the authorities that the distribution of CF benefits is fairly equitable. The 
poorest and marginalized families obtain forest products and services to enable them to meet 
their daily basic needs because they do not have private forest resources for available. The 
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Nepalese government’s prevailing policies and CF guidelines require all CFUGs to follow 
equity principles (CF Guidelines, 2008). However, in the field survey carried out during this 
study, respondents reported mixed results: 
Our executive committee members are not interested in the wider community 
benefits. They care about themselves and I can tell you that there is no fairness in 
benefit sharing. They [executive committee members] do not care about poor and 
marginalized group requirements and are prepared to take risks to get the resources 
for their own benefits. They are very selfish; they do not follow CF guidelines 
(Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
We have a fair benefit sharing mechanism. We give top priority to women and 
marginalized groups, we listen to their opinions regarding utilisation of forest 
products. The executive committee prepares annual plans based on the suggestions 
put forwarded by different interest groups so that everyone’s interests are protected 
(Interviewee, Godawarikunda CFUG, Lalitpur District). 
 
To assess the fairness of benefit sharing in CF, respondents’ opinion on this issue were 
obtained and are set out in Figure 7-13. The results indicate that Saraswoti and 
Godawarikunda CFUGs are perceived to have fair benefit sharing mechanisms while this is 
not the case in Navadurga, Chhyarchhyare or Bandevi CFUGs. The remaining CFUGs report 
a moderate level of fairness in benefit sharing. The empirical results of the study show that 
those CFUGs that practice equitable benefit sharing are more successful irrespective of the 
physiographic region in which they are located. 
 
243 | P a g e  
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-13 Respondents’ views on the fairness in benefit sharing from the forest. Numeric 
score in Y-axis represents the level of satisfaction (5, strongly agree that the CFUG fairly 
shares the benefits and 1, strongly disagree) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid 
Hills(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
 
7.3.4 FAIR SHARE OF CONTRIBUTION TO CF MANAGEMENT  
 
Community forestry provides a wide range of direct and indirect benefits to users, both local 
and regional.  Users who contribute to forest protection and management expect a fair share 
from their in-kind contribution. Usually users are able to obtain benefits based on their 
contribution. However, many studies reveal that some forest user communities (particularly  
poor and marginalised groups) obtain a reduced quantity of forest products and other benefits 
from forests than they obtained prior to  the forest being designated a community forest 
(Larsen et al., 2000; Malla et al., 2003). In short, in community forests the distribution of 
forest products appears to favour wealthier and higher caste households (Jones, 2007; Malla, 
2000). 
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Figure 7-14 depicts the responses of participants regarding the perception of fairness of the 
distribution of benefits from CFs. Saraswoti, Sitakunda and Godawarikunda CFUGs are 
perceived to provide a better share of users’ contributions than Navadurga, Janapriya and 
Sainamaina CFUGs from the Terai Region, which perform poorly on this indicator.  A very 
pessimistic view was expressed by a respondent from the Janapriya CFUG:  
I argue that we are not receiving the benefits based on our contribution. To give you a 
simple example, while every household is involved equally in CF protection and 
management activities, we get less say and enjoy fewer benefits compared to the 
Thulathalu (elites). The rich and elite members have control of our CFUG, as they are 
head of the CF and make decisions for their benefit. We contribute CF activities to 
obtain forest products required for our daily use but the executive committee is 
interested in selling forest products to outsiders to collect revenue that can be utilised 
for their own benefits... No matter who manages forests we poor are always poor and 
no one listens to our voice (Interviewee, Janapriya CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-14 Respondents’ views on the time allocation for protection and management of 
CF.  Numeric score in Y-axis represents the respondents’ response on whether he/she agree 
on ‘the time allocated for protection and management is equally shared by all members, , 
level of rights to collect forest products’ (5, strongly agree, and 1, strongly disagree) and 
name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills(middle) and High Mountain (right) shown 
in X-axis.    
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7.3.5 EQUITY IN RULES AND REGULATIONS  
 
A distinction can be made between economic equity, which involves the distribution of 
benefits as discussed in previous sections, and political equity, which involves participation 
in decision making in the development of CFUG rules and regulations (Buffum et al., 2010).  
Many authors argue that political equity in user groups is an important prerequisite for 
economic equity (e.g., Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). Furthermore, the ability of community 
groups to express their ideas and concerns regarding rules and regulations associated with 
forest management is important to enhance equity (Mahanty et al., 2006).  
It could be argued that CFUG rules and regulations should treat all CFUG members equally 
in decision making, implementation and benefit sharing and that well governed CFUGs 
provide equal opportunities for all members. However, the views of respondents in this study 
which are summarised in Figure 7-15 show a range of opinions regarding how equity is 
achieved or not through rules and regulations. A review of CFUG documents showed that 
Saraswoti, Godawarikunda and Sitakunda CFUGs formally treat all CF users’ equitably 
through rules and regulations and this is reflected in their perceptions of their performance on 
most of good governance indicators. Similarly, most respondents in the five remaining 
CFUGs except Navadurga perceived the CF rules and regulations were moderately equitable.  
Despite performing poorly on most indicators of governance, users from the Navadurga 
CFUG expressed a moderate level of satisfaction regarding CF rules and regulations.  
However, results from the focus group discussions indicated that rule and regulation 
implementation is poor and ineffective, resulting in poor governance in Navadurga CF. As 
one respondent noted: 
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We were not involved much in the preparation of CF rules and regulations during the 
preparation of the CF constitution and operational plan. The Ranger prepared our 
rules and regulations and he briefed us. While the rules and regulations of our CF 
appear fair, there is bias in implementation. The CFUG Executive Committee favours 
those they are nearest and social elites and they do not follow rules in our cases 
(Interviewee, Navadurga CFUG, Rupandehi District). 
 
The empirical results from the nine CFUGs show that having good rules and regulations does 
not guarantee good governance in a CF, unless they are implemented without bias and 
equitably.  
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-15 Respondents’ views that CFUG rules and regulations are the same for all 
members including the marginalised. Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of 
agreement (5, strongly agree and 1, strongly disagree) and name of study CF located in Terai 
(left), Mid Hills (middle) and High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
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7.3.6 FAIR AND EQUITABLE SYSTEM OF FOREST PRODUCTS PRICING  
 
CFUGs can determine the prices they charge for different products in consultation with the 
District Forest Office. The price can be lower, equal or higher than the standard royalty rate.  
In some cases the CFUG can provide the products free of cost to poor and marginalised 
members of the CFUG. However in many cases, CFUGs use two different prices – one for 
the CFUG members which is lower than the royalty rate set by the government; and another 
for outsiders, which is usually similar or higher than the royalty rate. Sometimes CFUGs sell 
forest products by auction, which can fetch a much higher price than the royalty rate.  
The respondents’ opinions on forest products pricing system is summarized in Figure 7-16. 
Results showed members of Saraswoti, Janapriya and Godawarikunda CFUGs perceived the 
forest product pricing system is fair and equitable while users of Navadurga, Bandevi and 
Chhyarchhyare CFUGs perceived the pricing system to be less fair and equitable. One 
respondent stated: 
We have a very well-organized pricing system for forest products... The timber price 
is set as per the royalty rate, however other products such as firewood and leaf litter 
can be collected free of cost. Members of low socio-economic background can apply 
for a reduced price, with the committee making the decision as to whether it is 
appropriate... Usually they provide us products at 50% lower than actual price... In 
cases where the member is very poor or affected with natural calamities such as fire, 
the committee provides timber free of cost (Interviewee, Saraswoti CFUG, Lalitpur 
District). 
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(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-16 Respondents’ views on fair and equitable forest products pricing system. 
Numeric score in Y-axis represents the level of satisfaction by respondent (5, strongly agree 
and 1, strongly disagree) and name of study CF located in Terai (left), Mid Hills (middle) and 
High Mountain (right) shown in X-axis.    
 
7.3.7 STATUS OF EQUITY IN DOLAKHA DISTRICT – HIGH MOUNTAIN  
 
Respondents’ views on indicators of equity in Dolakha District are depicted by the radar 
diagram in Figure 7-17. The results indicate Sitakunda CFUG is perceived to be the most 
well-functioning CFUG followed by Jhareni CFUG, although the forest products pricing 
system in Jhareni CFUG is perceived to be fairer and more equitable.  Similar to performance 
on other elements of governance, Chhyarchhyare CFUG is perceived by its members to be 
functioning poorly across all indicators of fairness and equity.  
Informal discussion with various stakeholders and a review of documents showed that 
Sitakunda and Jhareni CFUGs have a relatively long history of CF management which 
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enhanced most of the indicators associated with equity. CFUG members have received 
numerous training courses and support from the Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project, 
other NGOs, and the local CBOs. On the other hand, Chhyarchhyare CFUG has a relatively 
short history of CF management and there remains a lot for its members to learn. 
Furthermore, due to its small forest area, poor site quality and under stocked forest, there are 
limited opportunities to raise CF funds and the CF is not in a position to provide subsidies to 
marginalised members.   
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-17 Status of equity in the study CFUGs of the Dolakha District 
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7.3.8 STATUS OF EQUITY IN LALITPUR DISTRICT - MID-HILLS  
 
The results from the three CFUGs in the Lalitpur District clearly indicated Saraswoti CFUG 
is perceived to be performing well, Godawarikunda CFUG moderately and Bandevi CFUG 
poorly across the various indicators associated with fairness and equity. Saraswoti CFUG 
performs well across four of seven indicators assessed in this study. Godawarikunda, one of 
the oldest CFs in the district, performed better on one indicator, CFUG fund utilisation.  The 
poorest performing CF in this district was Bandevi CF, which was perceived to perform 
poorly across all indicators except subsidies/discounts to marginalised groups.  
 
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-18 Status of equity in study CFUGs of the Lalitpur District 
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7.3.9 STATUS OF EQUITY IN RUPANDEHI DISTRICT - TERAI REGION 
 
Similar to CFUGs from the Lalitpur District in the Mid-Hills, a clear distinction exists 
between CFUGs on the various indicators of equity in Rupandehi District, Terai Region 
(Figure 7-19). Navadurga CFUG was perceived to be the  poorest functioning CF across all 
equity indicators, while Sainamaina performed the best followed by Janapriya CF. The poor 
performance of  Navadurga CF appears to be mainly due to its short history as a community 
forest and because it  is run by Madhesi people who have a low level of awareness about CF 
management. The CFUG is perceived to be under the control of a few key people, who do not 
engage in a wider discussion with user groups.  
 
(Source: HH Survey, 2013) 
Figure 7-19 Status of equity in the study CFUGs of the Rupandehi District 
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7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter assessed the performance of the nine study CFUGs on two important elements 
of governance – efficiency and fairness/equity – using a range of associated indicators. 
According to the literature community forestry can contribute to improved livelihoods of 
CFUG members in a variety of ways, including fulfilling necessary subsistence needs for 
forest products, creating local organizations for collective action, enhancing natural capital, 
contributing to policy reforms, and supporting income generation activities to poor and 
marginalised members of the community (Gautam, 2009; MFSC, 2013).  
The study revealed that the government agencies and policy makers have given little 
recognition to local CFUGs of the big effort required in running, and the high economic cost 
entailed in managing, their community forests. The extra effort in time and cost to local 
people engaged in CF management is due to them receiving much degraded forests and 
young plantation at the outset, which has outweighed the benefits, received in terms of 
products and services and associated revenues. 
The study results show that some CFUGs, such as Sitakunda and Godawarikunda, are 
utilising their funds to support poor and marginalised CF members with the aim of creating 
income generation opportunities and promoting employment to poor and marginalised group 
members. The understanding of the essence of community forestry is more developed in 
these CFUGs because of the internalisation of inclusive values and norms among members 
and executives members. However, in some other CFUGs (e.g., Navadurga) CF funds are 
being utilised in the interest of elite members to invest in road building and school 
construction. From the perspective of the poor and marginalised, these projects are not a 
priority and CF funds should be deployed to meet more immediate needs. 
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This study found that CFUGs from the Mid Hills and High Mountain regions perform better 
on equity than those in the Terai Region and this appears mainly due to the fact that CFUGs 
from the former two regions have a long history of management and have developed a better 
capacity to manage their CFs. 
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CHAPTER 8: SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Within the context of a growing worldwide civic movement (WEF, 2013), recognition of the 
importance of local communities’ involvement in sustainable forest management is ever 
increasing in developing countries. In this context, decentralization is often viewed as a 
means of promoting good forest governance; governance that is responsive to poor and 
marginalised people and adaptive to local needs. To be effective, decentralised governance 
relies on public participation, accountability, transparency and equity among other 
requirements. When appropriately implemented, decentralised, ‘good’ forest governance is 
expected to make local communities and community forest users groups (CFUGs) more 
independent and build their legitimacy. In this dissertation, I have examined to what extent, 
and how, decentralized forest governance is delivering enhanced economic, social and 
environmental benefits to communities. More specifically this study developed and tested a 
framework to assess how devolved forest governance is performing across the indicators of 
participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. The 
theoretical concept of ‘environmentality’ was employed to investigate local level governance 
through the lens of the theory of the commons, feminist institutionalization and 
decentralization. These three elements enrich each approach and provide a foundation for 
'environmental governance' as discussed in Section 4-2. 
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This chapter synthesises the findings of this study, focusing on what we have learnt about 
how community forests are governed in Nepal and the implications and recommendations for 
the Nepalese government, donors and researchers interested in community forestry 
governance as well as for CFUG members themselves. Finally, the chapter reflects on the on 
the research methodology utilized, the study’s scientific contributions to knowledge and some 
future directions for research on decentralised forest governance. 
 
8.2 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
8.2.1 ASSESSING CF GOVERNANCE: FRAMEWORK OF ELEMENTS AND 
MULTIPLE INDICATORS 
 
The quality of CF governance in Nepal was assessed using a framework composed of six 
elements and 36 indicators. These elements and indicators were developed following a 
review of the national and international literature on community forest governance and 
discussions with many key informants including government officials, CFUG members and 
CSOs. The framework was tested and refined in one of the study CF’s before being deployed 
to investigate the general status of CF governance. The study revealed that the indicators are 
dialectically interconnected with performance on one framework element and associated 
indicators affecting performance across a range of other elements and indicators.  
While the framework of elements and indicators was developed to assess CF governance at 
the community level, it may also prove useful in assessing governance performance in other 
natural resource management sectors such as buffer zone community forests user groups, soil 
conservation groups, leasehold forestry groups, collaborative forests user groups and 
community irrigation groups. The framework may also be applicable to other regions of 
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Nepal and other countries where community groups are involved in natural resource 
management. Further research applying the framework is required to assess the degree to 
which it is useful to examine these alternatives. 
A summary table showing the performance of the nine CFUGs in three ecological zones of 
Nepal is shown below in Table 8-1. Out of nine, five CFUGs are well governed being 
high/very high performance (i.e., Saraswoti CFUG, Godawarikunda CFUG, Janapriya 
CFUG, Sainamaina CFUG and Sitakunda CFUG) and three of the remaining four being 
medium or medium/high performance (i.e., Navadurga CFUG, Jhareni CFUG and 
Chhyarchhyare CFUG) . Only one CFUG (i.e., Bandevi CFUG) scored a low performance. 
Although overall performance of Navadurga CFUG falls under medium performance the 
respondents have expressed their concern and dissatisfaction over the functioning of its 
executive committee.  
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Table 8-1 Summary of status of various elements of good forest governance in the nine study CFUGs in three ecological zones of Nepal 
Elements of 
governance  
Rupandehi (Terai Region) Lalitpur (Mid-Hills) Dolakha (High-Mountain) 
Janapriya 
CFUG 
Navadurga 
CFUG 
Sainamaina 
CFUG 
Saraswoti 
CFUG 
Godawarikunda 
CFUG 
Bandevi 
CFUG 
Sitakunda 
CFUG Jhareni CFUG 
Chhyarchhyare 
CFUG 
Participation  High Low Medium High Very high Low High High High 
Transparency High High High High Very high Very low Very  High High High 
Accountability High Medium High Very high Very high Low High Medium Medium 
Effectiveness High High High Very high Very high Low High Medium Medium 
Efficiency Medium Low High High High Low Medium Medium Medium 
Fairness and Equity High Low High High High Low High High Medium 
Overall summary High Medium High 
High/Very 
High High/Very High Low High Medium/High Medium/High 
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8.2.2 PARTICIPATION  
 
Q1: Does decentralised forest management enhance community participation 
including the participation of women and other marginalised groups? If not what are 
the barriers and how can these be overcome? To what extent are ‘marginalised 
groups’ involved in CF planning and decision making processes? How do they 
participate in these processes? (Chapter 5) 
 
Nepal’s community forestry programme aims to strengthen the participation of marginalised 
communities, such as women, in the management of natural resources, an aim backed by 
policies, acts and regulations, and directives. The participation of users from all interest 
groups, indigenous communities, and members of various socio-economic status groups in 
CF processes can enhance the success of CF and promote good forest governance. As one of 
the key elements of good decentralised governance, the participation of all CFUG members, 
most especially women and marginalised groups, in various community activities and 
decision making process was critically analysed. To do this, five different indicators of 
participation were employed including women’s participation, participation of indigenous 
communities, mediation between different interest groups, women and indigenous group 
participation in executive committees and consultation processes during preparation of CF 
constitutions and operational plans. 
The research results are summarised in Table 8-2 and show that women’s participation is 
increasing because of increasing awareness and, in some cases, the outmigration of men from 
rural areas. However, the study also revealed that the rate of participation, particularly 
functional participation of women and disadvantaged groups in decision making process, is 
very limited in most of the CFUGs in the Terai Region. In the Mid-Hills and High Mountain 
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Regions, the rate of meeting and general assembly attendance is comparatively higher but 
meaningful participation remains a challenge.  
Because it is a major decision-making platform, women’s representation in CF executive 
committees is important and can enhance community participation and ultimately improve 
forest governance. The empirical study showed that while most CFUGs fulfill the minimum 
conditions of prevailing acts, rules and regulations, their performance in terms of 
involvement and contribution of women to overall management of community forestry is 
comparatively lower than expected in many cases. Therefore, this study further concludes 
that the numerical representation of women and indigenous communities in executive 
committees alone is not a good measure of their participation and stake in decisions. In many 
cases, despite strong representation by number and position, marginalised groups are less 
well able to defend their interests and needs and are influenced by others.  The study 
concludes that actual functional participation is essential as the level representation in 
committee alone is not enough capacity to influence in key decision making.  The 
enhancement of the leadership capacity of women and other marginalised groups, via training 
and skills-development workshops, is key to improving governance in community forestry 
management. 
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Table 8-2 Summary of status of various indicators of participation of good forest governance in the nine study CFUGs in three ecological zones 
of Nepal 
 
Indicators for participation  
Rupandehi (Terai Region) Lalitpur (Mid-Hills) Dolakha (High-Mountain) 
Janapriya 
CF 
Navadurga 
CF 
Saina 
Maina CF 
Saraswoti 
CF 
Godawarikunda 
CF 
Bandevi 
CF 
Sitakunda 
CF 
Jhareni 
CF 
Chhyarchhyare 
CF 
Women participation in CF High Low Medium High High Medium Medium High High 
Participation of indigenous 
communities Medium Medium Medium High Very High 
Very 
Low Very High High Medium 
Mediation of different interest groups Medium Low High High Very High Low High Medium Medium 
Women's representation in executive 
committees Very High Very Low Low High Very High Very low High High Very High 
Consultation of various interest groups Medium Medium Medium High Very High Low Very High Medium Medium 
Participation in revenue collection High Medium High High Very High Low Medium Medium Medium 
Overall Summary  High Low Medium High Very High Low High High High 
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The success of CF management depends on how the various contrasting and contesting 
interests are managed. A strong mediation mechanism is important as it enhances the overall 
performance in community participation in CF management. The study showed that only a 
few CFUGs have conflict resolution forums, where representatives from DFO and 
FECOFUN are invited into the mediation process. Effective conflict resolution forums need 
to be in place in each CFUG to improve mediation and, ultimately, enhance greater 
participation. 
 
8.2.3 TRANSPARENCY 
 
Q2: Are CFUG policies, procedures and activities transparent to all members? What 
can be done to enhance transparency in CFUGs? (Chapter 5) 
 
Transparency is the bench mark of quality of community forestry which can be guaranteed by 
allowing CF members and relevant stakeholder access to CF information, decision making 
processes and benefit sharing mechanisms. Many recent studies (see Pokharel et al., 2009 & 
2011 for example) express a concern about transparency especially in terms of the 
availability of information, benefit sharing, annual auditing and reporting, this despite the 
internationally much-admired successes of Nepal’s CF programme. Transparency and 
participation are complementary to each other. Promoting the participation of all stakeholders 
leads to greater transparency in community forestry processes. The study suggests seven 
indicators for assessing transparency of CFUG such as availability of information, extent of 
information accessibility, usefulness of information, annual reporting, auditing and reporting, 
comprehensiveness of reports, and decision making in benefit sharing.
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Table 8-3 Summary of status of various indicators of transparency in the nine study CFUGs in three ecological zones of Nepal 
 
Indicators of Transparency 
Rupandehi (Terai Region) Lalitpur (Mid-Hills) Dolakha (High-Mountain) 
Janapriya 
CF 
Navadurga 
CF 
Saina Maina 
CF 
Saraswoti 
CF 
Godawarikunda 
CF 
Bandevi 
CF 
Sitakunda 
CF 
Jhareni 
CF 
Chhyarchhyare 
CF 
Availability of information  High Medium High Medium Very High Medium High High High 
Decision making in benefit 
sharing  High Medium High High Very High Medium Very High High High 
Annual reporting High High High High Very High Medium Very High High High 
Auditing and reporting  High High Very High High Very High Medium Very High High High 
Comprehensiveness of  reports Medium Medium High High Very High Medium Very High High High 
Extent of information 
accessibility  Very High Medium Very High High Very High Medium Very High High High 
Usefulness of information High Medium High High Very High Medium High High High 
Overall Summary  High Medium High High Very High Medium Very High High High 
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Forest managers, researchers and civil society actors are more closely linked with the local 
community in CF management through their access to CF information. This is one of their 
major concerns because they assess the level of transparency in CFUGs via the accuracy, 
regularity and quality of information they receive. The study reveals that, where access to 
information is good, the cohesion and coordination among CF members and with external 
agencies is also strong. The study supports the argument that access to information is one of 
the major concerns of CFUGs and a vital indicator to assess their transparency. Where access 
to information is provided, a CFUG tends to function well and cohesion and coordination 
among CF members and with external agencies is strong. However, when access to 
information is weak the credibility of the CFUG to members and stakeholders is damaged. 
Being a powerful tool, the information provided by a CFUG must be correct and useful to the 
CF users and relevant government authorities; when it is, it develops integrity among CF 
users and the executive committee as well as enhancing the CFUG’s reputation with the 
district forest office and stakeholders. 
Annual auditing and reporting is a mandatory component for CFs, offering a means to 
promote communication and improve transparency. The research shows that most CFUGs in 
the Mid-Hills and High Mountain regions produce well-structured reports which are 
circulated to their stakeholders. However, CFUGs located in the Terai Region were found to 
be weaker in writing and disseminating reports.  In addition, older, more established CFUGs 
such as Godawarikunda and Sitakunda produced higher quality reports compared to more 
recently established CFUGs such as Chhyarchhyare and Bandevi. The study found that the 
level of governance is higher in those CFUGs that evidence transparency in CF fund 
mobilisation and timely auditing (e.g., Sainamaina, Godawarikunda and Sitakunda) and that 
this is irrespective of ecological region. The quality, accuracy and regularity of reports reflect 
the motivation of office bearers and key CFUG position holders.  
264 | P a g e  
The study concludes that as CFs’ develop and gain resources, the distribution of such 
resources to benefit the community becomes an increasingly important issue in CF 
management. Further, the key reason for participating communities to engage in CF activities 
is to share equitably in the benefits. The empirical result shows that a transparent decision 
making benefit sharing mechanism enhances community participation, which leads to CF 
success. Very high transparency has generated harmony among CF members in 
Godawarikunda and Sitakunda CFUGs; in contrast, the medium level of transparency has led 
to disharmony in Navadurga and Bandevi CFUGs. In line with many scholars argument, this 
study shows that CFUGs which maintain high levels of transparency in benefit sharing 
decisions are successful in building robust and well governed CF institutions that result in 
productive CF management practices. 
 
8.2.4 ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Q3: How accountable are the actors that play a key role in managing CFs? Are they 
accountable to the users? If not, why not? (Chapter 6) 
 
The right of control over community forests rests with CFUGs, which is expressed through 
decisions made at annual general meetings. The AGM is empowered to take decisions within 
a national legal framework, including regarding how to make the community forest more 
effective and efficient. The AGM elects an executive committee which is empowered to 
implement these decisions and is accountable to CF members. In order to evaluate 
accountability, five indicators were identified: accountability of the chairperson and secretary 
to CFUG, accountability of executive committee to CFUG, accountability of office bearers 
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regarding decisions, the influence of external agencies, and the clearness of CF goals and 
targets.  
Within a CFUG executive committee, the key position holders include the chairperson and 
secretary, and these are considered to play an influential role in making and implementing 
decisions. The study finds that CF success depends on how accountable these office bearers 
are. In some cases, the negligence of the chairperson and secretary caused failure and results 
in the CF having a very weak performance. For example, the level of accountability among 
key position holders and executive committee members is relatively higher in older, more 
established CFUGs such as Godawarikunda and Sitakunda; in contrast to Navadurga and 
Chhyarchhyare CFUG, where a medium level of accountability was identified. The study 
showed that accountability in CFUG increases with years of experience in CF management. 
In addition, it found that if the chairperson and secretary are active and accountable, then the 
whole executive committee is more accountable. In those CFUGs studied, there isa strong 
correlation between years of experience and accountability, where older CFUGs such as 
Sitakunda and Godawarikunda exhibit higher level of performance, not only in accountability 
but also in other elements, in comparison to the newly established CFUG such as 
Chhyarchhyare, Navadurga and Bandevi. The main reasons attributed to a lack of 
accountability appear to be linked to leaders’ self-interested motives, which result in 
allegations of misuse of CF revenue and rent-seeking from the opportunities available from 
government and projects. Further capacity building and regular follow up monitoring by 
government and other stakeholders are key measures to enhance the level of accountability 
among CFUG members and executives.
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Table 8-4 Summary of status of various indicators of accountability in the nine study CFUGs in three ecological zones of Nepal 
 
Indicators of Accountability 
Rupandehi (Terai Region) Lalitpur (Mid-Hills) Dolakha (High-Mountain) 
Janapriya 
CF 
Navadurga 
CF 
Saina 
Maina CF 
Saraswoti 
CF 
Godawarikunda 
CF 
Bandevi 
CF 
Sitakunda 
CF 
Jhareni 
CF 
Chhyarchhyare 
CF 
Chairman and secretary accountability  High Medium High Medium Very High 
Very 
Low Very High Medium Medium 
Executive committee's accountability to 
CFUG members High Medium High Very High Very High Low Very High Medium Medium 
Accountability of office bearers for 
decisions High Medium High Very High Very High 
Very 
Low Very High Medium Medium 
Influence of external agencies High Medium High Very High Medium Low Medium Medium Medium 
Clarity of goals and targets High Low High Very High Very High 
Very 
Low High Medium Medium 
Overall summary  High Medium High Very High Very High Low High Medium Medium 
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According to Nepal’s prevailing laws, CFUGs are autonomous and self-sustaining 
institutions. They must be able to make their decisions themselves. Therefore, the influence 
of external agencies could be counterproductive to a good governance outcome. However, 
community forestry requires development and this is being facilitated by the efforts of many 
actors including international agencies and donors. Empirical evidence from this research 
suggests that increasing the contribution of external agencies such as DFO, FECOFUN, and 
other civil society organisations could actually enhance governance outcomes. For example, 
Godawarikunda and Sitakunda are two of the most successful CFUGs, but both have been 
highly influenced in decision making by external actors. Both CFUGs are influenced by 
donor supported forestry projects and government officials. The main reason for their 
superior outcomes appears to be due to synergy, interaction and cross-fertilization of 
knowledge between CFUG officers and members and other stakeholders. 
 
8.2.5 EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Q4: How effective is decentralised forest management in the form of community 
forestry in delivering economic benefits? What goods and services do people obtain 
from CF and how do they make decisions to distribute these benefits? (Chapter 6) 
 
The effectiveness of CF was assessed by developing five indicators: structure of CF 
operational plan and constitution, accomplishment of CF management objectives, 
implementation of meeting decisions and dispute resolution process.  
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 CFUGs are expected to develop a standard constitution and operational plan with long-, 
medium-, short-term goals. The purpose of these documents is to guide executive committees 
and users in the work they do over the stipulated time period.  In many cases, however, 
CFUGs do not follow their constitutions and operational plans; instead their work is based on 
ad hoc decisions taken by executive committees. Such decisions are also usually influenced 
by chairpersons and secretaries. The provisions of CFOPs are usually not implemented in 
practice due to bureaucratic procedures and delays in obtaining approvals from DFO offices. 
Those CFUGs that can exercise influence over their DFO offices, either by power or undue 
incentives, can obtain approval quickly. They often harvest more forest products than the 
annual allowable cut provided for in the CFOP. 
It is generally understood that CFUGs prepare their own constitutions and operational plan 
providing an opportunity for a rigorous discussion about what forest management provisions 
should be included in CFOPs. In many cases, however, in the study CFUGs, the constitution 
and operational plans were prepared by forest rangers, supported by DFO or other donor-
supported forestry staff, with CFUG members playing a minimal role. In some cases, forest 
rangers provided a copy of the plan to the CF chairperson or secretary which was then 
presented to the executive committee meeting. A review of the documents of sample CFUGs 
showed that all CFOPs and constitutions were in the same format supporting the claim that 
they are prepared by forest ranger and project supported forestry technicians. In the 
implementation phase too, undue influence from DFO staff hinders CFUGs from achieving 
management objectives, as for example in the recent ban to log green trees. 
This study found that CF constitutions and CF operational plans alone are not sufficient to 
achieve such goals of community forestry. Regular meetings and discussions are found 
equally important as these help to breakdown the management objectives into achievable, 
time-bound outputs. Several CFUGs in the Mid-Hills and High Mountain regions, such as 
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Saraswoti, Godawarikunda and Sitakunda, conducted monthly meetings and disclosed 
meeting decisions to all users and then worked to implement those decisions. In contrast, 
members of the Navadurga and Chhyarchhyare CFUGs seldom met and rarely implemented 
meeting decisions. They perceived that the reason for this poor performance was a low level 
of education and poor facilitation support from the District Forest Office. 
The study identified the existence of several types of conflict including intra-group and inter-
group conflict as well as conflicts between CFUGs and government regarding choice of 
management objectives and priority setting for development and distribution of benefits. 
Resolving such conflicts wisely and early paves the way to good governance and success in 
community forests. The amount and types of conflict varied according to ecological zone. It 
appears that the lower the altitude, the higher the conflict, with CFUGs in the Terai Region 
experiencing many conflicts and consequently having weaker governance outcomes. 
However, the study also shows that conflict is not necessarily bad providing timely and 
effective resolution mechanisms are in place to help the CF, a finding that is corroborated by 
other contemporary studies (Kanel, 2004; MFSC, 2013; Pokharel et al., 2009). 
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Table 8-5 Summary of status of various indicators of effectiveness in the nine study CFUGs in three ecological zones of Nepal 
 
Indicators of effectiveness 
Rupandehi (Terai Region) Lalitpur (Mid-Hills) Dolakha (High-Mountain) 
Janapriya 
CF 
Navadurga 
CF 
Saina Maina 
CF 
Saraswoti 
CF 
Godawarikunda 
CF 
Bandevi 
CF 
Sitakunda 
CF 
Jhareni 
CF 
Chhyarchhyare 
CF 
Structure of  CF operational plan High Medium High Very High Very High 
Very 
Low High Medium Medium 
Structure of CF constitution High Medium High Very High Very High 
Very 
Low High Medium Medium 
Accomplishment of CF management 
objectives High Low High Very High Very High Low High Medium Medium 
Implementation of meeting decisions High Medium High Very High Very High Low Very High Medium Medium 
Dispute resolution process High Low Very High Very High Very High Low Very High Medium Medium 
Overall Summary  High Medium High Very High Very High Low High Medium Medium 
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8.2.6 EFFICIENCY 
 
Q5: To what extent is decentralised forest governance efficient? (Chapter 7)   
 
The research assessed how efficiently CFs are being managed. Seven indicators were used to 
assess efficiency: financial benefits obtained by CF users over time and costs involved, 
people’s right to harvest forest products from CF, use and adequacy of silvicultural systems, 
time management in meetings, forest products pricing system and revenue collection system. 
The study finds that government agencies and policy makers have given little recognition to 
local CFUGs of the time required in running, and the high economic cost entailed in 
managing, their community forests. The extra effort in time and cost to local people engaged 
in CF management is often due to them receiving very degraded forests and young 
plantations at the outset, which has outweighed the benefits received by them in terms of 
products and services and associated revenues. In addition, while the literature isdivided 
regardingthe pattern of access  CFUG members have to CF resources (Kanel, 2004, MFSC, 
2013), this research found mixed results. Some Mid-hills and High Mountain CFUGs where 
the forest was in good condition such as Godawarikunda and Sitakunda provide good access 
to resources in terms of harvesting and utilising forest products. In contrast, in CFUGs where 
the forest is in poor condition, like Chhyarchhyare and Bandevi, members are receiving very 
limited benefits. 
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Table 8-6 Summary of status of various indicators of efficiency in the nine study CFUGs in three ecological zones of Nepal 
 
Indicators of efficiency 
Rupandehi (Terai Region) Lalitpur (Mid-Hills) Dolakha (High-Mountain) 
Janapriya 
CF 
Navadurga 
CF 
Saina Maina 
CF 
Saraswoti 
CF 
Godawarikunda 
CF 
Bandevi 
CF 
Sitakunda 
CF 
Jhareni 
CF 
Chhyarchhyare 
CF 
Financial benefit of forest 
management Medium Low Medium High High Low High Low Low 
Access to forest products Medium Medium Medium Medium High Low High Medium Medium 
Application of silvicultural 
systems Medium Medium Low Very High Very High Very Low Medium Medium Medium 
Adequacy of silvicultural systems Medium Low Medium High High Low Medium Medium Medium 
Time management Low Low High High High Low Low Medium Low 
Surplus forest products pricing 
and sale Low Low Low Low Low High Medium Medium Medium 
Revenue collection system in CF High Low High Very High Very High High Medium High Medium 
Overall Summary  Medium Low High High High Low Medium Medium Medium 
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 Another component of the research on CF efficiency focused on perceptions regarding the 
use and adequacy of silvicultural systems. A rational silvicultural system should fit logically 
into the overall management plan, securing forest products and livelihoods based on 
sustainable yield. Despite such provisions in CF operational plans, many CFUGs have failed 
to employ appropriate silviculture systems to enhance economic output of CFs. Instead, they 
apply conservation oriented measures such as weeding, pruning, thinning and some selection 
seasonal felling. Moreover, untimely instructions and ban notices from the Department of 
Forests on the harvesting of trees in community forestry disrupts the application of 
appropriate silvicultural system, which requires the harvesting of forests products. This 
research finds that these actions by communities and government derail the CF objectives and 
hinders operational efficiency. 
The study investigated the system used to price CF products. The results are discouraging as 
most executive committees have not followed the provisions of their operational plans. What 
happens is that they make decisions on forest product prices and later seek cursory approval 
from the general assembly. In the case of the Terai, it was found that local elites have 
influenced the price at which products have been sold and unduly personally benefitted. 
However, the system appears to be operating comparatively better in CFUGs in the Mid-Hills 
and High Mountain regions. 
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8.2.7 EQUITY AND FAIRNESS 
 
Q6: How fair or equitable are CF’s benefit sharing mechanisms? Do all members 
obtain benefits equitably? (Chapter 7)   
 
The results of this research highlight that fairness and equity are central in assessing CF 
governance and whether it is really benefiting those who are most in need and those who 
continue to struggle for basic livelihoods in a context of marginalisation and social exclusion. 
While promoting equity and fairness is an implicit goal of many initiatives including 
community based forest management, this study addresses its various facets: equity in the 
distribution of costs and benefits between households within communities, between local and 
national stakeholders, between generations and in decision-making processes. The study uses 
six indicators to assess the status of equity and fairness in CFUG decision making process. 
These are the mobilisation, use and outcomes of CF funds, the provision of subsidies or 
discounts to marginalised groups for forest products, the sharing of benefits, time allocation 
versus benefit sharing among users, equity in rules and regulations, and CF forest product 
pricing systems. 
The CF users and other stakeholders are very concerned regarding the mobilisation and use of 
CF funds and this constitutes a good basis for evaluating CF’s fairness and equity. The study 
results show that some CFUGs, such as Sitakunda and Godawarikunda, are utilising their 
funds to support poor and marginalised CF members with the aim of creating income 
generation opportunities and promoting employment to poor and marginalised group 
members. The understanding of the essence of community forestry is more developed in 
these CFUGs because of the internalisation of inclusive values and norms among members 
and executives members. However, in some other CFUGs (e.g., Navadurga), CF funds are 
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being utilised in the interest of elite members to invest in road building and school 
construction. From the perspective of the poor and marginalised, these projects are not a 
priority and CF funds should be deployed to meet more immediate needs. 
 CF constitutions, OPs and in some cases procedures developed by CFUGs normally contain 
provisions of fairness and equity, indicating that the equity aspects of governance has become 
institutionalised. However these rules and regulations have not been adequately implemented 
in practice. There might be several reasons for this gap between formal rules and 
implementation. First, the constitution and operational plan are often prepared by a forest 
technician rather than by CFUG members. Second, in many cases, the distribution of forest 
products is decided on, on an ad hoc basis, rather than by following the rules. In recent cases, 
and in spite of clear government rules and regulations, and provisions in approved CFOPs, 
the district forest office verbally instructed all logging operations to stop until further notice. 
This has created significant uncertainty over how to apply silvicultural systems in CFs, and 
the ruling is neither legally nor technically acceptable to local communities. The study 
concludes that such government actions are significantly disadvantaging local communities. 
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Table 8-7 Summary of status of various indicators of equity and fairness in the nine study CFUGs in three ecological zones of Nepal 
 
Indicators of fairness and equity  
Rupandehi (Terai Region) Lalitpur (Mid-Hills) Dolakha (High-Mountain) 
Janapriya 
CF 
Navadurga 
CF 
Saina Maina 
CF 
Saraswoti 
CF 
Godawarikunda 
CF 
Bandevi 
CF 
Sitakunda 
CF 
Jhareni 
CF 
Chhyarchhyare 
CF 
Fund mobilisation and use High Low High High Very High 
Very 
Low Very High High High 
Subsidy/discounts to marginalised 
groups Medium Low High Very Low Very High 
Very 
High High High Very Low 
Fairness in benefit sharing - products Medium Low High Very High Very High 
Very 
Low High High Medium 
Fair share of contribution to CF 
management Medium Low Medium Very High High 
Very 
Low High High Medium 
Equity in rules and regulations High Medium High Very High Very High 
Very 
Low High High High 
Fair and equitable system of forest 
product pricing High Medium High Very High High 
Very 
Low High High Medium 
Overall Summary  High Low High High High Low High High Medium 
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Initially this research accepted the hypothesis that CFs with good governance would provide 
products and services to poor and marginalized groups at subsidized rates. However, the 
results of the study show that it is not necessary to provide subsidies for a CFUG to be 
successful, providing there is transparency in resource use and a focus on livelihood 
improvement programmes. This study has found that most of the CFUGs in the Mid-Hills 
and High Mountain regions have been practising fairly equitable distribution of benefits. The 
empirical results also indicate that those CFUGs that practice equitable benefit sharing do so 
irrespective of physiographic regions. 
 
8.3 COMMUNITY FOREST GOVERNANCE AND MARGINALISED 
AND ELITE GROUPS 
 
Because of long term civil unrest in the country and the absence of local government at the 
village and district levels for the last 12 years, CFUGs are currently the only democratic 
institutions operating at the local level.  Consequently, community forestry in Nepal is 
considered to be one of the best examples of decentralized forest governance in the world, 
contributing to relatively equitable, inclusive and pro-poor outcomes in practice. Nepal’s 
legislation,  policies and practices have since early 2000 emphasised the issue of social 
inclusion (Pokharel and Nurse, 2003), and provided for the identification of poor and 
marginalised groups such as women, dalit indigenous people and indigenous  groups, the 
conduct of targeted CF programmes, and the use of CF funds for capacity building activities. 
Table 8-8 summarises the overall empirical results from the survey and document reviews. 
The results clearly demonstrate that CFs have a significant positive impact by focusing on 
women and poor and excluded households and on the livelihoods of rural people, particularly 
in ensuring a sustainable supply of forest products and in increasing the voice of women, 
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dalit, indigenous nationalities and other disadvantaged groups in the governance of 
community forests resources. Furthermore, the researcher found in her field study that most 
of CFUGs studied had been practising inclusive governance by considering the importance of 
women, indigenous people, poor and dalit when making decisions. However, there were a 
few CFUGs that still exhibited poor performance either by providing minimal opportunities 
or shutting them out from community forestry decision making. The following sections 
discuss the role played by women, dalit, poor, indigenous groups and well-off people in CF 
governance in more detail. 
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Table 8-8. Analysis of inclusive provisions for women, dalit, and indigenous nationalities in constitution and operation plans (after MFSC, 
2013) 
Provision in CFUGs 
Rupandehi (Terai Region) Lalitpur (Mid-Hills) Dolakha (High-Mountain) 
Janapriya Navadurga Sainamaina Saraswoti Godawarikunda Bandevi Sitakunda Jhareni Chhyarchhyare 
Representation of women, poor and 
excluded households in major posts of 
executive committees 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund mobilisation for welfare of women, 
poor and excluded households: e. g., in 
health, education and income generation  
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Employment creation for women, poor 
and excluded households, e.g. daily 
wages and employment 
yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Priority to women, poor and excluded 
households for training, workshop and 
study visits 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Cash incentives for women, poor and 
excluded households while attending 
meetings or participating in training and 
other development works 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Subsidy or no cost for poor and excluded 
groups for sale and distribution of forest 
products 
No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
CF land to generate income for women 
and poor 
No No No No Yes No Yes No No 
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8.3.1 WOMEN 
 
The study critically analysed women’s participation as a component of good CF governance 
by focusing on the meaningful involvement of women in CF AGMs, executive committees 
and CF activities. The study found that there is a high level of female representation on CF 
executive committees and that this enhanced women’s participation in CF activities. It was 
also found that female participation is increasing in all of the studied CFUGs because of 
increasing awareness of its importance. Further, participation in CFs has enhanced women’s 
leadership over the past decade, as women are now occupying senior positions on CF 
executive committees. Such participation is making their voice stronger and more effective in 
the public arena. For example, a good example of female leadership is the Chhyarchhyare 
CFUG of Dolakha district where most of the executive members are women including the 
chairperson and secretary. In this context, the research finds that an important effect of CF is 
as a vehicle to mainstream women in development via participation in community forestry 
programmes. 
 
The study found that the attendance rate of women at various CF meetings and the AGM is 
increasing. However, the functional participation of women in some CFUGs is weak. In some 
case, women are included on the executive committee to fulfil the minimum conditions of 
prevailing CF regulations. The participation of women in decision making is very limited in 
the Terai Region compared with the Mid-Hills and High Mountain regions. For example, 
while women are included in the executive committee in the Navadurga and Bandevi CFUGs, 
their involvement and contribution to managing the community forest is minimal. In these 
CFUGs, male elites have captured the executive committee and influence decisions and 
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ignore women’s voices, and arrangement that leads to further disempowerment and 
reluctance to engage in other CF activities. 
Indeed, women are often in the majority at most general assemblies today because of high 
rates of male outmigration in search of economic opportunities. However, male domination 
of annual general meetings and executive committees is still found to be a main hindering 
factor for women in community forestry. This study indicates that there is a difference 
between nominal representation and effective participation in the decision making process. 
Although most women do not feel directly prevented from speaking and raising their 
concerns, many of them still feel that men do not listen to them. 
In many cases men perceive women as having limited capabilities to make decisions and as 
seldom putting important agenda items and issues forward for discussion at meetings and 
assemblies. Such a male dominated discourse restricts active female participation and also 
restricts them in gaining leadership positions. 
In summary, the study finds that participation, transparency, accountability and fairness in CF 
management is enhanced where women are in leadership positions and hold major decision 
making power. Given this, there is a need to further develop women’s competency in 
managerial and leadership skills and this should be in a central focus of Nepal’s CF 
programme to further enhance CF governance. 
 
8.3.2 DALIT 
 
Community forestry aims at mainstreaming lower caste CF users into all activities. Most of 
CFUGs investigated in this study have been initiating dalit-focused programmes to meet legal 
provisions and Nepal’s CF Guidelines. The research found that participation of dalit in 
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management committees and their engagement in CF activities is increasing. CFUGs in the 
Mid-Hills and High Mountain regions are giving more emphasis to the inclusion of dalit in 
executive committees and other activities compared to CFUGs in the Terai region. In 
addition, most of the CFUGs are utilising part of their income to deliver special programmes 
to support dalit livelihoods. This study confirms that in many cases dalit members of CFUGs 
recognise that positive change has occurred in the last decade in CF governance.  
The study reveals that the general provisions contained in CF legal instruments and CF 
guidelines for the inclusion of dalit in community forestry are insufficient to secure their 
interest and participation. The historical exclusion of dalit and disadvantaged peoples in 
Nepalese society is the underlying cause of their lower participation in decision making 
process. In addition, caste discrimination is still a major issue hindering dalit participation 
and preventing them from occupying leadership roles. Hundreds of years of social 
discrimination experienced by the dalit community are also reflected in community forestry 
decision making processes, which have led to dalit feeling inferior from so-called high caste 
people. This social and mental phenomenon among dalit keeps them from raising their voices 
effectively in meetings and assemblies. Most dalit CFUG members who were interviewed in 
this study stated they often feel that they are prevented by high caste people from 
participation and from standing for leadership positions in the CFUGs.  
The research shows that most of provisions related to the inclusion of dalit in CF 
management and operations are not enforced properly to integrate them into mainstream 
decision making processes. Furthermore, dalit participants noted that have very little time 
available to participate in CF activities because they live from hand to mouth. Most dalit men 
work for daily wages and most dalit women do not usually participate in public affairs. 
Therefore, the research concludes that economic empowerment is a minimum condition to 
ensure dalit participation. Livelihood enhancement for dalit and marginalised communities 
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should be primary focus of CF programmes in the next stage, possibly via the transformation 
of traditional occupations into a modernised business model based on the forest products 
from the community forests.  
 
8.3.3 INDIGENOUS NATIONALITIES  
 
The role and stake of indigenous nationalities (ethnic groups), which refers to those who have 
been living in and around the forests, are recognised in prevailing government policies and 
guidelines and in the present practices in community forestry management. Initially, the CF 
programme created adequate awareness among indigenous nationalities regarding their rights 
and access to CF resources. Later, the inclusion agenda shifted from a narrow focus on 
community forestry to a broader one focused on development, and today it is a country-wide 
political agenda to include indigenous groups within the state as part of the restructuring 
process. Further, the government of Nepal ratified ILO Article 169 protecting the rights of 
indigenous people over their traditional lands, forests and other natural resources. However, 
there are still many unresolved, contested issues between indigenous and non-indigenous 
settlers over rights to geo-ecological regions and community forestry resources (MFSC, 
2013). 
The study finds that indigenous people contribute more to protecting and managing 
community forests than other caste groups because of their geographical proximity. As a 
consequence, they are well represented on executive committees and heavily involved in 
community forestry processes in CFUGs in the Mid- Hills and High Mountain regions 
compared to the Terai Region. Many specific provisions focusing on the rights of indigenous 
people have been included in CF constitutions and operational plans.   These provide them 
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with extra access to resources and raw materials for traditional enterprises and include wild 
fibre for spinning and weaving free of cost or at a subsidised price. Furthermore, some CF 
funds are set aside for indigenous people, especially the poorest segments, for income 
generation activities to improve their livelihoods.  
However, overall the rate of representation of indigenous people in leadership positions in 
CFs is very low, especially in the Terai region. Generally, CFUGs provide benefits to 
indigenous people as a welfare provision rather than as a right. Despite enabling laws and 
rules that assume equal access to decision making, the reality at the local-level is different 
and indigenous participation remains low.  
 
8.3.4 LOW INCOME GROUPS 
 
CF governance has focused particularly on the relationship between decentralization and 
forest management in the past (Larson, 2002; Colfer and Capistrano, 2005). The relationships 
between decentralization, management and livelihoods have been poorly addressed in CF 
management (Tacconi, 2007). However, there is a clear trend in the literature towards 
viewing decentralised CF governance as enhancing the contribution forests can make to 
poverty reduction (Sunderlin et al., 2005). Many previous studies have identified the positive 
contribution of CF in the improvement of rural livelihoods and poverty alleviation (Brown et 
al., 2002; NPC, 2002). Nepal’s CF policy envisions using CF as a tool for poverty reduction 
by allocating CF income to targeted pro-poor programmes (PPP) or to members of low 
income groups.  
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This research finds that many of the CFUGs studied have initiated PPPs as income-
generating activities. These income generating activities include soft loans, skills-oriented 
training for small business, and scholarships for children of the poorest members. 
Consequently, poor users funded from microfinance are engaged in various income 
generation activities such as goat keeping, pig farming, paper plate making, rope making and 
yarn from wild fibre.  
Similarly, the empirical results of this study indicate that most of the study CFUGs have 
special provisions in their constitutions and operational plans to enhance the participation and 
improve access of poor CF users to community forestry products. These include the free 
supply of basic forest products (e.g., charcoal to blacksmiths and wild fibre to poorest 
entrepreneurs) and the provision of other forest products at subsidized prices. Some of the 
study CFUGs invite poor and disadvantaged people to participate in the pricing of forest 
products, while others have developed institutional arrangements that secure a fair 
distribution of benefits to the poorest community.  
However, the results of the study reveal that CFUGs in the Terai Region are relatively less 
generous in their support of the poorest CF members. These CFUGs have designed very 
limited programmes which allocate limited CF funds to PPPs instead of adopting prevailing 
rules and guidelines. The degree of ownership experienced by the poorest of the poor was 
found to be weaker as result of lack of proper inclusion and poor CFUG governance. 
Therefore, intervention and support from external agencies is important as a catalyst and 
plays a vital role in enhancing the livelihood of local people. 
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8.3.5 ELITE GROUP 
 
Community forestry has provided a venue for everyone including women, dalit, indigenous 
nationalities, disadvantaged groups and social elites to experience a form of democratic 
governance. This is important in a country that has undergone a decade-long civil unrest, 
leading to the absence of local government at the village and district levels. Because it is a 
grassroots level institution, CFUGs have become only the local institution for practising 
democracy during the conflict period. As a result, social elites have been attracted to CFUGs 
as they present an opportunity for community development and social leadership. 
Consequently, social elites often hold influential positions in executive committees and 
exercise control over CFUG resources. The empirical results of this research reveal that 
social elites have more access to CF positions and resources. Further, the research shows that 
democratic practice within CFUGs improved and became stronger than before with an 
increase in the inclusion of women and other social disadvantages groups. The new CF 
regulations and guidelines adopted inclusion provisions to reflect the greater awareness 
among women, dalit, indigenous nationalities and other disadvantaged members.  
The results of the research indicate that there are many positive outcomes in CF management 
as a result of the involvement and strong leadership from social elites. In spite of occupying 
most of the executive positions in Godawarikunda and Sitakunda, CFUGs that have been 
managed by higher caste groups since their inception, these two CFUGs possessed better 
governance outcomes. The perceptions of members from most of the disadvantaged groups 
which included women, dalit and indigenous nationalities was that they were fully satisfied 
by the work of the executive committee. The main reason for this successful governance 
outcome was the use of participatory and transparent decision making processes, which 
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resulted in fairness and equity as well as respect for a dedicated leadership group that was 
perceived to manage the CFUG impartially.  
On the other hand, elite occupy most CF executive positions and in some cases have been 
working to benefit their own groups. For example, Navadurga CFUG performs poorly across 
almost all 36 indicators used in this assessment of forest governance. The research finds that 
its Executive Committee works in isolation from the community and does not listen to users 
during the decision making process. The Executive Committee keeps most of decisions secret 
from general CF users out of a desire to favour elite groups. Monitoring by district forest 
offices and other stakeholders is very poor in these types of elite-dominated CFUG and a lack 
of awareness among general members regarding the rules and guidelines is one of the main 
reasons for poor governance. A number of other CFUGs such as Chhyarchhyare and Jhareni 
CFUGs of Dolakha District, also evidence poor CF governance even though they have more 
inclusive leadership with appropriate representation from diverse interest groups. In this case, 
it appears that the capacity of executive members in terms of managerial and networking 
skills was comparatively weaker than better performing CFUGs.  
The study concludes that experience in CF management and degree of institutional support is 
key elements that contribute to improved governance in CFUGs.  Elite control over 
leadership positions will decline over time as a consequence of growing awareness amongst 
the wider membership.  An awareness campaign targeted at general users and a capacity 
building programme targeting women, dalit and other disadvantaged users should be the 
main focus to improve community forestry processes and, ultimately, CF governance. 
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8.4 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION  
 
This research shows that a combination of qualitative and quantitative data has been useful in 
investigating the quality of CF. The quantitative method employed constructed and analysed 
data regarding users’ perceptions of governance across a large number of indicators 
supplemented with qualitative interview methods to provide greater understanding about 
internal CFUG governance dynamics.  
The study was conducted using a stratified, purposive sample of nine CFUGs located in three 
districts representing three ecological zones (Bryman, 2001; Patton, 2002). Detailed 
information was collective and interviews conducted in 135 sample households during a 
specific time period. While the sample was selected to be representative of the diversity of 
CFUGs in Nepal and varied by ecological zone, distance from capital, and composition of 
members, it is possible the empirical results may not reflect the full range of variation in the 
country the country because of small sample size and limited coverage of research area. It is 
recommended that a larger, follow-up study be undertaken based on the current methodology 
using a larger sample size of CFUGs and a wider geographical coverage to verify the current 
findings. 
The questionnaires employed for the in-depth interviews were translated into the Nepali 
language and the interviews were conducted in the local language. The translation of all the 
raw data from Nepali back into English was a time-consuming task. Before actually 
conducting the field survey, translated copies of questionnaires were tested in the field and, 
based on the results; a final set of questions was prepared. To ensure accuracy of translation 
from English to Nepali and back to English required a careful and repeated reading of the 
original interviews in order to interpret as accurately as possible what participants were 
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saying.  To minimise inter subjective differences, the researcher was personally involved in 
all the data collection over two time periods and translated the entire date sets. Developing in 
depth understanding of study locations and collected data, the researcher could ensure the 
data collected, transcribed and interpreted accurately and consistently as stipulated by the 
research. However, such an approach would not be possible in an extended project, which 
would require the development of protocols to manage a research team. 
 
8.5 MAIN SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
 
Much of the literature on 'governance' is consistent with the view that it strengthens the 
market and private sector at an expense of public and community institutions. The empirical 
evidence from this research challenges this notion and argues that governance can also 
strengthen community institutions such as CFUGs. 
This study fills a number of gaps in the literature on community forestry governance. The 
researcher reviewed and compared several models and frameworks used by international 
organisations such as World Bank and FAO and based on these approaches, synthesised a 
nationally applicable framework for assessing CF governance at the local level. Furthermore, 
a set of governance indicators was developed through a participatory process that involved a 
large number of stakeholders including CFUG members and policy makers; and then field 
tested in three ecological zones of Nepal. Finally, the study developed 36 indicators grouped 
under six elements and utilised them to assess the status of governance under each element.  
The CF governance framework developed in this study is likely to be applicable to other 
regions of Nepal and to other countries where CF management is in place. 
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The research also fills a gap in the literature regarding the role of external agencies and the 
impact of subsidies to the poor. In previous literature, the role of external agencies in general 
has highlighted a number of negative effects on CFUG governance at the local level. This 
research provides evidence that external agencies including governments, international and 
national NGOs, and donor agencies engaged in capacity building can have a positive impact 
on governance outcomes. With regard to the view that subsidies should be provided to poor 
and marginalised people as a general consideration, this research finds that subsidies are not 
necessary for a CFUG to be governed successfully, providing the programme is directed to 
the livelihood enhancement of poor people. However, transparency in resource use is a 
minimum condition of good CFUG governance. 
Another contribution made by this study is in the methodological approach used, which 
bridges a conceptual and methodological gap in previous studies. This research shows that a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data has been useful in the investigation of CF 
governance at the local level, while most of past studies have adopted only qualitative 
approaches. The quantitative methods used to construct and analyse data collected from 
individual interview regarding the presentation of status of governance through various 
indicators and qualitative methods provides greater understanding about the internal 
dynamics of governance in CFUGs. The conclusion is that employing only on qualitative 
methods is insufficient for a powerful analysis of CFUG governance, and the methodology 
adopted here will prove useful in further research in this sector. The methodology is not 
limited to the CF sector either, and could potentially be used to investigate the broader sector 
of natural resource management especially those programmes that employ a participatory 
approach. Contemporary literature on buffer zone community forests under protected areas 
management systems and participatory watershed management highlight the need for 
inclusive governance institutions. The methodology of this study could be adapted to 
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investigate whether and how these organisations perform in terms of participation, 
accountability and justice for the benefit of poor and disadvantaged groups. 
This study adds to the critical literature on participatory approaches to assessing governance 
in community forestry, a literature that emphasizes the need to shift the understanding of 
social transformation through CF development practices that local community would be key 
intervening actors in order to assist the poor and other disadvantaged groups. This study 
focuses on the community forestry sector in Nepal, but the central question of this study 
deserves attention in other natural resource management sectors and other contexts. A focus 
on power relationships between people could enhance the ability of governments and 
community-based institutions to produce positive governance outcomes. More studies of 
particular processes of inclusive governance in this sector would be a critical step towards 
drawing more lessons and expanding the understanding of governance and rural livelihoods. 
 
 
8.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Based on the above findings, this study draws some policy implications for planners and 
policy makers regarding better management of community forestry.  The study raised 
important concerns regarding the operation of decentralised forest governance at the local 
level. Evidently, a CFUG is a decentralised institution working at the local level and 
assessing its governance status through newly developed and clearly defined indicators has 
generated new insights with significant implications for governments, donors and other 
organisations supporting Nepal’s community forestry programme. These research findings 
can be utilised to improve national policy for assessing CFUG governance as well as to 
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develop new strategies to improve the operation of underperforming CFUGs. The study 
suggests that there is great potential to achieve more effective user participation in the 
governance of CFs. 
The study indicates that creating incentives to poor and marginalised people is not necessary 
and that instead policies should focus on enhancing their livelihood by changing the rules 
governing resource access and use. This policy should be pro poor and explicitly address the 
issue of power inequalities which has characteristically limited the participation and access of 
poor and marginalised group to resources and benefits from the practice of community 
forestry. The study suggests that one of the most effective policy measures to stimulate 
improved governance would be to strengthen poor and disadvantaged people’s rights to 
enable them to obtain fair access to resources. 
Based on the current experience of CF governance at the local level, the government should 
take measures to ensure greater participation of poor and disadvantaged groups in CF 
management. The concerned stakeholders—staff in District Forest Offices, civil society 
organisation and even donor agencies--should also consider inclusive governance even under 
the current policy framework. The policy should be targeted to the poor people to increase 
participation in each activity. The study stresses the need for a focus on securing greater 
deliberation within CF governance structures and decision-making process to enable poor and 
disadvantaged members to participate in resource and benefit distribution decisions and to 
enhance their participation in governance at the same time. The research also suggests that 
the widely shared mentality that external agencies exercise a negative impact on CF 
governance needs to be challenged. From this research, it is clear that external agencies such 
as government and non-governmental organisations as well as donor’ agencies are having a 
positive impact on CF governance and playing a significant role in building capacity and 
enhancing the capabilities of CF users and ultimately improving the governance of CFUGs. 
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8.7 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
 
In this study, 36 indicators were developed and tested in nine CFUGs of three ecological 
zones for assessing status of governance of community forestry at local level. To refine these 
indicators, further research is necessary in wider geographical and ecological settings in 
Nepal and other countries with similar approach of community forests management. In 
addition, the limited coverage of the current study-that is three out of 75 districts in Nepal 
means that there is an opportunity for a larger investigation into spatial variation of 
governance. The methodology also provides a means of assessing how governance 
arrangements are change over time, enabling regular assessments of CF governance progress.  
Repeated studies covering a wider area could enhance our understanding of local level 
governance and associated factors influencing it.  
Community forestry has shifted remarkably from its original aim of securing basic needs for 
forest products and environmental conservation to one that now focuses on sustainable 
livelihoods. In the future, the growing and often conflicting demands from different groups 
for ecosystem goods and services will pose severe challenges to effective CF governance 
(Agrawal et al., 2008). To manage this conflict, community and market actors need to have a 
greater role in enhancing good forest governance.   
This study was conducted in three ecological regions: High Mountain, Mid-Hills and Terai 
regions in Nepal. The community characteristics are different in the Terai Region where 
communities evidence a high degree of heterogeneity. Having a better access to roads, CFUG 
participants in the Terai Region access and use resources differently from those in the High 
Mountain and Mid-Hills regions, which poses problems in participation, transparency and 
accountability in CF management. A further, more detailed study of community forestry in 
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the Terai Region would provide a better understanding of the factors potentially leading to 
improved governance in Terai forests. 
The research shows that formal and informal linkages between CFUGs and other groups and 
local government institutions such as Village Development Committee (VDC) and District 
Development Committee (DDC) influence the governance of resource use and alter the 
access of poor and marginalised people. The Local Self Governance Act (1999) of Nepal 
confers on VDCs and DDCs the rights to manage the forests and related resources. Under this 
provision, forest officials and CFUGs are required to work closely with local government 
institutions to plan and implement forestry-related activities including community forestry. 
Such linkages between CFUGs and VDCs and their influence to CF governance could further 
be researched for empowerment of CFUG members, better coordination and synergies. 
Finally, while community forests have a potential to improve the livelihoods of the poor and 
disadvantaged people, more needs to be done to achieve this aim.  Good CF governance is a 
minimum condition for this to occur. It is therefore, vital to continue research on various 
dimensions of CF governance to gain further understanding of how CF institutions can be 
strengthened and the livelihoods of the poor improved.  
 
8.8 CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
 
Decentralised good forest governance has emerged to enable local communities and 
community forest users groups to better manage and utilise forests resources independently 
and with legitimate rights although the implementation of decentralization is not 
straightforward in many cases (see central hypothesis, Section 1.6). However, only a few 
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studies have systematically evaluated whether decentralisation actually generates good 
outcomes and the literature identifies many contradictions with CF governance at the local 
level. This research has addressed this gap in the literature and employed six elements 
(participation, accountability, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency and equity and fairness 
as pillars for good governance) to analyse the state of governance in decentralised, 
community forestry operations. More specifically this study has assessed community forest 
governance in Nepal at the local level and investigated how well current governance 
arrangements in CFUG are performing and whether they are meeting the expectations of 
local communities. To undertake this critical assessment of community forestry governance, 
36 locally applicable indicators were identified, developed and tested in three ecological 
zones of Nepal.  
As a result of this comprehensive study, the following broad conclusions can be reached: 
 Despite the high expectations of policy makers and donor communities decentralized 
forest policy may not achieve equal participation of local people and poor and 
margilalised people who may be either excluded from major decision makings 
processes or from actively participating.   
 The active role of civil society institutions (including NGOs and INGOs) is very 
important and they play a key role in various stages of CF process as well as assisting 
in conflict resolution. 
 In contrast to several reports that claim that Nepal’s CF programme is best 
implemented in the Mid-Hills region and is not suited to the Terai and High Mountain 
regions, this empirical study has demonstrated that geographic region is not a 
determining factor for good governance, which depends instead on a variety of other 
factors including users' interest, management capability and resource availability.  
 In addition, while the influence of external agencies is often perceived to be 
counterproductive to CF governance outcomes, the results of this research suggest 
that the greater the contribution of external agencies the better the governance 
outcomes as a result of synergy, interaction and cross-fertilization of knowledge 
between CFUG operators and other external stakeholders.  
 The study also identifies the need for governments to think through the consequences 
of regulation. Thus, despite CFUGs having rights over their forests, the recent ban on 
harvesting of trees in community forestry by the Nepali government has hindered the 
efficiency of operations and negatively impacted on the livelihoods of poor and 
marginalised peoples. 
 It is a basic assumption that CFs demonstrating good governance will provide 
subsidies to the poor and marginalized in terms of access to products and services. 
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However, the study shows that this is not necessary providing there is transparency in 
resource use and a focus on programmes to improve livelihoods. 
 A general conclusion of the study is that adequate consultation among different 
interest group enhances member participation and CF ownership. In contrast, a lack of 
consultation hinders overall participation and is a useful general indicator of poor CF 
governance.  
 The study indicates that the amount and type of conflict that occurs within CFs varies 
according to ecological zone. Thus, CFUGs of the Terai region had many conflicts 
and these significantly weakened performances across other governance indicators. 
This study also showed that the lower the conflict, the better were the governance outcomes. 
Likewise, timely resolution of conflict results in better performance on the broad range of 
governance indicators and signals more successful community forestry. 
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ANNEX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR HOUSEHOLD 
SURVEY  
 
Decentralised community-based forest governance in Nepal: comparative 
study of three ecological zones in Nepal 
 
Questionnaire for Interviews 
 
Household ID:    Date of Interview: 
Name of Interviewee:     Name of CFUG 
Address: District:    Village/Ward No:   
Start time: End time:   VDC/Municipality: 
Wealth-rank:  Rich     Medium     Poor  
Data checked by:     Data entry by: 
Part A: Household characteristics  
(A household comprises people living together in the same house) 
1. Gender of the Household Head (1 = Man, 2 = Woman)   
 
2. Age of the Household Head:  
 
3. Number of male members  
 
4. Number of female members  
 
5. Number of children (below 16 yrs of age) 
 
6. Which ethnic group do you belong to? (1 = Brahamin/Chhetri; 2 = Janajati; 3 = 
Dalit; 4= Madhesi; 5= Others) 
 
7. What are the major sources of household income? 
………………………………………………….……………..…….. 
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Part B: Inclusive Participation 
Do all interested members of CFUG have an opportunity to influence decision making?  (6 
indicators, maximum score 30, minimum score 6) 
8. What is your estimate of the percentage of women who participate in the general 
assembly of CFUG? 
80-100%        ,  
60 -80%  ,  
40- 60%  ,  
20-40%  ,  
0-20%    
 
What accounts for the observed level of participation by women? (e. g., if women are 
participating extensively, what is the incentives that encouraged them to participate? If 
women are not participating extensively, what factors are hindering them from taking part in 
the assembly?) 
 
 
 
Additional comments (if any): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. What is your estimate of the percentage of ethnic groups which participate in general 
assembly of CFUG?  
All ethnic groups in the CFUG  ,  
60 -80% of ethnic groups in CFUG  ,  
40- 60% of ethnic groups in CFUG  ,  
20-40% ethnic groups in the CFUG  ,  
0-20% ethnic groups in CFUG   
 
Why are they participating or why not in proportion to their population/representation in the 
community? 
 
327 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Additional comments (if any): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 
 
 
10. ‘Different interests (poor, women, dalit) are well mediated at the general assembly of 
CFUG.’ Indicate what extent you agree with this statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly disagree  
 
How difficult/easy is it to mediate the interests? 
 
 
Additional comments (if any): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 
11. What is your estimate of the percentage of women who participate in the executive 
committee of CFUG?  
50% or more  ,  
40-50%   ,  
30-40%  ,  
20-30%  ,  
<20%    
 
As per the recent community forestry guidelines, at least half of the executive members 
should be women. If it is less than 50% in this committee, what are the factors constraining 
the compliance of the guidelines? 
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Additional comments (if any): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 
 
12.  ‘Interest groups (poor, women, dalit) are consulted during constitution/management plan 
making and revision of CFUG.’ Indicate what extent you agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly disagree  
 
Can you provide an example of the ways used to consult with interest groups? 
 
 
Additional comments (if any): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 
 
13.  ‘All CFUG members are participated in collection of revenue as agreed by the Annual 
General Meeting (financial participation).’ Indicate what extent you agree with the 
statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you strongly agree, why do you think financial participation is necessary? 
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If you disagree, why do you think financial participation was not necessary? (e.g., ‘in kind’ 
contribution was enough for sustainable management of CF?) 
 
 
 
Part C: Transparency  
Is information about the community forest and how it is governed reasonably available to all 
CFUG members? (7 indicators, maximum score 35, minimum score 7) 
14.  ‘All CFUG information is freely available to CFUG members upon request.’ Indicate 
what extent you agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you disagree, can you provide an example of when and what kind of  information was not 
available?  
 
 
 
15.  ‘Decision-making process of CFUG regarding benefit sharing (use of forest products) is 
clear and transparent to all members.’ Indicate what extent you agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
 
How does the decision-making take place? (e. g. in-house discussion within committee? 
between the chairperson and secretary? the chairperson only?) 
 
 
 
 
16. Are annual reports of CFUG submitted to relevant agencies?  
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Submission of annual reports to General Assembly and DFO  ,  
Submission of annual reports to General Assembly only   ,  
Submission of annual reports to Executive Committee only   ,  
Annual report known by key officials only    ,   
No annual reporting       
 
 
If annual reports are not being submitted to relevant agencies, why do you think that is? 
 
 
 
17. Are required audits and reports other than the annual reports of CFUG submitted to the 
relevant agencies?  
Submission of audit reports to General Assembly and DFO ,  
Submission of audit reports to General Assembly  ,  
Submission of audit reports to Executive Committee  ,  
Audit report known by key official    ,  
No audit reporting       
 
 
If audits and reports (other than the annual report) are not being submitted to relevant 
agencies, why do you think that is? 
 
 
 
 
 
18.  ‘Information in the annual report and other reports is comprehensive.’ Indicate what 
extent you agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you think the information in reports is inadequate, can you provide an example?  
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19. To what extent is information of CFUF widely accessible to all its members?  
Publicly available    ,  
Available to elite groups   ,  
Committee members    ,  
Key official     , 
Only chairman and secretary    
 
If you think the information is not easily accessible to the CFUG members, can you provide 
an example?  
 
 
 
20. To what extent you agree or disagree that the information available is useful format to the 
CFUG members?  
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you think the information available to the CFUG members is in useful formats, can you 
provide an example?  
 
 
Part D: Accountability  
Are the key people and executive committee members accountable for their actions? (5 
indicators, maximum score 25, minimum score 5) 
21.  ‘The chairman and secretary are accountable to the CFUG.’ Indicate what extent you 
agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
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What do you mean by the accountability of position holders in executive committee? Why 
should they be accountable to whom? If you think they are less accountable than they should 
be, can you provide an example?  
 
 
 
 
22.  ‘The executive committee is accountable to CFUG members.’ Indicate what extent you 
agree with the following statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
What are the mechanisms to establish the accountability of executive committee to CFUG? 
(e. g., does it call CFUG assembly to take major decisions? Does the executive committee 
take it seriously and hold an emergency/immediate meeting if some CFUG members 
complain against some irregularities?).  
 
 
If you think the executive committee is not accountable to the CFUG, can you provide an 
example?  
 
 
 
23.  Indicate how strongly you agree with the following statement: ‘Office holders are 
accountable for their decisions’  
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you think office holders are not accountable for their decisions, why do you think that 
occurs? Can you provide an example of when such non-accountability occurred?   
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24.  ‘Decisions regarding CF management is entirely made by CFUG and not influenced by 
external agencies such as government agencies or NGOs/INGOS.’ Indicate what extent 
you agree with the statement.  
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you agree, what are the agencies that influence the committee more strongly than CFUG or 
its members? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25.  ‘The CFUG has clear goals and targets.’ Indicate what extent you agree with the 
statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you do not think the CFUG has clear goals and targets, can you provide an example?  
 
 
Part E: Effectiveness 
Are governance arrangements achieving the expressed objectives of CFUG members? (5 
indicators, maximum score 25, minimum score 5) 
26.  ‘The operational plan is appropriately structured to achieve expressed objectives.’ 
Indicate what extent you agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
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Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
 
If you think the operational plan is not written to achieve the expressed objectives of CFUG 
members, please explain why and provide an example.  
 
 
27.  ‘The constitution is appropriately structured to achieve the expressed objectives of 
CFUG.’ Indicate what extent you agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you think the constitution is not written to achieve the expressed objectives of CFUG 
members, please explain why and provide an example.  
 
 
 
28. Indicate how strongly you agree with the following statement: ‘The CFUGs objectives 
with regard to forest management have been accomplished’? 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you think the CFUG’s objectives are not being accomplished, please explain why and 
provide an example.  
 
 
29.  ‘Meeting decisions are implemented and enforced.’ Indicate what extent you agree with 
the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
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If you think the decisions of meetings are not being implemented and enforced, please 
explain why and provide an example.  
 
 
30. Please rate your perception of the CFUG’s dispute resolution process on a scale from 
highly participatory/consultative/win-win to coercive?  
Highly participatory/consultative/win-win  ,  
Participatory and consultative   ,  
Medium participatory and consultative  ,  
Low participatory and less consultative   ,  
Coercive        
 
Part F: Efficiency 
Does the governance structure of the CFUG minimise the waste of resources? (6 indicators, 
maximum score 30, minimum score 6) 
31. Do the financial benefits of the forest management overweight the costs? Financial 
benefits of forest management in relation to financial cost involved?  
Benefits considerably outweigh the costs involved  ,  
Benefits outweigh the cost      ,  
Benefits and costs are equal/ more or less same   ,  
Costs outweigh the benefits      ,  
Costs considerably outweigh the benefits    
 
If the financial costs of managing the CFUG outweigh the benefits, please explain why you 
think this is happening and provide an example.  
 
 
  
32. The right to harvest/collect forest products compensates CFUG members for their in-kind 
contributions?  
Very high level of right to harvest/collect forest products  ,  
High level of right to harvest/collect forest    ,  
Moderate         ,  
Low level of right to harvest/collect forest products   ,  
No right to harvest/collect forest products       
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33. Do you agree that the “CFUG apply the silvicultural system as per approved management 
plan? “ 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
 
If you strongly agree can you give an example of silvicultural system applied by the CFUG? 
Shelter wood system , Coppice system , Selection system  , Thinning only ,  
Pruning only              , Clearing only     , Silvicultural system not followed        ,   
 
 
34. How adequate is the silvicultral systems to deliver the objects of the CFUG?  
More than adequate     ,  
Adequate      ,  
Moderately adequate      , 
Less than adequate     ,  
Not adequate        
 
 
If you think inadequate can you explain why? And what will be sufficient to your opinion? 
 
 
 
 
35. Describe your view of the time management of meetings (including the general assembly)  
On time and very efficient  ,  
Good time management   ,   
Moderate time management  ,   
Low time management  ,   
Unmanaged time    
 
If meetings are poorly managed with regard to time, explain why you think that occurs.  
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36. Are the forest products from your CFUG sold at market prices or at a discount rate?  
Product sold at more than market price  ,  
Sold at equal to market price     , 
25% below market price     ,  
50% below market price     ,  
>50% below market price or given away for free   
 
 
If forest products are sold at a discount to the market price, why does that occur? Can you 
give an example? 
 
 
37. ‘My CFUG has an efficient system for collecting revenue (from the sale of forest 
products, fines for transgressions, etc).’ Indicate what extent you agree with the 
statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you view your CFUG’s system for collecting revenues as inefficient, what could be done to 
improve it? 
 
 
Part G: Fairness/equity   
Are the benefits and burdens of the community forest and associated management practices 
fairly distributed? (6 indicators, maximum score 30, minimum score 6) 
38. How is CFUG funds distributed?  
Benefit to wider community and special program for marginalised groups ,  
Benefit to wider community       ,  
Benefits to CFUG members only      ,  
Benefits to the selected groups only       ,  
Benefits to few people only        
If the benefits flow only to a particular group, why do you think this occurs?  
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Did you agree or disagree with the decisions that led to this distribution arrangement? (For 
example, if the money was invested in roads rather than drinking water, the benefits are 
captured by those households which have vehicles. In this case, the benefits are captured by 
the better-off at a cost of the worse-off) 
 
 
39. Does your CFUG offer subsidies and discounts on forest products to marginalized groups 
(poor, women-headed households and ethnic groups)? 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
 
If so, why are subsidies/discounts offered to these particular groups? 
 
 
 
40.  ‘My CFUG fairly shares the benefits from the forest.’ Indicate what extent you agree 
with the following statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
Describe how the benefits are shared in your CFUG? Are they ‘equally shared’? Or the poor 
and disadvantaged get more than the relatively better-off households? 
 
 
 
41.  ‘The time allocated for protection and management of the CFUG is equally shared.’ 
Indicate what extent you agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
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If you disagree, which group of people do you think contribute more to protection and 
management? 
 
42. ‘The rules and regulations are the same for all including the poor, dalit and women.’ 
Indicate what extent you agree with the statement. 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
 
If you agree that the regulations are the same for all, do you think this arrangement is 
equitable? If you disagree, do you think the rules are biased towards or against poor, dalit and 
women? Can you suggest how it can be made more equitable and just? 
 
 
 
43. Indicate how strongly you agree with the following statement: ‘The pricing system used 
in the CFUG is fair and equitable’? 
Strongly agree  ,  
Moderately agree ,  
Agree   ,  
Moderately disagree ,  
Strongly Disagree  
 
If you agree, why do you think it is fair? If you disagree, why do you think it is unfair? 
 
 
 
44. Are there any other comments you would like to make regarding the operation of your 
CFUG that are not addressed in the above questions and that you think are important?  
 
 
Thank you for your time and help. 
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ANNEX 2-1 INFORMATION SHEET FOR AN INDIVIDUAL 
HOUSEHOLD 
 
 
Project: Decentralised Community-Based Forest Governance in Nepal 
 
Information Sheet 
 
Interviews 
 
CFUG members and non-members 
 
1. Invitation to Participate 
You are cordially invited to participate in the research project entitled “Decentralised 
community-based forest governance in Nepal”. 
The researcher, Biddya Sigdel Baral, is a doctoral student of the School of Government, 
University of Tasmania, Australia. This research project is being conducted in order to fulfill 
one of the requirements for Doctor of Philosophy in natural resources governance. The 
researcher is doing her research under the supervision of  Dr. Fred Gale and Dr. Joanna 
Vince, School of Government, University of Tasmania.  
This research is open to participants who are NOT 
 Pregnant;  
 Under 18;  
 Involved in illegal activities; or 
 Cognitively impaired;  
 
2. What is the purpose of the research? 
This research compares and contrasts the forest resource management and governance system 
in 8 community forestry user groups from central and western Nepal. The research aims to 
investigate the relationship between forest governance, resource management and community 
outcomes in Nepalese Community Forest User Groups. 
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3. Why have I been invited to participate in this study 
You have been selected into this study because you live in one of the eight Community Forest 
User Group regions being investigated OR have other expertise in community-based forest 
governance. The 8 chosen CFUGs reflect a diversity of community forestry types in Nepal: 
Terai, Mid-hills and Mountains. CFUG members and non-members selected into this 
research represent a diversity of household types based on forest user group membership/non-
membership and socio-economic characteristics (male/female, rich/poor, ethnicity, etc).  
4. What does the study involve? 
The study involves voluntarily participating in an interview for approximately one (1) hour. 
The interview will employ a semi-structured questionnaire on such things as existing rules 
and regulations for forest management applied by your community forest user group, your 
participation in decision making and management, and access and benefits obtained. The 
interviewer will take notes during the interview and a transcript will be prepared. You will be 
given the opportunity to edit, retract, or add to any of the comments you have made. 
You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have 
the rights to: 
• decline to answer any particular question;  
• withdraw from the study at any time;  
• ask any questions about the study at any time during your participation;  
• provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used; 
• be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is concluded  
The information provided by you will be used for analysis and interpretation. A summary of 
findings, written in Nepali, will be sent to your Forest User Group in about September 2013. 
It is important that you understand that your involvement is this study is voluntary. While I 
sincerely hope you will participate, I respect your right to decline. There will be no 
consequences to you if you decide not to participate. If you decide to discontinue 
participation at any time, you may do so without providing an explanation. 
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In accordance with NS 3.4.1, participants are advised that while data may have uses unrelated 
to the research project, it will not be released for such uses. If you wish to withdraw from the 
project, all data recorded up to the date of withdrawal will be destroyed. 
 
5. Benefits from the study 
This is an academic study and no immediate benefits from participation are anticipated. The 
study will inform the theory and practice of community forestry generally and in Nepal, 
especially with regard to the relationship regarding community forestry governance, forest 
management and community benefits. These results may feed into community forestry policy 
in the medium to longer term. 
6. Photographs 
As part of the process of documenting the structure and operation of CFUGs, the researcher 
will take photographs which may include images of individuals. Individuals in these 
photographs may be identified to illustrate aspects of CFUG operations. If you wish, you may 
exclude your image from inclusion in any photographs when you sign the Consent Form for 
the project.  
7. Are there any possible risks from participating in the study? 
There are no specific risks anticipated with participation in this study. However, if you find 
that you are becoming distressed, I will arrange for you to see a counsellor at no expense to 
you.  
Interview transcripts and published results may be cited in reports and published articles. 
While every effort will be made to maintain anonymity, there is a slight risk that you could be 
identified from the character of your answers.  
Interview transcripts will be kept confidential to the researchers. A copy of the transcribed 
interview will be forwarded to you for review and correction. Once the transcribed has been 
corrected and finalised, the data will be stored in secure place in the university’s PhD 
student’s electronic data storage system. 
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In addition, you may be identified from photographs taken of CFUGs designed to illustrate 
their structure and operation. As noted above, you will be able to exclude your image from 
use in pictures by ticking the ‘No’ box when signing the project’s Consent Form.  
8. What if I have questions about this research? 
If you have any query with regard to this research, please contact me (Biddya Sigdel Baral) at 
the following addresses:  
 
Researcher: Biddya Sigdel Baral 
 
  In Australia: 
School of Government 
University of Tasmania 
Locked Bag 1340 
LAUNCESTON TAS 7250 
 
Tel. +61 3 93634754 
Email. Bsigdel@utas.edu.au   
 
 
In Nepal:  
C/O Dr Maheshore Dhakal,  
Under Secretary,  
Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Conservation,  
Babarmahal, Kathmandu, Nepal,  
Tel. +977 -9851142405,  
Email Maheshore.dhakal@gmail.com  
 
You can also contact my supervisor and project Chief Investigator, Dr Fred Gale at the 
following address 
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Chief Investigator: Dr. Fred P. Gale 
Senior Lecturer  
School of Government 
University of Tasmania 
Locked Bag 1340 
LAUNCESTON TAS 7250 
Tel. +61 (03) 6324 3376 
Fax. +61 (03) 
Email. Fred.gale@utas.edu.au  
 
Please note that this study has been reviewed and approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences 
Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of 
this study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on +61 
(03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the person 
nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote ethics reference 
number [H12757]. 
Thank you for your participation and support. 
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ANNEX 2-2 TELEPHONE CONTACT SHEET 
 
Title of Project: Decentralised Community Forest Governance in Nepal 
Telephone contact sheet 
 
The following approach will be used to recruit individuals into the interviews and focus 
groups 
 
Hello 
 
My name is Biddya Sigdel Baral and I am contacting you because you are a member of the 
[insert name of Community Forest User Group].  
 
I am undertaking this research as part of my doctoral studies at the University of Tasmania, 
Australia. My study focuses on how Community Forest User Groups in Nepal are governed 
and how governance arrangements influence the benefits receive by different social groups.  
  
You have been selected at random from a list of members of the [insert name of Community 
Forest User Group] to be invited to participate in a [focus group or interview].  
  
It would be very beneficial to my study if you were available to attend an [focus group or 
interview]. If you are, I will provide you with further information about the study and the 
[focus group or interview].  
 
If the participant is willing to consider being interviewed/participate in the focus group, the 
researcher will then provide details of the study from the information sheet and, if the 
participant is willing to participate, schedule an appointment.  
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ANNEX 2-3 PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: Decentralised Community Forest Governance in Nepal 
Consent Form 
Participant to read and sign 
1. I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
3. I confirm that I am not 
 Pregnant;  
 Under 18;  
 Involved in illegal activities; or 
 Cognitively impaired;  
4. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
5. I understand that the study involves the following procedures: interviews lasting 
approximately one hour on the subject of my organisation’s role in community 
forestry/decentralization and good forest governance.  
6. I agree to be photographed during the interview/focus group.  Yes   No   
7. I understand that I may be asked to participate in a follow up interview. 
8. I understand that the following risks are involved: low risks related to being misquoted and 
identified as the source of the comment. Such risks will be mitigated by (a) Circulating draft 
of interview/focus group manuscript for correction/elaboration; and (b) referencing your 
comments by sector, not by individual and by de-identifying interviewees by using 
letter/number system. 
9. I understand that all research data will be securely stored in the University’s secure storage 
system for five years from the publication of the study results, and will then be destroyed.   
10. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
11. I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that any information I 
supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of the research. 
12. I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot be identified as 
a participant.  
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13. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time 
without any effect.  
14. I understand that, once I have had an opportunity to correct the record, that the 
information provided by me cannot be withdrawn, but that amendments, elaboration and 
additional information may be provided. 
 
Participant’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
 
Statement by Investigator  
 I have explained the project and the implications of participation in it to this 
volunteer and I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the 
implications of participation. 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, 
the following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been 
provided so participants have had the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting 
to participate in this project. 
 
Investigator’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Investigator’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
